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Abstract
In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse outlines an account of virtue ethics and human
flourishing grounded in an understanding of human beings as emotionally complex, social,
and rational animals. These attributes give rise to a set of ends against which the goodness of
our behavioural, affective, and intellectual dispositions are measured, namely, 1) survival of
the individual, 2) continuance of the species, 3) characteristic enjoyment of pleasures (and
avoidance of pain), and 4) the good functioning of the social group.
I contend, however, that this picture is incomplete. More specifically, I outline the
psychological effects of prolonged solitary confinement to make the case that Hursthouse’s
model excludes an important and morally salient human attribute: relationality. Moreover, as
a result of this exclusion, Hursthouse’s model also leaves out an important end against which
to measure the goodness of character traits, namely, the granting of recognition.
Taking seriously the role of recognition in evaluations of goodness gives rise to a number of
virtues that are not normally foregrounded by virtue ethicists. I identify and discuss six of
these virtues of recognition. The first three are reflexivity, reflectivity, and attentiveness. I
characterize these three as “virtues of cognizing” insofar as they play a role in apprehending
(with reasonable accuracy) the ways others experience the world. The other three character
traits I offer as examples of virtues of recognition are epistemic temperance, deference
guided by humility, and a moralized notion of etiquette. I characterize these as virtues of
recognizing since they are involved in communicating to others our recognition of the
character of their experiences.

Keywords
Natural Goodness, Rosalind Hursthouse, neo-Aristotelian ethics, virtue ethics, natural
normativity, relationality, recognition, contemplation, solitary confinement, epistemic
injustice.

i

Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ ii
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1
1 The Natural Goodness Model: Twenty-first Century Neo-Aristotelian Ethical
Naturalism ...................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Foot’s Ethical Naturalism ....................................................................................... 2
1.2 Hursthouse’s Ethical Naturalism ............................................................................ 9
1.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 21
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 22
2 Revisiting Rationality: Sandler’s Challenge to Hursthouse ......................................... 22
2.1 The First Challenge: Varieties of Naturalism ....................................................... 23
2.2 The Second Challenge: Transhumanism .............................................................. 26
2.3 The Third Challenge: Three Proposals for Ends Corresponding to Rationality ... 28
2.4 Revisiting Hursthouse’s Candidates for Ends Corresponding to Rationality ....... 36
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 47
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 48
3 Relationality ................................................................................................................. 49
3.1 Social Animality ................................................................................................... 50
3.2 Solitary Confinement ............................................................................................ 65
3.3 Solitary Confinement and Minimal Sensory Stimulation ..................................... 81
3.4 Solitary Confinement and Forced Incarceration ................................................... 84
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 85
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 88
4 Recognition I: From Relationality to Recognition ....................................................... 88
4.1 Recognition ........................................................................................................... 89
ii

4.2 Recognition and Relational Harms ....................................................................... 92
4.3 Apprehending, Cognizing, and Recognizing ...................................................... 101
4.4 Heading Some Objections Off at the Pass .......................................................... 107
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 114
5 Recognition II: The Virtues of Cognizing ................................................................. 114
5.1 Testimony ........................................................................................................... 115
5.2 The Social Imaginary .......................................................................................... 120
5.3 Differentiating the Virtues of Epistemic Justice ................................................. 125
5.4 Summary of the Virtues of Cognizing ................................................................ 127
Chapter 6 ......................................................................................................................... 129
6 Recognition III: The Virtues of Recognizing............................................................. 129
6.1 Simple Ignorance and Epistemophilia ................................................................ 130
6.2 Etiquette as Virtue............................................................................................... 144
6.3 Summary of the Virtues of Recognizing ............................................................ 148
6.4 Conclusion: The Virtues of Recognition and a New Model for the Old Structure
............................................................................................................................. 149
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 152
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 158

iii

1

Chapter 1

1

The Natural Goodness Model: Twenty-first Century
Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism

In this chapter, I lay the theoretical groundwork for my project of formulating a relational
account of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics based on the natural goodness model of virtue. I
begin, in Section 1, by considering the first explicit formulation of this theory, found in
the late works of Philippa Foot, especially its final articulation in 2001’s Natural
Goodness. One distinctive feature of Foot's account of natural goodness is that, following
Elizabeth Anscombe, she makes the concepts of basic human needs and practical
rationality central to her moral theory. I will attempt to shed light on the rationale for her
appeal to basic needs rather than a more comprehensive picture of human nature, as
Aristotelian naturalism would seem to warrant. In Section 2, I summarize and defend the
adoption of Hursthouse's account of natural goodness in On Virtue Ethics. Hursthouse's
model is an elaboration on Foot's and departs from hers mainly in grounding our
evaluation of the virtues in a more elaborate conception of human nature.1
Defending Hursthouse's elaboration of natural goodness will open up space to further
complicate it, as I will in subsequent chapters. Beginning in Chapter Two, I will argue
that there are certain ends against which we can evaluate the goodness of individual
character traits that can be derived from the fact that humans are rational beings. In
Chapter Three, I argue that there is an important aspect of human nature that isn’t
represented in Hursthouse’s focus on human beings as emotionally complex, social, and
rational animals, namely, the fact of human relationality. Armed with a fuller conception

1

I confess to a slightly loose and ahistorical use of the term “human nature.” It is a concept that has a
storied and checkered history and much has accrued to it along the way. I don’t mean to adopt all of its
baggage with my usage, but I find it a difficult term to do without. Something like “human function”—a
term I may avail myself to from time to time—is also close to the mark but is similarly burdened. For one
thing, I don’t mean anything so narrow as Aristotle did (I have no interest in picking out the one
characteristic that is going to serve as the human function). For another, I by no means wish to endorse the
distinction he drew between the characteristic functions of men and women. And yet, I have struggled but
not found any suitable terminological substitute. So, I will employ the language “as is” and hope that my
intended meaning takes clear shape as the reader progresses through these chapters.
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of human nature, I turn, in the last three chapters, to the task of roughly sketching what
the natural goodness model (its Hursthousean variant, at any rate) entails once we factor
in relationality. In Chapter Four, I make the case that the goodness of character traits of
relational beings like ourselves should be evaluated in light of how conducive they are to
securing recognition of others. It would, however, be a pity to leave things at such a very
abstract level, so I devote the final two chapters of this thesis to outlining some of the
particular virtues that correspond to our need for recognition, tackling what I call the
virtues of cognizing in Chapter Five and those of recognizing in Chapter Six.

1.1 Foot’s Ethical Naturalism
Foot's account of ethical naturalism begins from the observation that judgments that
attribute goodness to any object fall under two broad categories. There is, first, a "natural
goodness" that can only be appropriately attributed to living things and, second, a
"secondary goodness" that is a derivative of natural goodness and can also apply to
inanimate objects. Natural goodness is attributed to individual living things—either to
whole, individual beings or to their parts, characteristics, and operations—when they are
evaluated in light of their relation to some features of the species of which they are a
member. Secondary goodness, on the other hand, is derivative, since it is ascribed to
individual things on the basis of their relation either to some living thing or, if it is itself a
living thing, to some member of a species other than its own. The derivative nature of this
secondary goodness is most evident in the case of artifacts, which are only good insofar
as they serve the interests of the animals that make use of them. It is also, perhaps, still
rather clear when it comes to non-living natural objects. Good soil, after all, is judged as
good only in relation to some living thing. It might be, for instance, good as a source of
nutrients for the basil growing on my windowsill or good as terrain for cycling, but it
would be rather odd to speak of the soil as being intrinsically good, independent of its
relation to any living being. Finally, while living beings can possess natural goodness, we
still ascribe secondary goodness to them whenever we evaluate them in light of some
species other than their own. To use one of Foot's examples, we ascribe natural goodness
to a horse by evaluating it in relation to its species, but we can also ascribe secondary
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goodness to it by judging it well suited to "carry us as we want to be carried."2 There is,
in other words, a difference between a good horse (simpliciter) and a horse that is good
for riding or that serves as a good muse for poetry.
To better understand the role that the concept of species plays in ascribing goodness to
living beings, it is important to arm ourselves with a few concepts defined by Michael
Thompson, whose work heavily influenced Foot’s. In "The Representation of Life,"
Thompson discusses what he calls "natural-historical judgements," which are specieslevel claims, the sort found in works of natural history, such as Aristotle's History of
Animals, and in "the voice-overs on public television nature programmes."3 They are
characteristically expressed in what Thompson calls "Aristotelian categoricals"—
sentences with the structure "The S is (or has, or does) F," where "S" stands in for a term
that designates a particular species, as in the sentences "The American black bear
hibernates during the winter season" and "The beaver builds dams." It is important to
note that while these types of sentences express some general truth about a species, they
are not simply statistical claims. The statements above about beavers and American black
bears might well be statistically true—perhaps there are no American black bears who
abstain from hibernation or beavers who do not build dams, at least among those that live
through the characteristic life span of their species—but the statistical truth of
Aristotelian categoricals are only incidental. Elizabeth Anscombe highlights this fact in
"Modern Moral Philosophy" by pointing out that the statement that adult human beings
have thirty-two teeth is true despite the fact that the average number of teeth possessed by
adult human beings is certain not to be so high.4 The whole of what these natural history
judgments and their expressions in Aristotelian categoricals capture about a species is
what Thompson calls that species' life-form. Life-forms, then, consist of the whole set of
characteristics and behaviours that can rightly be ascribed to living things at the level of
the species, rather than at the level of individuals.

2 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 26.
3 Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life" (1998), p. 280.
4 G.E.M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958), p. 14.
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There is, for Thompson, a certain normative upshot to this analysis. Having this concept
of species life-form at hand allows us to go beyond judgments that ascribe goodness to
members of the non-human living world solely on the basis of human interests or even
the interests of members of other species—what Foot calls secondary goodness—and
enables us to ascribe natural goodness to individual living things, a goodness of
individuals in their own right, independent of the interests of members of any species
other than their own. These evaluations begin by placing the individual within the wider
context of the life-form of its species and then ascribing to it a "natural defect" insofar as
its characteristics, parts, or operations do not correspond to those of the life-form (and,
conversely, a "natural goodness" to the extent that they do). Drawing on the structure of
Aristotelian categoricals, Thompson summarizes the normative inference as follows:
"From 'The S is F' and 'This S is not F' [we] infer 'This S is defective in that it is not F'."5
One striking consequence of accepting this model of ascriptions of goodness (and defect)
to individual living things, and the one that animates Foot, is that it can be applied to the
goodness of human beings. Rather than requiring some entirely sui generis form of
evaluation to account for and evaluate human goodness, including all we would place in
the category of moral goodness, Thompson's analysis shows us that we can employ
judgments that have the same underlying structure as those used in evaluations of
goodness across all animal and plant species. Vices, in other words, are fundamentally
types of natural defect.6
Foot adopts Thompson's account of natural goodness and defect but points out that an
important distinction is missing from it—perhaps not surprisingly, given that Thompson
himself describes his brief, two-page treatment as "a few unguarded remarks on concepts

5 Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life" (1998), p. 295.
6 The Aristotelian ethical naturalists' penchant for discussions not only of human defects but human defects
as the basis of negative moral evaluations should strike every reader as jarring and unsavory, at least at first
glance. The worry that the entire theory is ableist arises even at this preliminary stage and it is not clear that
Thompson, Foot, and Hursthouse are sensitive to this problem. At least, none of them attempt to answer the
charge. I will set this problem aside for the moment, but will address it in a later chapter, once I have
defended some claims about human relationality.
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of good."7 As Foot notes, not just any natural-history judgment will be relevant to the
evaluation of the natural goodness of a living being, but only those that concern the
aspects of an individual that are teleologically related to its development, selfmaintenance, and reproduction. Foot illustrates this by drawing a distinction between the
colouring of the peacock's tail feathers and the patch of blue feathers on the head of a
blue tit.8 Both of these features can be captured by an Aristotelian categorical, but only
the former can be captured by an Aristotelian categorical that admits of a teleological or
functional qualifier.9 We do not, in other words, have to simply say that "The peacock
has a brightly coloured tail;" we can go further and add that "The peacock has a brightly
coloured tail in order to attract a mate." No such teleological qualifier is appropriate in
the case of the blue tit's blue patch, assuming, as Foot does, that the patch’s presence or
absence has no consequence for its development, survival, or reproduction.
Since both are features characteristic of a species that can be formulated as Aristotelian
categoricals, the presence of a characteristic pattern of colour in the feathers of the
peacock and the blue tit bear a superficial similarity. But the fact that only the peacock's
colouring plays a role in reproduction makes the two patterns significantly different when
it comes to evaluations of goodness. The absence of the characteristic colouring on the
peacock's tail will have an impact on its reproductive life since it will be less likely to
successfully engage in mating rituals with peahen. This absence, then, counts as a natural
defect, since it does not live up to the life-form of the peafowl. The absence of the
characteristic blue patch on the blue tit’s head, on the other hand, is rather
inconsequential. We might say, then, that the absence of the blue patch makes a blue tit
merely atypical—an anomalous or abnormal member of its species, perhaps, but not a
defective one. Likewise, the presence of the characteristic colouring makes it a typical
member of its species but it is far too incidental a feature to serve as the basis for a
judgment that the individual that possesses it is a good member of its species. We may, at

7 Michael Thompson, "The Representation of Life" (1998), p. 295.
8 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), pp. 30-31.
9 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 31.
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most, ascribe to it, and to any non-teleological characteristic, a goodness dependent on
the interests of members of other species. If the absence of the blue patch compromises
the goodness of the blue tit at all, it will only compromise some secondary goodness—
say, if the discoloured patch offends the aesthetic sensibilities of a birdwatcher or does
not make the atypical blue tit a good prey for some predator that relies on the blue
colouring to track it.
Like Thompson, Foot extends the analysis of natural goodness to human beings. This is
not to say that Foot denies that there is a realm of specifically moral evaluations that
applies only to rational beings. She holds that "[t]here is nothing wrong with using the
word 'moral' as Mill does,"10 namely, to denote a contrast with prudential considerations.
Morality, on this definition, would simply designate the realm of voluntary human
actions that have other individuals or societies as their objects, particularly those that
involve "special relationships... for example, that of having rights, obligations, or
duties."11 However, despite being a realm of evaluation that is unique to human beings,
Foot denies that evaluations of moral goodness require us to abandon or transcend the
model of natural normativity in favour of some special form of evaluation. In other
words, although human rationality is sui generis, moral evaluations are grounded in the
same underlying theoretical structure that explains not only the goodness of prudential
behaviour but also the goodness of non-rational, living beings. The evaluation of human
beings, as is the case with members of other species, involves assessing the parts and
operations of individuals that are relevant to their survival and reproduction against the
background of the life-form of the species. As rational beings, humans characteristically
achieve the end of survival and reproduction by means of practical reason. A human that
fails to reason well, then, is not a good human being, or is, in Foot's terminology, a
defective one. There is, for Foot, a very close relation between evaluations of rationality
and those of morality. In fact, she goes so far as to state—"baldly," as she puts it—that

10 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 68.
11 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 69.
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"there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of
the will"12 so that "goodness... set[s] a necessary condition of practical rationality."13
The connection between moral goodness and practical rationality originates from Foot's
realization that her early work, especially "Morality as a System of Hypothetical
Imperatives," was founded on two mistaken assumptions.14 The first is that, being
beholden to a Humean account of action, she assumed that the motivation for any action
requires that the agent has some desire to engage in that action. In her later work,
however, she argues that some actions can be motivated entirely by the recognition of
reasons, "based on facts and concepts, not on some prior attitude [or] feeling."15 The
second mistake was to begin her inquiries into the rationality of morality by first
postulating an account of practical reason independent of morality, one that understands
practical rationality "to be self-interested action,"16 and only then attempting to explain
moral actions on the basis of it. Foot's approach in her later works is to "turn the problem
on its head: to start out not from a theory of practical rationality but from the idea that
justice is a virtue."17 Having discarded the notion that practical rationality must be selfinterested and based on the desires of the agent, Foot holds that it is irrational not to act in
accordance with the virtues since doing so means failing to recognize an appropriate
reason for action.
Just what Foot means by this becomes clearer in the final chapter of Natural Goodness,
where she formulates a response to Nietzsche and other immoralists. Those whom Foot
classifies as immoralists are not moral skeptics who deny the truth of any and all moral

12 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 11.
13 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 63.
14 Late in her career, Foot described herself as having, in that article, "made such a mess of things"
("Rationality and Virtue" [2002], p. 169) and having "made a rotten job" of explaining why it is rational to
follow the rules of morality but not "silly rules of etiquette" ("Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a
Mistake?" [2002], p. 200).
15 Philippa Foot, "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" (2002), p. 206.
16 Philippa Foot, "Rationality and Virtue" (2002), p. 160.
17 Philippa Foot, "Rationality and Virtue" (2002), p. 160.
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claims. Rather, they are purveyors of rival moral theories or outlooks that value what are
ordinarily considered vices.18 Nietzsche's subversion of commonly held values and
Thrasymachus's praise of injustice can serve as exemplars of immoralism. Against such
immoralists, Foot points out that human life must be "lived according to norms that are
known and taken as patterns by those whose norms they are," and that these norms must
not be those of a Nietzschean Übermensch or of one who equates goodness with power,
as Thrasymachus19 does, but "must largely be formulated in terms of the prohibition of
actions such as murder and theft."20 This is due to the fact that human life requires at
least some confidence that "a stranger [who] should come on us when we are sleeping...
will not think it all right to kill us or appropriate the tools that we need for the next day's
work."21 Considerations such as these point to a basic conception of human needs, one
that is sure to be widely shared and unlikely to rouse much controversy, except, perhaps,
for the needs it excludes rather than those it includes. From these basic needs we can then
derive a "broad vision of the virtues"22 by identifying the dispositions that humans must
possess if they are to meet these needs. This focus on basic needs provides Foot with a
close connection between morality and rationality, since failing to recognize or act upon
considerations of basic human needs is to act in a way that is both immoral and irrational.
Considerations of our basic needs, however, seem a bit too thin for a theory of human
goodness. It is not unreasonable to want to extend our thinking about morality beyond
our most basic needs, or to want to get something more precise and detailed than a "broad
vision" of virtue. There are indications that Foot has a richer picture of moral life than her

18 This should be no surprise; as Richard Hamilton puts it, Aristotelian ethical naturalism has no aspiration
to convert moral skeptics since "[v]irtue only speaks to someone immersed in an ethical life" ("Naturalistic
Virtue Ethics and the New Biology" [2014], p. 46). We should not expect Foot, then, to engage seriously
with such skeptics.
19 Of course, Thrasymachus equates, at least to some extent, what he considers the appropriate use of
power with injustice. I do not, however, mean to imply by my use of "goodness" that Thrasymachus
endorses any traditional list of virtues but that his favorable evaluations are reserved for those who succeed
in exercising power unjustly.
20 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 114.
21 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 114.
22 John Hacker-Wright, "What Is Natural About Foot's Ethical Naturalism?" (2009), p. 321.
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theory might suggest, at least on its surface. This richer picture shows up, for instance, in
her comment that "human beings... need powers of imagination that allow them to
understand stories, to join songs and dances—and to laugh at jokes."23 She does not,
however, provide much elaboration on these suggestive comments and the reader who
wishes to fill in the gaps is left to draw inferences on their own.
It is likely the case that this non-elaboration of the richer picture of moral life is not an
omission on Foot's part but the result of her holding a somewhat conservative view about
the role of theorizing in moral matters. Theory may demonstrate a link between
normativity and human needs or function, but fleshing this out might lie beyond its
purview. Grasping the relevant human needs and understanding which virtues would
adequately meet them may be, in Foot’s view, something that philosophy has little to tell
us about and that, instead, we must hope that we, like Aristotle's intended audience for
the Nicomachean Ethics, have lived in such a way that our experiences have furnished us
with a vague but accurate understanding of human nature and the virtues.24 On this
reading, then, much of Foot's account remains suggestive because it points to something
that is to be grasped by practical reason rather than articulated by moral theory.25

1.2 Hursthouse’s Ethical Naturalism
1.2.a: Hursthouse’s Functions Model

23 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 43.
24 Aristotle states that the lectures that are recorded in the Nicomachean Ethics are, along with any other
"lectures on political science," intended only for those who are experienced in, and hence good judges of,
"the actions that occur in life" (1094b28-1095a4. This and all subsequent citations of the Nicomachean
Ethics are from the W.D. Ross translation).
25 I owe this interpretation, in part, to a comment made by John Hacker-Wright about the role of practical
reason in Foot's late works (personal communication). It is, moreover, in keeping with Foot's career-long
attempts to convert the immoralists and subjectivists. Decades spent sparring with recalcitrant interlocutors
may very well have left Foot to concur with Alan Gettner's assessment that "The very fact that [moral]
theory must be adjusted to prior moral conviction and not vice versa... suggests the moral priority of
considered convictions over the general principles of moral theory," leaving moral theory with a value that
"is only theoretical" ("Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" [1976], p. 243). This pessimism about
theory is, at the very least, compatible with Foot's conservative view that moral philosophy can defend the
claim that human beings need the virtues, but any adjustment to moral convictions beyond this very basic
one will have to be performed by other means.
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Hursthouse's account of virtue theory in On Virtue Ethics takes Foot's natural goodness
model as its starting point. Hursthouse, however, sees the model as somewhat limited and
elaborates it by identifying aspects of species function other than their parts and
operations, along with ends or needs other than the most basic ones of survival and
reproduction. Indeed, Hursthouse restricts the application of Foot's basic needs model of
natural goodness to plant species. In the case of plants, evaluations of natural goodness
involve nothing more than judging how conducive their parts and operations are to the
individual plant’s survival and the continuance of its species. But evaluations of
animals—or, at any rate, some animals; sponges, barnacles, and the like26 might be
evaluated in the same manner as plants—requires a larger set of considerations. At "some
indeterminate point,"27 the adequate evaluation of an individual animal must take into
account the fact that it does things in ways that plants cannot. As such, we must evaluate
whether their actions as well as their operations contribute to the ends of survival and
reproduction.
It is not immediately clear that this first step in elaborating on Foot's model of natural
normativity is significant. After all, Foot includes actions as part of an individual's
operations. By specifying action as an aspect of species function, then, Hursthouse seems
to be drawing a distinction only to emphasize a nuance that Foot has not spelled out in
detail but does, nevertheless, recognize. Hursthouse characterizes the move from
operations to actions as one that involves greater complexity. As she notes, in order to
survive, plants need to passively absorb nutrition, but for many animals this is a far more
complex process, involving not only absorption and digestion but also certain perceptual

26 There is, perhaps, a different taxonomy at play in Aristotelian naturalism. The line that divides plants
from animals might not be the same as the one employed in the life sciences. That is to say, it might be that
for the purposes of natural normativity anything that can only be evaluated by considering its parts and
operations and their relation to survival and reproduction counts as a plant, while anything that is evaluated
according to more complex criteria counts as an animal. Although this departs from existing biological
classifications and the way the terms "plant" and "animal" are commonly applied, I don't think the
suggestion is absurd. After all, it makes sense to think of sponges in the context of ethical reasoning as
being "like a plant". However, I won't pursue the matter in the context of this paper, although it would
allow me to avoid the occasional bulky qualifier (e.g. "plants and members of simple animal species").
Given that where the line is drawn is likely to be a merely terminological point—at any rate, one that I do
not think makes any non-rhetorical difference—I will employ the ordinary uses of the terms.
27 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 199.
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capabilities, locomotion, and the good functioning of claws, arms, jaws, or whatever
other characteristic physical apparatus is employed in the gathering and consumption of
food. Likewise, most animal species contribute to the continuance of their species in a
way that "involves a great deal more than just, so to speak, the scattering of seeds,"28 and
includes activities such as engaging in mating rituals, laying and protecting eggs, and
gathering food for their offspring. There is, to be sure, a degree of complexity that is not
found in the species that Hursthouse characterizes as living by operations alone. And
there are, indeed, rather significant and evident differences between romaine lettuce
photosynthesizing and a hawk swooping to capture a field mouse, and these differences
might seem, at least intuitively, to be the kinds of things that require different models of
evaluation. However, despite these differences, it is not clear that distinguishing them has
any serious theoretical implications for the basic structure of natural normativity. After
all, it is difficult to see what theoretical changes would result from abandoning Foot's
claim that the operations (understood as including actions) of animals are to be evaluated
in light of their contribution to survival and reproduction in favour of Hursthouse's claim
that the operations (understood as excluding actions) and actions of animals are to be
evaluated in light of such contributions.
Hursthouse's next addition to Foot's model, however, does have clear theoretical
implications. Animals whose psychology is complex enough that they are able to
experience pleasure and pain are to be evaluated by a third end, beyond the ends of
survival and the continuance of the species. This third end is "characteristic freedom from
pain and characteristic pleasure or enjoyment."29 As Hursthouse emphasizes, the qualifier
that the only pains and pleasures that are relevant here are those characteristic to the
species is important. This is not, as Hursthouse calls it, a "utilitarian [approach] to animal
suffering"30 that counts each instance of pleasure as a good and each experience of pain
as a defect, but one that is derived from considerations of the life form of the species. As

28 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 199.
29 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 199.
30 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 200.
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she notes, a dog that is insensible to pain is not a better dog than the members of its
species who do experience pain in the usual manner. In fact, far from being better, since
the experience of pain often functions as a survival mechanism, the insensible dog would
count as having a natural defect. Similarly, an animal does not count as defective because
it experiences pain while giving birth, so long as the degree of pain is within the range
that is characteristic of its species.
The psychological complexity that allows for the experience of pleasure and pain also
tends to be paired with another aspect of animal function, namely, emotions and desires.
As Hursthouse points out, animals of sufficient psychological complexity may well have
the parts, operations, and abilities that make them well-suited to, say, find and consume
adequate sources of nourishment, but would still count as defective if they did not want to
nourish themselves. Likewise, individuals who do not fear their natural predators, or who
are terrified of their natural prey, may count as defective for not "feel[ing] fear in the
right way,"31 that is, in the way characteristic of their species.
Hursthouse posits a fourth end that comes into play when we evaluate the natural
goodness of animals who are not only affective but also social, namely, "the good
functioning of the social group."32 As Hursthouse points out, this end is relevant
primarily to the evaluation of actions, emotions, and desires, going so far as to confess
that she "do[es] not know enough animal physiology to be sure of any examples of their
parts being evaluated with respect to this fourth end."33 The good functioning of the
social group is characterized by Hursthouse in terms of the other three ends she has
already identified. A social group that functions well is one that enables its members to
live well by "foster[ing] their characteristic individual survival, their characteristic
contribution to the continuance of the species and their characteristic freedom from pain
and enjoyment of such things as is characteristic for their species to enjoy."34 The traits

31 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 200.
32 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 201.
33 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 201.
34 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 201.
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of social animals, then, can be defective insofar as they tend to impede the functioning of
their social groups, either by behaving in an antagonistic or abusive fashion or simply by
failing to participate in the activities that allow the social group to flourish or contribute
to the proper development of its members. What these defects are and the specific ways
in which they manifest themselves will, as is the case with every type of defect, vary
across species, but they can involve, to use Hursthouse's examples, not participating in
the pack's hunts, not grooming others, or refusing to engage in play.
For social animals, then, assessing the natural goodness involves evaluating an
individual’s parts, operations, actions, and desires and emotions in light of their role in
achieving the ends of survival, continuance of the species, freedom from pain and
enjoyment of pleasure, and the good functioning of the social group. Social animals are,
as Hursthouse puts it, the most sophisticated of the non-human species—or, perhaps, of
the non-rational ones, if we wish to ascribe rationality to great apes, dolphins, pinnipeds,
and other species. They are not, however, the pinnacle of sophistication, a title reserved
for rational beings. We might expect, then, that there would be an increase in the
sophistication of the model of natural normativity corresponding with the increased
sophistication of the function of the species, in the same way that new ends were added,
first when psychologically complex animals were the objects of evaluation and, second,
when consideration turned to social animals. Hursthouse, however, denies that rational
beings are evaluated by a more sophisticated model than the one employed in the
evaluation of social animals. She raises and hastily dismisses two traditional candidates
for a fifth end, specific to rational beings: the preparation of the soul for the afterlife and
contemplation.35 The first of these she takes to be implausible because "to adopt [it]... is
to go beyond naturalism towards supernaturalism."36 As for the second, she simply states
that "even philosophers have baulked at following Aristotle and endorsing [it]."37

35 In the next chapter, I will consider Hursthouse's objections to these in more detail, but for now, in the
interest of providing a summary not too cluttered with evaluative digressions, I will simply state them.
36 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 218.
37 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 218.
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Despite her denial that there are any plausible ends corresponding to rationality,
Hursthouse does hold that moving from the evaluation of the natural goodness of social
animals to that of animals that are also rational marks a change in the structure of the
evaluation. Simply put, the evaluation of rational animals must take into account the fact
that their "characteristic way of going on... is a rational way," that is, "any way that [they]
can rightly see as good, as something [they] have reason to do."38 This seemingly
unassuming statement is in fact rather significant, since it ushers in two important
changes to natural normativity, one that has to do with our methods of evaluation and the
other with the prevalence of natural goodness and defect within the species. When it
comes to non-rational species, the evaluative methods we employ are somewhat
straightforward; merely collecting physiological information about its members along
with ethological facts about their behaviour is sufficient to paint an adequate picture of
the characteristic features of those species. Rationality, however, complicates naturalistic
evaluation and frustrates any hope of such simple evidence-gathering, since those who
possess it do not live lives entirely constrained by nature and biological instinct but can
"contemplate alternatives and decide to change things."39 What it means to be a good
human being and to live well, then, cannot entirely be illuminated by ethological findings
about the way human beings typically and ordinarily behave and organize their lives
since "we have room for the idea that we might be able to be and to live better."40
The freedom brought about by rationality entails another, related break in evaluations of
natural goodness. Hursthouse notes that the things that are characteristic of non-rational
species may well not be merely statistical—recall the claim by Anscombe, related above,
about the number of teeth humans have—but, nevertheless, in most, or at least many,
instances it will be the case that the behavior of the majority of the members of a species
conforms to what is characteristic of it. In other words, we can expect that what is
characteristic of a species is also typical of its members. Consequently, natural defects,

38 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 222.
39 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 220.
40 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), pp. 221-222. Italics in original.
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while not exactly rare—we can expect to find them in any fairly large population—are
still likely to be less common than natural goodness. It is true that this is not always the
case and that we must sometimes resort to something more normative than mere
empirical observation to identify the characteristic behaviour of a species. We could, for
instance, find a species that is near extinction and almost all of its members dwell in
some form of captivity. If there is a discrepancy in behaviour between those members of
the species who are captive and those who are free-living,41 we would surely think that
the best way to understand what sort of behavior is characteristic of the species is to
observe the behaviour of the minority who dwell in their natural habitat, rather than that
of the majority living in captivity. It would seem rather misguided, after all, to judge such
a species as one that characteristically does not mate because its members are reluctant to
do so while housed in zoos. There would be something amiss in the behaviour of those
living in captivity and we could point to the behaviour of the free-living members of the
species to bolster that fact. Still, there is a nagging sense that, despite this conceptual
possibility, it is almost always the case that the behaviour of the majority of the members
of a species will be in conformity with what is characteristic of that species. This is not,
however, the case with human beings.42 Far from being typical, it is uncommon for
"human beings [to] do what it is 'characteristic' of human beings to do."43 That the
characteristically human way of behaving is not typical of humans means that we cannot,
as is usually the case with non-rational beings, simply look at how we live in order to
understand what it is for us to live well, nor can we account for the discrepancy between

41 I use "free-living" instead of "wild" in keeping with the language policy recommended by Andrew
Linzey and Priscilla N. Cohn in their editorial for the inaugural issue of the Journal of Animal Ethics
("From the Editors: Terms of Discourse", Journal of Animal Ethics 1:1 [2011]). Linzey and Cohn
characterize the word "wild", along with other terms and idioms, as derogatory and "saturated with the
prejudgments of the past" (ix), and caution that using such language "has major implications for how we
conceptualize and think about the many worlds of animals" (vii). For a discussion, and response to, the
subsequent criticism in the popular press of Linzey and Cohn's language policy see Linzey and Cohn,
"From the Editors: Those Who Toil and Those Who Spin", Journal of Animal Ethics 2:1 (2012).
42 I won't pause to consider whether it is the case with other rational species, if there are any, or whether
those species, while rational, are "significantly less or differently rational" (Ronald Sandler, Character and
Environment [2007], p. 23) than we are. My project is about specifically human virtue and vice and, more
importantly in this context, Hursthouse equates "rational" with "human", suggesting that she believes our
species to be the only rational one.
43 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 223.
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typical and characteristic behaviour by claiming that the majority of the species lives in
captivity. Rather than treating this assertion as shocking, Hursthouse simply takes it to be
common sense. In support of her contention, she offers only a set of rhetorical questions:
But isn't this exactly what we should expect a plausible naturalism to yield?
Does anyone think that most human beings are good human beings? Does
anyone think that, regarding ourselves as a collection of social groups or as
one global one, we are flourishing, living well as human beings? Surely not.44
Perhaps it is, as she seems to suppose, common sense. At least, it seems to be among
virtue ethicists, who may be a bit more pessimistic about the prospect of human goodness
than their counterparts in other sub-disciplines of moral philosophy.45 Christian Miller's
assessment of the literature concurs with this view. In his response to the much-vaunted
situationist challenge to virtue ethics,46 Miller mentions that those issuing the challenge
have not provided evidence "that there actually are any virtue ethicists who accept [the]
assumption [that most people are either virtuous or vicious]."47 It is, moreover, as Miller
points out, an attitude that is grounded in the origins of the tradition of virtue ethics, since
both Plato and Aristotle held that the cultivation of virtue requires an upbringing and
education that few were fortunate enough to receive.48 It is, at any rate, no problem with
Hursthouse's theory that it involves a sombre assessment of the goodness of human
beings, given that her goal is to contribute to an accurate understanding of what it means

44 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 223.
45 This pessimism may well extend to virtue theories in non-Western traditions as well. Owen Flanagan,
for instance, claims not only that Mencius holds that developing the cardinal virtues is "not normal in the
sense of 'usual'" but that this view is also held by "Confucius and every other classical Chinese
philosophers, [who are] nostalgic for a past Golden Age when virtue was normal in the sense of 'usual'"
(Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleologies [2014], p. 35 n.).
46 The main proponents of this challenge are Gilbert Harman, in papers such as "Moral Philosophy Meets
Social Psychology" (1999), and John Doris, in his book Lack of Character (2002). Briefly, it holds that
social psychology provides evidence that the majority of human beings do not have the kind of stable
character traits that virtue theorists ascribe to the virtuous.
47 Christian Miller, "The Problem of Character" (2014), pp. 420-421. Emphasis in original.
48 Christian Miller, "The Problem of Character" (2014), p. 421.
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to be good and to live well, not to pander to or assuage her readers with assurances of
their moral success.49
The difference rationality makes to evaluations is quite large, but Hursthouse still locates
these evaluations within the system of natural normativity. Despite the far more
"normative notion of 'a characteristic way of going on'"50 that is appropriate to rational
beings, she retains the naturalistic structure. A good human being is, as with other social
animals, one whose behavioural dispositions are conducive to achieving the ends
appropriate to social animals and these ends delimit what can count as a virtue for human
beings. Adopting character traits and endorsing them as good is not sufficient to make us
good members of our species, even if we adopted and endorsed them en masse. Unless
those dispositions are also genuinely conducive to the ends of survival, continuance of
the species, characteristic enjoyment of pleasure, and the good functioning of the social
group, they will not count as human virtues.
1.2.b: An Assessment of Hursthouse's Model
From this summary of Hursthouse's natural goodness account of virtue, it is evident that
her version of Aristotelian ethical naturalism draws heavily on Foot's but also departs
from her in significant ways. The primary difference is the greater number of aspects of
animal function and corresponding species ends that Hursthouse treats as having
theoretical significance. For Foot, only the parts and operations of individuals matter and
they are only evaluated in light of their role in fostering individual survival and the
continuance of the species. On Hursthouse's account, this is only true of plants and very
simple animals, like bivalve mollusks and sponges; more complex or sophisticated living
beings require a correspondingly more complex method of evaluation. There is, however,
a conspicuous silence in On Virtue Ethics: Hursthouse elaborates on Foot's account

49 I would, however, quibble with Hursthouse's occasional use of the first-person plural (on page 223, for
instance) which seems to imply a bit more optimism about her audience than her theory seems to warrant.
At least in most cases, this is likely a mode of address employed rhetorically rather than an assumption
about the goodness of the readers of her text.
50 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 224.
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without either mentioning the reason an elaboration is needed or why she was motivated
to depart from Foot’s austere version of the theory.
Whatever the reasons behind Hursthouse's modifications, the results of them are evident.
Recall that my interpretation of Foot explains her simpler model of evaluations of natural
goodness as the product of the constrained role of theory in her moral philosophy.
Briefly, Foot gives theory a conservative role in moral life: theory can provide a basic
justification of morality by appealing to the basic needs of living beings, but a detailed
picture of moral life can only be grasped through experience and practical wisdom.
Hursthouse, on the other hand, allows theory to play a more pervasive role. This is no
surprise—not only because she is the author of articles with titles like "Applying Virtue
Ethics"51 and "Virtue Theory and Abortion"52 but she also explicitly states that her more
complicated theoretical structure "really does constrain, substantially, what [she] can
reasonably maintain is a virtue for human beings."53 Hursthouse's decision to elaborate
on the theory, then, appears to be, ultimately, the result of her comfort with a broader role
for theorizing in morality.
Hursthouse has provided us with a significant elaboration of Foot's theory—that much is
clear—but this raises the question of whether it is not only a modification but also an
improvement on it. Rather than a single theory, perhaps summarized with different
emphases, we have two distinct ones and if we wish to adopt this particular brand of
Aristotelian ethical naturalism, we must choose which will serve as our starting point.
There are some advantages to adopting Foot's theory over Hursthouse's. For one thing, it
is the sleeker model of natural normativity. Not only is Foot's naturalism far more
parsimonious, positing as few aspects of function and species ends as any proper account
of virtue would require, but it also applies, without modification, across all forms of life.
Moreover, the concluding pages of Natural Goodness reveal another attractive feature of
her theory, namely, its persuasive power. Foot's final chapter makes the case that an

51 In Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (1995).
52 In Philosophy and Public Affairs 20:3 (1991).
53 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 224.
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Aristotelian ethical naturalism focused only on the primal needs of survival and
reproduction provides us with resources to convince a receptive and intellectually honest
immoralist—who, after all, is quite likely to agree that humans have these basic needs—
that their moral outlook is irrational. If Hursthouse, on the other hand, is to win over her
philosophical opponent she must convince them that for a human being to live well they
must not only be part of a social group and a recipient of its benefits, but also live in a
way that contributes to its proper functioning. This would, at the very least, be a tough
sell to those whose intuitions harmonize best with ethical egoism. To be sure, Hursthouse
does provide arguments meant to convince immoralists and other skeptics of virtue, but
none are as direct or forceful as those allowed by Foot's grounding of virtue in basic
needs. Take, for example, the appeal to what she calls "the smile factor." The immoralist,
Hursthouse contends, should recognize that the virtuous enjoy a flourishing life because
they display various signs of well-being that any immoralist would find familiar, such as
doing things "with zest and enthusiasm, anticipated and recalled in certain tones of voice
with certain facial expressions, and in a certain vocabulary."54 However, it is easy to
imagine an immoralist wryly dismissing these signs as evidence not of flourishing but of,
say, self-deception brought on by an eagerness to believe that virtue is its own reward—
perhaps to mask the fact that they are motivated not by a wish to do good but by some
form of self-righteous pride. Moreover, even if immoralists were to accept the "smile
factor" as evidence that living virtuously does lead to flourishing, this would not be as
devastating to their own moral position as a realization that holding that position is
irrational.
Despite the merits of Foot's theory, I nevertheless favour and adopt as my theoretical
starting point Hursthouse's variant of natural goodness. My main reason is that
Hursthouse's more comprehensive picture of animal function seems to be what a
naturalistic approach would entail. Naturalistic moral theories, at least the Aristotelian
variants, are derived from considerations about human nature, specifically, about the
relation between aspects of human function and the ends and needs that correspond to

54 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 185.
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them. Any claim that we must exclude from consideration certain aspects of function or
certain ends and needs that correspond to these would seem to require arguments that lie
outside of the core of naturalistic moral theory. There may well be such arguments, but
Foot does not present them and in their absence we have no reason to deviate from
naturalism's expected course. Of course, Foot does tell us that only those aspects of
function that are teleologically relevant fall under the purview of natural normativity, and
that only those that are related to development, self-maintenance, and reproduction are
teleological, at least in the appropriate sense. The worry I raised, however, still stands
since it is not clear why considerations about the good functioning of social groups and
the enjoyment of pleasure are not teleologically relevant. If certain species do have
emotional and social needs, then surely this is something that should be reflected in our
evaluations of natural normativity. It is not, moreover, only the fact that Hursthouse's
theory follows naturalism to its expected conclusion that makes it favourable; it has
advantages of its own. What it sacrifices in simplicity it makes up for in greater scope. In
other words, by allowing theory a wider role, it provides us a means of justifying and
explicating far more aspects of our moral lives, rather than relying on the tacit knowledge
involved in practical wisdom. It also has the advantage of reflecting an intuition that is
difficult to shake, namely, that there are significant differences between plants, simple
animals, social animals, and rational animals and that these differences have implications
for our models of normative evaluation. This intuition, furthermore, harmonizes
particularly well with natural normativity. Given that naturalistic evaluations are
grounded in the natures of various species, it would be somewhat surprising if the
structure of the evaluation does not change in keeping with very broad changes in the
nature of the species whose members are the objects of such evaluation.
Even with these considerations in mind, Foot—at least as I interpret her—does seem to
have a point. Moral life and the lived experience of virtue—not to mention the associated
ones of vice, weakness of will, and self-control—are quite complex and difficult to
capture or distil. We should worry, then, that ethical theory might be a clumsy tool that
invariably and crudely oversimplifies virtue and flourishing. This concern, however,
should not necessarily lead us to throw out theorizing altogether or to put overly strict
limitations on its application. Rather, we can hold onto theorizing but do so with at least
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two caveats. First, given that moral theories will never provide a comprehensive picture
of moral life, we must proceed as Aristotle advises in Nicomachean Ethics I.3 and take
much of what our theory tells us as indicating—if we are successful, at any rate—"the
truth roughly and in outline."55 Second, we must also recognize that theory is always to
some extent in dialogue with lived experience and they are mutually affected by this
interplay. Theory can explicate and lead us to revise the moral judgments we make "on
the ground," while those judgments can, in turn, influence what we take to plausible or
important aspects of a moral theory. These caveats reflect the fact that moral theory does,
indeed, provide us only the contours of a moral life. The disagreement, then, is not about
whether theory can inform us of only the contours of moral life but about just how thick
those contours are, that is, how much of the lived experience they leave untouched and
unarticulated. Still, the reasons I gave for favouring Hursthouse's account over Foot's
stand, and I see no compelling reason to be restricted to an articulation of only the
thinnest contours.

1.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have summarized the two primary accounts of the natural goodness
variant of virtue ethics, namely, Foot's model based on a conception of basic human
needs and Hursthouse's model based on a fuller conception of human nature. I then gave
reasons to favour the adoption of Hursthouse's model over Foot's. My ultimate aim is to
formulate a natural goodness theory that reflects an even more complex understanding of
human nature than the one Hursthouse provides in On Virtue Ethics. As such, in the next
chapter, I consider Ronald Sandler's proposals in Character and Environment for
expanding the structure of natural normativity by adding three ends according to which
we should evaluate the character dispositions of rational beings: meaningfulness, the
acquisition and transmission of knowledge, and autonomy.

55 1094b20-21.
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Chapter 2

2

Revisiting Rationality: Sandler’s Challenge to
Hursthouse

In Character and Environment, Ronald Sandler provides a natural goodness account of
environmental virtue ethics. His first chapter lays the groundwork for the rest of the book
by outlining the natural goodness approach to virtue, as found in Hursthouse's writings
rather than Foot's, but Sandler does more than merely summarize the available theory.
Near the end of the chapter, he raises a number of challenges to Hursthouse that, although
at times so brief as to be opaque, are worthy of serious consideration.
While I am not convinced by all of Sandler's arguments, considering them at length will
serve two important functions. First, my defence of Hursthouse against Sandler's charges
will afford me the opportunity to elucidate some of the details of the theory I have
adopted and clear up some potential misconceptions about it. Second, and more
importantly, Sandler is the only philosopher I know of who has attempted, at least in
print, to expand on Hursthouse's natural goodness model. Since my project is to provide
such an expansion, considering Sandler's attempt to do so will serve as something of a
first attempt at testing just how far—and in what direction—the natural goodness theory
can be pushed.
I begin this chapter by briefly responding to Sandler's first two challenges to Hursthouse's
model of natural normativity. In Section 1, I consider Sandler's claim that the existence of
a plurality of scientific approaches entails that Hursthouse cannot rely on scientific
naturalism to do much of the metaethical heavy lifting required to justify the theory of
natural goodness. I dispense with this challenge rather swiftly, since I contend that it
arises from a misunderstanding of the kind of naturalism on which Hursthouse's theory
relies, which is more Aristotelian than scientific—although Aristotle would no doubt
have considered it to be both and it is by no means unscientific. In Section 2, I respond
with skepticism to Sandler's claim that the natural goodness model appears to be more
flexible than is warranted given the potential for the technological enhancement of human
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capabilities and transformation of human nature. Section 3 is devoted to Sandler's attempt
to expand the model of natural normativity by positing three species ends for rational
species. As discussed in the previous chapter, Hursthouse posits additional species ends
with every significant jump in the complexity of the species' form of life; however, she
denies that there is any such end that corresponds to rationality. Sandler, however,
contends that, just as there are species ends relevant only to species that have sufficiently
complex emotional lives (the end of characteristic enjoyment of pleasures and freedom
from pain) and to those that are social (the end of the good functioning of the social
group), there are three species ends for members of rational species: meaningfulness, the
acquisition and transmission of knowledge, and autonomy. I will consider and discuss
each of these individually.
While I reject Sandler's proposals for ends correspond to rationality, I too break with
Hursthouse in holding that there are no such ends. In Section 5, I revisit the two
candidates that Hursthouse rejects, namely, the preparation of the soul for the afterlife
and contemplation. Although I agree with her rejection of the preparation of the soul as
an appropriate end for rational beings—albeit for a different reason than the one she
provides—I argue that her rejection of contemplation is too hasty. I conclude by
examining some of the features of Aristotle's account of contemplation and defending the
adoption of a (neo-)Aristotelian conception of contemplation as a species end for rational
beings.

2.1 The First Challenge: Varieties of Naturalism
Sandler challenges Hursthouse’s appeal to naturalism by stating that it fails, at least on its
own, to justify an appeal to the life-forms of species in the evaluation of goodness. The
problem is that scientific naturalism provides us with "quite a lot of ways to divide the
natural world up into kinds other than by species."56 While ethologists and botanists are
concerned primarily with making species-level claims, the practitioners of other branches
of the life sciences do not share this focus. Appealing to scientific naturalism to ground

56 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 19.
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normative evaluations, then, is not so straightforward since it requires us to explain why
we privilege the scale of classification that is of interest to ethology and botany, namely,
that of species, over others that would lead us, instead, to "evaluat[e]... a living thing as a
member of a genus, a bearer of a particular genotype, or a member of a local group or
population."57 Sandler claims that this shows that much of the naturalistic picture is
justified by a set of ethical commitments rather than by scientific naturalism itself and
that, as a result, "[t]he theoretical underpinnings of the structure of evaluations of human
goodness are thus somewhat different than advocates of the natural goodness approach
suppose."58 We can, then, alluding to the title of Prichard's famous paper,59 say that
Sandler's worry is that natural goodness rests on a mistake.
It is, however, Sandler's critique of the virtue theorists' appeal to naturalism that rests on a
mistake. Foot and Hursthouse both provide theories that they label as variants of "ethical
naturalism" but neither of them claims to be grounding their work on any form of
reductionist scientific naturalism that would delegate all moral questions to the findings
of scientific inquiry. Sandler is perhaps not to be faulted for this confusion; after all, the
neo-Aristotelians who employ the term "naturalism" do so in a rather idiosyncratic way.
When neo-Aristotelian ethicists appeal to naturalism, they mean simply that their
normative evaluations of individuals or their traits and dispositions are grounded in facts
about the nature or function of the species of which those individuals are a part.60 To
speak of naturalism in these contexts, then, is not to invoke the natural sciences, nor is it
to rest moral claims on any kind of scientific naturalism. What Analytic philosophers
typically mean when uttering the term, on the other hand, really does tie it quite closely
and directly to scientific naturalism, so it is to be expected that some readers of

57 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 19.
58 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 20.
59 H.A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912). The paper is perhaps nowadays
more famous for its title than its content, but famous nonetheless.
60 Hursthouse, for example, defines "ethical naturalism" as "broadly, the enterprise of basing ethics in
some way on considerations of human nature, on what is involved in being good qua human being" (On
Virtue Ethics [1999], p. 192).
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Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics will import this notion into their interpretation of natural
goodness.
Some of the fault for this misinterpretation lands on Hursthouse's own shoulders. There is
a passage in On Virtue Ethics that is likely to mislead. It states that "the truth of [natural
goodness] evaluations.... are, in the most straightforward sense of the term, 'objective';
indeed, given that botany, zoology, ethology, etc. are sciences, they are scientific."61
Sandler is not the only one to have been misled by this passage. David Copp and David
Sobel zero in on it and take issue with Hursthouse's "suggest[ion] that her account of
natural evaluation has a scientific status."62 In an earlier passage, however, she mentions
that Aristotelian naturalism is not scientific "in any ordinary understanding of the term[
]," meaning that "[i]t does not seek to establish its conclusions from 'a neutral point of
view.'"63 What Hursthouse means by calling her brand of naturalism "scientific," then, is
something other than implying that ethical claims are to be reduced to findings from the
natural sciences. We can begin to see why the appeal to scientific naturalism would be a
misreading of her view by noting what is conspicuously absent from her claim that there
is something scientific about natural goodness: she selects botany, zoology, and ethology
as the sciences that best exemplify the scientific nature of natural normativity, but she
leaves out biology, behavioural psychology, and neuroscience, even though these would
be more evident candidates for fields of inquiry whose deliverances could give us
material relevant to a reductionist ethical approach. There is, of course, the "etc."
appended at the end of the list, but it is not clear that it is meant to imply a much wider
range than what is presented in the list. After all, she defends the claim that natural
normativity is scientific by appealing, first, to the use of Aristotelian categoricals as they
are employed in "many excellent gardening and nature programmes available on
television,"64 and then to the fact that "[f]armers, and people concerned with domestic

61 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 202.
62 David Copp and David Sobel, "Morality and Virtue" (2004), p. 534. I won't rehearse Copp and Sobel's
objection here since it is, so far as I can tell, the same one that Sandler raises.
63 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 193
64 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 203.
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animals, have always had a special kind of vested interest in arriving at a subset of such
[natural goodness] evaluations correctly; botanists and ethologists are now just interested
in arriving at true ones for their own sake."65 What Hursthouse has in mind, then, is
scientific insofar as it relies on observations about the way various species live, but it is
decidedly not scientific in the way Sandler believes she intends it to be.

2.2 The Second Challenge: Transhumanism
The second challenge to the natural goodness model concerns its appeal to a defined
conception of the life form of human beings. Here, Sandler raises the spectre of
transhumanism, stating that the model of natural normativity propounded by Hursthouse
has a certain flexibility to it, such that "[t]he thesis can... be modified as necessary to
accommodate ends that go beyond a strictly naturalistic conception of human
flourishing."66 What he has in mind are not ends that are supernatural but, rather, those
that are artefactual. Although careful to note that it is still too early to know whether
technological developments that allow radical human enhancement will prove to be
"science fiction or science in progress,"67 he does evince a certain optimism about the
prospect of "technologies that alter our life form in ways that require de-emphasizing
some naturalistic ends or recognizing some artifactual ones."68 His brief musings on the
subject end with a hint at what sort of modification of human nature he envisions coming
about as the result of cognitive technological enhancements. The widespread
implementation of these, Sandler tells us, may well usher human beings into a new form
of life in which we are "living, sentient, social, rational, networked animals."69
Even with the development of sophisticated cybernetic implants, however, it is difficult
to see how we would be able to bring about a radical change in human function. After all,

65 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 203.
66 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 25.
67 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 26.
68 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 26.
69 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 26. Emphasis mine.
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we already employ a number of rather sophisticated technological tools so frequently that
they have become so mundane that they are often counted as necessities, but they are just
that: tools. How we make use of them is something that is to be scrutinized by natural
normativity. We can ask, for instance, whether the dispositions we cultivate in our use of
smart-phone technology, our engagement in various social media platforms, or even
writing with a keyboard rather than a pen or pencil are conducive to the good functioning
of the social group. There is nothing about that, that requires updating our model of the
evaluation of the natural goodness of human beings; we are still simply determining
which behavioural dispositions are virtues or vices and then deciding which uses of
technology encourage or are manifestations of those virtues and vices. There is no need
to posit new aspects of function, nor any need to posit new ends corresponding to existing
ones, to evaluate our use of technological devices and—to return to Sandler's challenge—
there is no reason to suppose we would have to do so simply because those devices have
been engineered so that they are located within the skull rather than without.
Sandler is not wrong to suppose that changes to human nature are a possibility and that
such changes could bring along with them modifications to our conception of naturalistic
virtue ethics. It may be instructive to look at an issue analogous to the one raised by
Sandler, namely, evolution. Human beings, along with all living beings, are subject to
evolutionary processes and, as such, our account of the evaluation of human goodness
may become outdated once humans evolve into a rather different life form than the one
they are currently.70 This is, of course, not a problem for the theory itself, since its
evaluations are sensitive to differences across species and, as such, function somewhat
like sets of conditional claims (it states, for instance, that if the species is a social one,
then evaluations of the goodness of its members must consider the good functioning of
the social group). Sandler, then, is right that the theory remains flexible and that needing
to exercise that flexibility would have significant implications for our evaluations of
human beings. The outcome of evolutionary processes may mean that we gradually cease

70 Setting aside, for the sake of simplicity, the question of whether the species that results from this process
would still be human rather than a descendant of humans.
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being rational beings and become more like (merely) social animals. If that is the case,
the model of human evaluation would need to be modified so that what it considers to be
the characteristic way for humans to go about no longer involves acting for reasons
endorsed and assessed as good.71 If the outcome, however, imparts upon us a new aspect
of function, one not currently found in nature, the way sociality and rationality had
emerged in the distant, prehistorical past, then this would result in the kind of radical
change that Sandler envisions. When it comes to theorizing about this kind of
modification, however, we are entirely unmoored. It would be quite bold to attempt to
predict the character of an entirely new form of life, and I leave such a task to the authors
of speculative fiction rather than muddy philosophical waters with it. I remain, moreover,
skeptical that we can fabricate sufficiently radical modifications to human nature and, as
such, feel no sense of urgency in theorizing about it.72 Furthermore, although the theory
of evolution gives us the conceptual room for the modification of human nature, if a new
type of animal function were to arise, it would not be as Sandler envisions it. To be
networked, in the relevant sense of the term, is not equivalent to evolving into a new
species or form of life, but simply to surgically implant ourselves with smaller and more
sophisticated versions of our current digital instruments so that they are more readily
accessible and an even more ubiquitous feature of our interactions with the world.

2.3 The Third Challenge: Three Proposals for Ends
Corresponding to Rationality
Sandler's third challenge is to Hursthouse's claim that there are no species ends
corresponding to rationality. Hursthouse holds that we should evaluate the parts,
operations, actions, and desires and emotions of social animals according to how well
they serve the four ends of survival, continuance of the species, characteristic enjoyment

71 Although, in the absence of our rationality, it is unclear who would still be theorizing about goodness.
72 After drafting this sentence, I had the good fortune to come across a video from a panel discussion in
which Hursthouse seems to express this view. Although the video's editing makes part of the discussion a
bit ambiguous, Hursthouse refers to the notion that we are "at a crossroads"—which, given the context of
the discussion, I take to mean the point at which the reality of employing technology to manipulate the
human form of life is within our grasp or, at least, close at hand—as "rather overblown and inflated"
(Auckland Museum, "Species Identity: Now and Future" [2010]).
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of pleasures and freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group.
Hursthouse holds that the evaluation of rational beings involves no additional end.
Sandler, however, posits not only one, but three such ends, namely, meaningfulness, the
acquisition and transmission of knowledge, and autonomy. I will consider his case for
each of these individually.
2.3.a: Meaningfulness
Sandler considers meaningfulness to be a plausible candidate for an end corresponding to
rationality since rationality enables us to be "concerned with the meaningfulness of our
lives in a way that bears, pigeons, squid, and gophers cannot be about theirs."73 Contrary
to Hursthouse's charge that preparation of the soul for the afterlife cannot count as a
naturalistic end for human beings because it involves an appeal to the supernatural,
Sandler holds that lives whose meaningfulness is tied to some supernatural conception or
aim do not fall outside of or violate the norms of naturalistic evaluation since that
meaningfulness is still "understood through what goes on in this world: our projects,
endeavors, and relationships, and our efforts and accomplishments regarding them."74
Meaningfulness, then, as it is understood by Sandler, is a state that is caused by or
supervenes upon the way we live our lives.
There is something compelling about this; indeed, as Sandler points out, it is hardly a
controversial view that meaningfulness is constitutive of a good human life and it is one
that "finds strong support within common beliefs about human flourishing."75
Nevertheless, I hesitate to include it as an end for rational beings because it strikes me as
one that would be superfluous. There seems to be, after all, a very direct correlation
between flourishing and meaningfulness. The idea that there are meaningful lives that are
not also flourishing lives and flourishing lives that are not also meaningful strains
credibility. To say that in order to flourish we need to live in a way that is conducive to

73 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 23.
74 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 23.
75 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 23.
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the end of meaningfulness, then, is sort of like saying that in order to flourish we need to
live in a way that is conducive to flourishing. This is, of course, true, but hardly
interesting or informative. In fact, even Sandler’s claim that the need for meaningfulness
in a flourishing life receives widespread assent may simply reflect the fact that the two
concepts play roughly the same role in eudaimonistic ethics. It is possible that Sandler
has a thicker concept of meaningfulness in mind than the one I am attributing to him and
that it identifies something that is not already captured in the notion of flourishing, but he
says too little on the topic for us to be able clearly to draw out any alternative
interpretation.
2.3.b: The Acquisition and Transmission of Knowledge
The next candidate for an end corresponding to rationality that Sandler considers is the
acquisition and transmission of knowledge. It is, as both Sandler and I maintain,
something of a truism that a flourishing life is a meaningful one, and Sandler's case for
knowledge as an end rests on a fact that is perhaps even less controversial than that claim,
namely, that knowledge plays a central role in human life. The activities related to
knowledge-gathering are incessant: "[w]e continually process data and information, and
form, sort out, choose among, deliberate upon, and accept and reject beliefs."76 Not only
is our form of life saturated with knowledge but, as Aristotle famously recognizes in the
opening passage to his Metaphysics,77 we also assign great value to it such that
"possessing knowledge is commonly considered to be a human good."78 Sandler is
cautious here, however, and qualifies his endorsement of knowledge as a species end.
Some of our knowledge is valuable not because it has intrinsic value but because it plays
an instrumental role in helping us fulfill our other species ends, while some of it will
simply be too trivial—Sandler's example is "the number of blades of grass in my
backyard"79—to have any influence on how well we are living as human beings. With

76 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 24.
77 "By nature, all men long to know" (980a21). I employ the Hugh Lawson-Tancred translation.
78 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), pp. 23-24.
79 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 24.
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those caveats in place, Sandler gives two reasons for maintaining that knowledge is still
an appropriate candidate for a species end. First, while we can find ourselves cogitating
about rather trivial matters, it is nevertheless the case that "in general and under most
circumstances, more knowledge is preferable to less knowledge, and a belief that is true
is preferable to a belief that is false."80 Second, there are a number of character traits
generally considered to be virtues, such as "studiousness, openness, innovativeness,
articulateness, patience, and humility, [that] are considered virtues in part because of their
conduciveness to the production, transmission, and reception of knowledge."81
As for the first argument, it is indeed the case that we generally favour increasing our
stores of knowledge and the number of true beliefs we possess, but this does not by itself
show that these things are valued in the way that Sandler purports them to be. After all,
he has already conceded that much of our knowledge is valuable because it is conducive
to survival, continuance of the species, pleasure, and the good functioning of the social
group. Surely those instrumental benefits by themselves provide us with a very strong
reason to increase our store of knowledge, to acquire true beliefs, and disabuse ourselves
of false ones. Knowledge acquisition may be valued, then, because it fulfills the ends
already defended by Hursthouse. Given this, there is yet no reason to elevate knowledge
acquisition to the status of a species end.
Sandler's second reason, that many of the traits considered to be virtues are concerned
with knowledge, has another problem, namely, that it puts the cart before the horse.
Recall the way that the natural goodness approach to ethics determines which character
traits count as virtues: we evaluate an individual’s character trait in light of the role the
trait plays in fulfilling the two (as Foot would have it) or as many as four (as Hursthouse
maintains) ends appropriate to the individual’s species. Sandler, however, does not
identify virtues in light of the ends appropriate to the evaluation of the natural goodness
of members of the species; instead, he slips into inferring such an end from the virtues it

80 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 24.
81 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 24.
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ostensibly possesses. Of course, as a heuristic of sorts, that is not a terrible procedure. It
is certainly a useful exercise to ponder the sorts of things we consider to be virtues in
order to seek out gaps in the structure of our natural normativity. Sandler is right, then, to
look at the fact that many virtuous traits are concerned with knowledge and raise the
question of whether Hursthouse has overlooked the acquisition and transmission of
knowledge as an end relevant to the evaluation of human natural goodness. The problem,
however, is that Sandler moves directly from this interesting suggestion to a robust and,
at least in the pages of his book, unjustified claim about Hursthouse's model of natural
normativity—that it is lacking this particular end. Sandler, in other words, has found his
way to the beginning of an investigation into the role of knowledge in the structure of
evaluations of natural goodness, but, unfortunately, treats it as the conclusion to one.
2.3.c: Autonomy
The last end for rational species that Sandler defends is autonomy. While Sandler begins
his paragraph on autonomy with a rather simple formulation—an autonomous life is one
that is lived not only in a way that is endorsable but also in a way that the person living it
has, in fact, endorsed—things get a bit more complicated by the end of it. Sandler's
concept of autonomy has three separate features: understanding, freedom, and control. It
will be easiest to properly assess autonomy as a species end by unpacking this rather
thick notion, that is, by examining each of its components individually.
I will begin by considering understanding, which Sandler characterizes as "a person's
basic practical knowledge of her social, political, technological, and ecological
environment."82 This sort of understanding is, indeed, required to successfully and
effectively execute our intended actions and carry out our life plans, but this sort of
practical knowledge strikes me as being something more like the means or instrument by
which we can achieve our ends rather than an end itself.

82 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), pp. 24-25.
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The other two components of autonomy are freedom and control, which are the "internal
capabilities of a person to reflect upon and choose her desired realization of the ends, as
well as the social and material resources to pursue them."83 Sandler's decision to treat
freedom and control in a single sentence makes it a bit ambiguous which of these labels
applies to which of the components of autonomy. I will assume that control is meant to
connote something like self-control and is concerned with the agent's internal capacities,
while freedom refers to the external conditions that may aid or impede the successful
undertaking of the agent's course of actions.
Control, the ability to deliberate and choose the means to fulfilling our ends, seems to be
reducible to doing things in a characteristically rational way, in Hursthouse's sense. In
other words, it seems to simply amount to living in a way that we can reasonably see as
good, which is already a feature of Hursthouse's natural goodness model. Although, it
may be that Sandler has something more basic than this in mind. Perhaps control is the
bare ability to choose rather than to be led about by the sub-rational parts of our natures,
as is the case with other animals who are guided only by natural instinct. If this is what
Sandler means, however, we come to the very threshold of rationality, at least as it is
characterized by Hursthouse. That is to say, lacking control would not be to fail to live up
to an end for rational beings; it would be to cease being rational altogether. Lacking
control, in Sandler's sense, would not entail that an individual has a natural defect when it
comes to the achievement of the species ends of a rational being; instead, it would render
the ascription of either natural goodness or natural defect with respect to any end
corresponding to rationality a category error. Control in this more basic sense, then, is
part of the life form or function of a species and not one of its ends.
As for freedom—the social and material conditions required for the successful execution
of our actions—it is tempting to see it as simply reducible to the end of the good
functioning of the social group. After all, it is difficult to see what it would mean to act in
a way conducive to the end of social and material freedom if this would not simply

83 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 25.
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amount to the improvement of the social and material conditions in our environment, or,
in other words, of the good functioning of the social group. As with control, however,
Sandler's comments are brief enough to allow an alternative interpretation of his claim.
We may, then, understand the end of freedom not as the good functioning of the social
group, but, instead, as a literalist reading of Sandler's claim would. On the literal reading,
freedom amounts to the social and material conditions that enable us to live in the way of
our choosing. This would not, however, resolve the problem, since, as was the case with
the "understanding" component of autonomy, this would not itself be an end but an
instrument that enables and eases the achievement of other ends. Moreover, supposing
these material conditions to be a species end would not only be conceptually suspect but
also troubling. Recall that species ends serve as benchmarks against which we measure
the goodness or defect of individual living beings. If we were to accept freedom as a
species end—although doing so seems even on its surface to be a category error—then
we would have to conclude that a number of character traits are evidence of natural
defect because of the environmental conditions in which they are exercised. Consider the
case of honesty under conditions of political oppression. If political conditions are such
that the publication of true claims about the regime in power is an act that is likely to lead
either to imprisonment or execution, we can certainly employ the language of "defect"
here and hold that there is something defective about all of this. The defect, however, is
located in the social conditions that make it such that honesty results in harm, rather than
in the character trait of the honest individual. There is something amiss in claiming that
an honest human being is naturally defective or that honesty is a vice simply because
honesty brings about unfavourable outcomes under certain conditions, but this is what is
entailed by Sandler's inclusion of freedom—at least as he defines it—in the structure of
natural normativity.
The suggestion that autonomy is an appropriate end by which to evaluate members of
rational species is an attractive one. We have, however, reason to exclude each of its
components, namely, understanding, freedom, and control. If autonomy is to be plausibly
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included in the structure of natural normativity, we will, at the very least, need a different
account of it than the one Sandler provides.84
2.3.d: The Third Challenge and Sandler's Faithfulness to Hursthouse's Model
Some of my criticisms of Sandler's proposals would, to be sure, lose their force if he had
not set out to adhere closely to Hursthouse's brand of natural normativity. He does,
indeed, build on Hursthouse, but that, by itself, should not lead us to conclude that even
some fundamental aspects of Hursthouse's natural goodness account will remain intact.
Sandler, however, preserves too much of the original theory to allow us to read him as
advocating a radical overhaul of it. In fact, Sandler concludes his discussion of the three
rational ends by simply slotting them into Hursthouse's original model. It is worth
highlighting this by quoting in its entirety what he claims is the outcome of
"[i]ncorporating the ends appropriate to us as rational beings into the natural goodness
thesis":85
A human being is ethically good (i.e., virtuous) insofar as she is well fitted with respect
to her (i) emotions, (ii) desires, and (iii) actions (from reason and inclination); whether
she is thus well fitted is determined by whether these aspects well serve (1) her survival,
(2) the continuance of the species, (3) her characteristic freedom from pain and
characteristic enjoyment, (4) the good functioning of her social groups, (5) her autonomy,
(6) the accumulation of knowledge, and (7) a meaningful life—in the way characteristic
of human beings (i.e., in a way that can rightly be seen as good).86
There is one significant change to this summary of the structure of natural normativity
beside the addition of rational ends: Sandler has excluded parts and operations from the
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Self-legislation has been suggested to me as a contender. However, I take it that this is roughly what
Sandler has in mind with the notion of control, of deliberating upon and choosing our own ends, so I take it
that my comments about control likewise apply to self-legislation.
85 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 25.
86 Ronald Sandler, Character and Environment (2007), p. 25. For comparison, here is the corresponding
paragraph from Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics: "So now we have, for the more sophisticated animals, four
aspects—(i) parts, (ii) operations/reactions, (iii) actions, and (iv) emotions/desires—and three ends with
respect to which they are evaluated—(i) individual survival, (ii) the continuance of the species, and (iii)
characteristic pleasure or enjoyment/characteristic freedom from pain. If we now move onto another rung,
and consider, specifically, social animals, we find that a fourth end comes in, namely (iv) the good
functioning of the social group." (pp. 200-201).
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list of relevant aspects of function. This may be because he is only discussing a narrower
notion of good than the one that is the province of the more general theory of natural
normativity, signaled by his use of "ethically good," or it may be that restricting his
summary to the evaluation of human beings—rather than all social animals—makes
emotions, desires, and actions salient in a way that parts and operations are not.
Regardless of the reason behind these changes to the aspects of function under
evaluation, the fact remains that the structure of natural normativity remains unchanged:
what counts as a good human being is determined by how conducive their dispositions
are to fulfilling the ends relevant to their species. Sandler, then, does not employ
Hursthouse's theory as a stepping stone to developing some alternative variant of virtue
ethics, but is himself a proponent of the natural goodness approach and we are, therefore,
warranted in evaluating his proposals in accordance with it.

2.4 Revisiting Hursthouse’s Candidates for Ends
Corresponding to Rationality
Before moving to the following chapter, I want to pause and consider more generally
Sandler's challenge to Hursthouse's claim that there is no species end that corresponds to
rationality. While I have not been convinced by any of Sandler's proposals, I share his
view that Hursthouse has not given the question of whether there is such an end sufficient
attention. I will, then, pay the subject the closer attention it deserves by reconsidering the
ends that Hursthouse dismisses and will show that the end of contemplation is not one of
the features of the Aristotelian tradition that we should abandon.
2.4.a: Hursthouse's Candidate Ends Reconsidered
The first end Hursthouse considers is "the preparation of our souls for the life hereafter,"
which she denies has any place within neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism since "to adopt
[it]... is to go beyond naturalism towards supernaturalism."87 This, however, is not a
terribly convincing reason to deny the legitimacy of a species end. After all, if we were to
become, or already are, convinced that humans are not simply rational beings but also

87 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 218.
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ensouled beings, it would not only be a relevant fact in evaluating the natural goodness of
human beings but it would also fall within the purview of the natural goodness models of
ethical naturalism. It would, after all, be an appropriate subject of natural history
judgments, one that could be captured by the Aristotelian categorical "Human beings are
ensouled animals" and which might well give rise to new ends corresponding to this
aspect of human nature. I do, however, share Hursthouse's position that the preparation of
the soul for the afterlife is not, in fact, an end corresponding to the rational aspect of
human function. This is not because I agree with her that considerations pertaining to
immortal souls are to be excluded in principle from evaluations of natural goodness;
rather, it is simply because it is not part of my conception of human nature—I do not
believe that human beings, or members of any other species for that matter, do, in fact,
possess immortal souls.88 In other words, I exclude this end from my model of natural
normativity for metaphysical reasons, rather than metaethical ones.
The second candidate Hursthouse considers for an end corresponding to rationality is
contemplation. She dismisses this one by simply stating that "even philosophers have
baulked at following Aristotle and endorsing [it]."89 This statement is a bit puzzling since
it is unlikely that Hursthouse really meant what a superficial reading of her words
implies, namely, that contemplation is not to be taken seriously as a candidate end simply
because it is an unpopular view. In fact, if this surface reading was precisely what
Hursthouse meant, then by following the same rationale she would likely be led to deny
much of the moral theory she defends, given that Aristotelian ethical naturalism is still
quite a long way from becoming a widely held philosophical position. Rather than
dealing with such an uncharitable reading, it is better to take her reference to Aristotle as
hinting at the reason for her excluding the end contemplation from evaluations of natural
goodness. The reason for the exclusion is likely to be that Hursthouse simply does not
find Aristotle's comments about the contemplative life in Book X of the Nicomachean
Ethics to accurately reflect human nature. There is, indeed, one way in which this is very

88 This is not something for which I will provide arguments; I will, for the purposes of this project, simply
assume a secular view of human nature.
89 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 218.
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much the case. As Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches perceptively note, there is
something about Aristotle's arguments for placing the contemplative life at the pinnacle
of human flourishing that "rings strange" since they "base human happiness on something
godlike."90 Although one of Aristotle's reasons for privileging the contemplative life is
that "reason more than anything is man,"91 he also claims that "reason is divine,"92 that
we must engage in contemplation in order to turn ourselves away from our humanity and
"so far as we can, make ourselves immortal,"93 and defends these claims by indicating
that contemplation is the activity of the gods.94 Given those statements, I would go even
further than Hauerwas and Pinches: Aristotle's case for the life of contemplation does not
merely ring strange but completely violates the natural normativity model since it appeals
not to the life form of human beings directly but to that of another species (if the term is
even applicable): the gods.
There is a further reason Hursthouse may be hesitant to follow Aristotle on this matter.
The life of contemplation that Aristotle lauds is likely to be too aristocratic and, let's be
frank, elitist for anyone who holds even moderately egalitarian values. The Aristotelian
contemplative life is one that requires such a high degree of leisure that we cannot engage
in it if we have to work to sustain ourselves—not to mention others—materially.95
Spending our weekends leaning back in our armchairs deep in contemplative appreciation
of truth will not suffice to achieve the sort of life Aristotle has in mind. The life of
contemplation, then, must be restricted to a small leisured class who are sustained by the

90 Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians among the Virtues (1997), p. 11.
91 1178a8.
92 1177b30.
93 1177b34.
94 1178b8-23.
95 Aristotle sets a very high bar for leisure, one that could never be attained by anyone who has to give any
serious consideration to practical matters. He characterizes the second best life, the political life concerned
with the practical virtues, as unleisurely even when it aims at happiness (whether one's own or that of
others) because this—along with, it would seem, just about any activity other than contemplation—is act
for the sake of something beyond the activity itself (1177b3-26).
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unleisurely toil of others96—and, perhaps, also to those who adopt the lifestyle
disclaimed by Macheath in The Threepenny Opera and "just... starve [themselves] and do
a lot of reading."97 Aristotle's account of the contemplative life, then, has the undesirable
feature of condemning some class of workers or population of helots to a life in which
their own species-specific end of contemplation could never be realized. Given these
features of the life of contemplation as it is described in the Nicomachean Ethics,
Hursthouse has good reason not to take it on board or even to give it much
consideration.98
2.4.b: Aristotelian Contemplation
It would be a bit hasty, however, to deny that contemplation is the end corresponding to
the rational aspect of human function simply because we do not find Aristotle's
description of a life spent in the monomaniacal pursuit of it all that appealing. It would, in
fact, even be hasty to write off Aristotle altogether at this point, since his comments about
the activity of contemplation can be mined fruitfully for insights even if the same cannot
be said of his account of the life of contemplation. The characterization in Book X of the
activity as being the contemplation of truth,99 specifically, of what is divine and immortal
rather than of "mortal things,"100 is perhaps too narrow in scope to serve as a plausible
candidate for the end corresponding to rationality. Moreover, it is not simply the

96 This connection between the life of leisure and the toil of others is more explicit in Politics 3.5 than it is
in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the Politics, Aristotle mentions that not only contemplation but even the
"virtue of a citizen... cannot be spoken of as belonging to everyone or even to every free person, but only to
those who have been relieved of necessary sorts of work. Those who perform necessary services for one
person are slaves; those who do so for the partnership are vulgar persons and laborers" (1278a8-13).
97 Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill, "Ballad of the Easy Life" (2000).
98 It is not clear even from the Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle really thought that the contemplative life
he describes should be sought in practice. In one passage, for instance, he states that "such a life would be
too high for man" (1177b27) and that the activities that characterize the second-best life, that is, the
political life, are those that "befit our human estate" (1178a10-11). As Dorothea Frede puts it, "his
preference for pure theôria must be taken with more than a pinch of salt" ("The Political Character of
Aristotle's Ethics" [2013], p. 33). Nevertheless, even if Aristotle thought the ideal philosophical life to be
unattainable for us, this is still the account of contemplation that Hursthouse seems to take aim at in her
very brief comment on the matter.
99 1177a22.
100 1177b30-1178a1.
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narrowness of the scope that is a problem but just what is contained within that scope,
given that we are unlikely to think that there is something amiss—let alone defective with
respect to the life form of human beings—in those who do not spend their time
contemplating first principles and the like. However, Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics
provides us with a far more useful suggestion. There, Aristotle explains why those who
are happy—and, as such, are "self-sufficient and need nothing further"101—nonetheless
need friends. One of the reasons friends are needed is that those who are lovers of
excellent activity have difficulty contemplating their own excellent actions. Aristotle
does not defend this claim, but perhaps the first-person vantage point is simply not the
ideal one from which to observe most kinds of conduct, or it may be that the activity of
contemplation is itself distracting and impedes the proper execution of actions undertaken
simultaneously. Since our own activities are poor objects of contemplation, we require
the company of others who engage in their own excellent activities and execute joint
actions with us. The excellent activity of friends allows us to engage in appropriate
appreciation, since "we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their
actions better than our own."102 This suggests that contemplation can be, even for
Aristotle, far more down-to-earth than the portrayal of the contemplative life in Book X
would lead us to believe.
Looking even further afield, beyond the Nicomachean Ethics to its companion piece, the
Politics, provides further confirmation that this is an appropriate interpretation of
Aristotelian contemplation. The Politics concludes by considering what type of common
education legislators should establish to benefit their city-state. Aristotle accepts a
customary division of education into four categories: letters, gymnastics, music, and
drawing. The young are to be educated in letters and drawing because these arts are
"useful for life"103 and in gymnastics because proper physical training fosters good health
and the development of a courageous disposition. As for musical education, its purpose is

101 1169b4-6.
102 1169b30-35.
103 1337b25.
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to provide citizens with a "liberal and noble"104 activity with which they can occupy
themselves during their leisure hours. While Aristotle, in his discussion of the value of
musical training, identifies three powers in which it shares—education, play, and
pastime105—I am concerned here only with its educational role. Musical training is
educational insofar as those who undertake it in their youth are able, in adulthood, to
properly judge fine musical performances. This aim of developing good judgment places
some restrictions on musical education: it is not to impart expertise on the learner (since
"difficult and extraordinary" performances are fit for participation in contests rather than
musical appreciation and are, therefore, more befitting of laborers than free persons),106
involve the use of flutes (an instrument whose playing is frenzied and, as such, useful for
"purification rather than learning"),107 or include harmonies in the Phrygian mode (like
the music of flutes, they are "characteristically frenzied and passionate").108 A proper
education in music, then, according to Aristotle, is undertaken for the sake of engaging in
aesthetic contemplation. While musical appreciation also involves pleasure, Aristotle
carefully distinguishes among music's various powers and effects, making it clear that the
goods of contemplation and pleasure are, at least in principle, separable. Indeed, in his
discussion of musical education in the Politics, Pierre Destrée identifies the cooccurrence of these two separate goods (the "exercising of an intellectual faculty and the
emotional correlative to this")109 as a feature of both aesthetic and philosophical
contemplation.
Aristotle's claims about contemplation in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics and in
Book VIII of the Politics are less famous than those found in Book X of the
Nicomachean Ethics but they leave us with a far more mundane picture of contemplation.

104 1338a32.
105 1339b13-15.
106 1341a9-17, 1341b9-18.
107 1341a21-24.
108 1342b2-3.
109 Pierre Destrée, "Education, Leisure, and Politics" (2013), p. 318.
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The discussions of friendship in Book IX and of musical education in Book VIII of the
Politics reveal that Aristotelian contemplation is neither an activity whose object is
entirely abstracted from lived reality nor the preserve of some leisured class of
philosophers. Contemplation is, rather, accessible to anyone with at least some leisure to
engage in the appreciation of aesthetic objects and the appreciation of the performance of
skilled tasks. We contemplate, in other words, by directing our attention to the
experiences that we have and the knowledge that we have gained. To flourish as humans
requires this kind of appreciative, aesthetic exercise because we are more than mere
cognitive trawlers who insatiably amass information without ever stopping to simply
examine or enjoy it.
Considering this more comprehensive account makes it difficult to follow Hursthouse's
contention that contemplation is not worth taking seriously as a so-called "fifth end."110
The good that encompasses the appreciation of the virtuosity of a musical performance
(pace Aristotle and his holding up his nose to expert performers), of the euphonic
cadences of speech or poetry, of the discernment involved in temperate acts, and so on
seems to be a rather fitting candidate for an end appropriate to rational beings.
2.4.c: Contemplation and Pleasure
Of course, Hursthouse may agree that such mundane contemplative appreciation is
something that, unlike the contemplation of first principles and abstract eternal truths, is
part of the evaluation of the natural goodness of rational beings. It may simply be that she
conflates the good of contemplation with the pleasure that typically—and perhaps almost
invariably—accompanies it. If that is the case, then she would simply subsume this kind
of end to that of the enjoyment of pleasures characteristic to human beings. Here, we run
into an interpretive problem: pleasure is under-theorized in On Virtue Ethics. Hursthouse
describes the role of pleasure in evaluations of natural goodness but does not pause to

110 The language of "fifth end" is Hursthouse's: "So we might expect that, having reached creatures who
are rational, their aspects would be evaluated in the light of some fifth end which relates to this new,
transforming, capacity" (On Virtue Ethics [1999], p. 218).
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give her readers an account of just what she takes pleasure to be.111 Her brief treatment of
the topic does, however, contain a few suggestive comments that may allow us to grasp
what she may have in mind. The end of characteristic pleasures arises once Hursthouse
moves from considering animals that can act to those whose psychological complexity
also allows them to experience pleasure and pain. Her explanation of the qualifier that the
pleasures and pains must be characteristic (as I already discussed briefly in Chapter One)
raises the point that freedom from pain simpliciter is not a good since much of the pain
experienced by animals acts as a survival mechanism, a signal that their bodies have been
damaged and may be at risk of further damage. In this context, the examples of noncharacteristic pains that she provides as illustration are of pains that result from
physiological abnormalities, namely, a ram whose twisted horn "grew into his cheek and
caused him lots of pain" and "[a]n animal whose teeth had grown in such an abnormal
way that it couldn't chew without pain."112 Later, when evaluating a number of
candidates for virtues, she mentions that "[w]ithout honesty, generosity, and loyalty we
would miss out one on of our greatest sources of characteristic enjoyment, namely loving
relationships."113 This is, again, not much material from which to piece together a theory
of pleasure, but it does seem to point to a notion of pleasures as rather simple positive
affective states. The mention of loving relationships might seem to hint at a more
complex account; however, there is little even in that passage to suggest that human
pleasures are any different than those of more psychologically rudimentary animals who
are also capable of pleasures but who partake in a life form that is far removed from
rationality or even sociality. Notice, for instance, that Hursthouse mentions that loving
relationships are a source of pleasure in the same way she might say that loving
relationships are one of the most effective ways humans have of ensuring the continuance
of the species. Loving relationships, then, are perhaps a very reliable source of large
quantities of pleasure, and they are characteristic insofar as they are an ordinary feature

111 Even assuming that Hursthouse's broadly Aristotelian approach to ethics justifies turning to Aristotle's
works to fill in the gaps in her theory would give us little help—Aristotle notoriously and frustratingly
provides two incompatible accounts of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics.
112 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 200.
113 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 209.
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of the form of life of humans, but there is no reason to suppose that the pleasure,
considered by itself, is any different than those enjoyed by, say, dogs engaged in play or
qualitatively distinct from the pleasure of satiating thirst and hunger. In other words,
while there is surely something special about loving relationships, there seems to be
nothing special about the pleasure that arises from them, at least nothing that can readily
be identified from Hursthouse's account.
If my interpretation of Hursthouse is correct, then the intellectual activity of
contemplation is not a special instance of pleasure. However, even if my interpretation is
mistaken, we still should not subsume the end of contemplation to that of pleasure, since
this would result in evaluations of natural goodness that miss the mark. To see why this is
so, suppose—as would be the case whether we were to accept a separate end of
contemplation or treat it as a sub-class of the enjoyment of characteristic pleasure—that
some individual counts as having a natural defect because they fall short of the human
form of life in not being suited in some way for the appreciation of skilled actions or fine
artistic products. The source of that defect is not likely to be that the individual lacks the
proper affective disposition toward the object of appreciation, but, rather, that they are
unable to fully understand or perceive their value or aesthetic qualities. The defect, then,
would be more intellectual than affective and, as such, it would not be related to
pleasure—at least, not directly—but to contemplation.
This distinction between the roles of pleasure and contemplation in evaluations of natural
goodness can be made more evident by considering the contemplative appreciation of
types of music that were not available for consideration by Aristotle. The advent of
modern experimental and avant-garde music has provided us with a number of rather
cerebral works that elicit contemplative appreciation from us without also being clear
sources of amusement. One example that allows us to more easily tease apart these two
facets of musical appreciation is the performance of John Cage's "Organ²/ASLSP"114

114

It has been pointed out to me that there seems to be a tension between my repudiation of elitism in
Aristotle’s account of contemplation and then using Cage’s work—which is frequently thought to be elitist
insofar as it is snooty or inaccessibly cerebral—to illustrate a feature of my own account of contemplation
as a species end for humans. Although avant-garde art like Cage’s does strike something of an elitist note, I
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currently under way in a church in the German town of Halberstadt. The performance
began on September 5, 2001 and is scheduled to end in the year 2640. The note being
played on the church's organ at the time of this writing has been playing since October 5,
2013 and will only be changed to the next note of the composition in the year 2020. If we
were to visit Halberstadt and confront the sound of a years-long note continuously
droning out of the organ's pipes, we would be unlikely to think the perception of the
sound emitted from the organ itself to be pleasant. However, this confrontation would
undoubtedly provide us with an opportunity for intellectual and aesthetic appreciation of
the performance and the composition, and this would certainly satisfy the end of
contemplation. Some pleasure might accompany the act of contemplation but subsuming
the whole value of the experience to the fulfillment of our need for pleasure is to mistake
the incidental affective accompaniment to the act for one of its central properties.115
Contrary to Hursthouse's contention, then, I hold that contemplation is an at least
plausible species end for rational beings. Now, I may seem to be splitting hairs and
harping on a rather minor point, especially since I have conceded that Hursthouse may be

believe it’s a false one. Or, if it is elitist, it is so in a very different way than Aristotle’s account of
contemplation is. The life of contemplation in Aristotle is elitist precisely because it is restricted to an elite:
the exploitation of an underclass for the flourishing of a few is built right into the account. The same cannot
be said of Cage’s work. Although it’s true that a composition like ASLSP is unlikely to be as widely
appreciated as songs composed by Willie Dixon, Cole Porter, or Holland-Dozier-Holland, there is no
principled reason why it could not find more widespread appreciation or why the appreciation of it should
be barred to anyone outside an elite class.
115 The point also could be reinforced by drawing on Foot's comments on Wittgenstein's death bed
pronouncement that he had lived a wonderful life. Foot states that the pronouncement "rang true because of
the things he had done, with rare passion and genius, and especially on account of his philosophy" but adds
that "[i]nterpreted in terms of happy states of mind it would, however, have been very puzzling indeed if a
life as troubled as his had been described as a good life" (Natural Goodness [2001], p. 85). It would be
quite plausible to locate as the source of Wittgenstein's happiness his fulfillment of the end of
contemplation, even if it was not coupled with a corresponding intense and consistent experience of
pleasures. As useful as it is to my argument, however, I hesitate to employ it if only because it relies on an
image of Wittgenstein as a rather sour individual that is not uncontested. While the anecdotes about him
that are popularly traded among philosophers and students of philosophy, as well as his portrayal in Derek
Jarman's film Wittgenstein, do paint him as such a character, Norman Malcolm's memoir of his friendship
with Wittgenstein is apt to leave us with a different impression. Malcolm's portrayal of Wittgenstein
includes, among other things, his fondness for Carmen Miranda films, his love of detective stories, and his
invention of games during long walks with friends (Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir [1958]).

46

subsuming the phenomena I am describing under the wider category of pleasure, but this
is not a merely superficial disagreement. While Hursthouse and I are, indeed, attempting
to classify the same fact about human life within the same kind of system of natural
normativity, the classification will involve either a system with, in Hursthouse's case,
four ends relevant to the evaluation of human goodness or, as I contend, one with at least
five such ends. Opening up space for a mode of contemplation whose value is, at least in
principle, capable of being divorced from pleasure adds another dimension to the
evaluations of the natural goodness of human beings, one that is likely to be given too
little direct attention or prominence if it is not seen as discrete from the other four.
Evaluating dispositions according to how conducive they are to contemplation will also
yield a set of intellectual and aesthetic virtues that are different than those that would be
endorsed simply on the basis of the pleasures to which they give rise.
2.4.d: Contemplation and Sandler's Knowledge-Based Ends
There may seem to be a tension or even a contradiction in my rejection of Sandler's
suggestion that we make the acquisition of knowledge an end corresponding to rationality
and my subsequent defense of contemplation as such an end. Contemplation is, after all,
quite directly concerned with knowledge. There is, however, a difference between the
two proposed ends and making that difference salient should dispel the worry about any
tension in denying one while adopting the other. The difference between the two ends is
that the value of contemplation lies in what we do with the knowledge, with the ways
which we bring our thoughts to bear upon it, while Sandler's proposed end is concerned,
instead, with the acquisition and possession of stores of knowledge. The role of
knowledge in contemplation, then, parallels that of the role of knowledge in the
achievement of other ends. Just as Sandler admits that the value of acquiring knowledge
is, in many cases, reducible to how well a healthy store of knowledge is conducive to
survival, continuance of the species, the enjoyment of pleasure, and the good functioning
of the social group, so the value of knowledge is also reducible to how well it enables our
acts of contemplation. The acquisition of knowledge is important for the end of
contemplation, since it allows us to be like Aristotle's virtuous person who finds their
own company pleasant in part because their “mind... is well stored with subjects of
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contemplation."116 It is not difficult to see why a healthy stock of knowledge helps us
fulfill our contemplative nature: the richest and most rewarding moments of
contemplation are often those that draw together disparate pieces from our store of
knowledge in unexpected and creative ways. This does not, however, mean that the very
acquisition of knowledge is itself an end appropriate to the species. It is, after all, far
easier to grasp how engaging in acts of contemplation is conducive to living a good,
characteristically human life than it is to grasp how amassing an idle vault of unaccessed
information and experiential data could be relevant to such a life.

2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended a first elaboration to Hursthouse's model of natural
normativity, namely, the addition of the end of contemplation for rational animals. The
addition of contemplation, however, still leaves us with an insufficiently comprehensive
account of natural goodness. In the following chapter, I will propose and defend a further
elaboration to Hursthouse's model of natural goodness. I argue that human beings are not
just social but also deeply relational and that natural goodness evaluations of human
beings must account for that fact. This will form the basis and justification for the final
three chapters, which argue that our character traits should be evaluated, in part, in terms
of how well they fulfill the end of recognition (Chapter Four). Relationality and
recognition are concepts that have been articulated and fruitfully applied by feminist
philosophers for a few decades now.117 The insights of these philosophers, however, have
rarely been taken up in the works of neo-Aristotelian ethicists. As a result, the work of
virtue theorists still largely present the virtues as the character traits of, and those

116 Nicomachean Ethics 1166a26.
117

For feminist approaches to relationality, see Susan J. Bison’s Aftermath (2002) and the anthologies
Relational Autonomy (2000) and Feminists Rethink the Self (1997). For feminist approaches to recognition,
see Iris Marion Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) and Patricia Hill Collins’ Black
Feminist Thought (1991), especially her discussion of controlling images and the importance of selfdefinition. Although I have not drawn directly on these works in this thesis, they have influenced my
thinking on recognition and my approach to questions about the self.
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appropriate to, independent, bounded, or atomistic individuals.118 Drawing on the
concepts of relationality and recognition, as they have been understood by feminist
philosophers, I will make a preliminary attempt to update this picture of the virtuous life
by identifying and elevating to prominence a set of virtues that I will call the virtues of
recognition (Chapters Five and Six).

118

One notable exception is Alasdair MacIntyre, whose Dependent Rational Animals (1999) treats
dependence and vulnerability as a central feature of the human condition. Nevertheless, even MacIntyre’s
conception of human dependence falls into what I will call social animality rather than the kind of
relationality I will defend. Likewise, his virtues of acknowledged dependence (those meant to complement
the virtues of independent rational agency) do not include those that I will be discussing under the umbrella
of “virtues of recognition,” namely, virtues concerned with the apprehension and communication of
another’s experience of the world.
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3

Relationality

In this chapter, I continue my project of elaborating the structure of natural normativity in
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. I began, in the first chapter, by summarizing the two main
variants of the Natural Goodness theory, namely, those defended by Foot and
Hursthouse. According to Foot, the goodness of individual living beings or their traits—
that is, their parts and operations—are to be evaluated in light of the way members of that
individual's species characteristically meet the ends of individual survival and the
continuance of their species. The traits that are conducive to achieving these ends bear
what Foot calls a natural goodness, and, conversely, those that impede the achievement of
those ends are natural defects. In the case of human beings, dispositions related to the
exercise of practical reason that display natural goodness will be classified as virtues, and
those that are evidence of a defect in practical reasoning will be classified as vices.
For Hursthouse, the method is largely the same: individual traits are, likewise, evaluated
according to how well they tend to achieve certain species ends. Hursthouse's evaluative
model, however, is more complex than Foot's insofar as it posits ends beyond the basic
ones of survival and the continuance of the species. For social animals, their parts,
operations, actions, and desires and emotions are to be evaluated in light of their
suitability for achieving—in ways characteristic of their species—the ends of survival,
continuance of the species, (characteristic) freedom from pain and (characteristic)
enjoyment of pleasure, and the good functioning of the social group.
For rational animals, Hursthouse adds no new species end relevant to evaluating the
goodness of individuals or their traits. However, in Chapter Two I have defended the
addition of contemplation as a species end corresponding to rationality. Thus, the
character traits of rational animals must also be evaluated according to whether they
fulfill or impede acts of contemplation.
In this chapter, I will propose and defend a further addition to the structure of natural
normativity. Specifically, I will conclude that we must evaluate virtues and vices in light
of the fact that we are not only social and rational animals, but also relational beings. To
bolster my case for this claim, I will examine the psychological effects of the prolonged
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social isolation of prisoners held in solitary confinement. These effects, I will contend, go
beyond the harms that we would expect a (merely) social animal to suffer from the
deprivation of interpersonal contact but are the sort we would expect relational beings to
experience.
The chapter begins, in Section 1, by clarifying Foot and Hursthouse's conceptions of
social animality. Section 2 will detail the living conditions of those housed in solitary
confinement units within American supermax prisons and summarize some of the
documented psychological effects of prolonged confinement within these units. In that
section, I assess the concepts of social animality discussed in Section 1 in light of the
psychological effects of confinement and conclude that this assessment gives us reason to
posit a new aspect of human function relevant to the evaluation of natural goodness,
namely, relationality. Sections 3 and 4 are responses to a pair of objections about drawing
conclusions about the effects of social isolation from studies of the effects of solitary
confinement, specifically, that solitary confinement’s effects may be the result not of
isolation per se but of the restricted sensory stimulus or the violence and forced
confinement that are characteristic of solitary confinement.

3.1 Social Animality
So far in my analysis of the natural goodness variant of virtue ethics, the question of
whether Foot and Hursthouse have a conception of human beings as relational remains
unanswered. To be sure, both posit that we are social animals, and Hursthouse makes this
fact an explicit part of the structure of natural normativity, but this does not, by itself,
provide us much of an answer. That we are social animals is a truism. Yet, as is the case
with many widely accepted assertions, there is not always a clear sense of what it
denotes. Few would, for instance, follow Aristotle in claiming, as he does in History of
Animals I.1, that we are social insofar as we have, as a species, "one common end in
view."119 Still fewer would accept Aristotle's specification from the opening chapters of
Politics I.2 that we are social insofar as we have as our common end the polis. The

119 488a9-10. Quotations from the History of Animals are from the Thompson translation.
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modern understanding of what it means to be a social animal is better captured, I would
venture, by Aristotle's other characterization of our species in History of Animals I.1 as
being gregarious in addition to social (in his technical sense). Yet describing ourselves as
gregarious animals does not seem to quite capture all that we mean, or can mean, by the
claim that we are a social species. For one thing, that we are drawn to others and pleased
by their company does not capture the extent to which we depend on others for our
various needs and for the achievement of various goods.
Given this lack of specificity, the assessment of the extent to which Foot and Hursthouse
conceive of us as relational beings requires us to clarify just how they understand our
social animality. Accordingly, I will begin this section by examining Foot's claims about
social animality and show that she understands it in a roughly Hobbesian way, as a matter
of interdependence in meeting our basic needs combined with a natural affection for our
loved ones. I will then examine Hursthouse's claims about social animality and show that
she, too, ascribes to a Hobbesian interdependence and natural affection, but goes further
than this by also conceiving of us as being what Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar
call "causally relational,"120 that is, individuals whose character traits and dispositions are
in a significant way the result of the social influences that impinge on their development.
Before proceeding to my interpretations of Foot and Hursthouse, I should briefly
clarify—lest I be accused of awkwardly slotting their theories into overly rigid
categories—that ascriptions of human relationality are a matter of degree rather than
absolutes. As Misha Strauss rightly notes, it is very rare to find a philosopher whose
image of human nature is not relational in some way.121 To this I would add that it is also
quite rare to find a proponent of relationality who will also entirely disavow some notion
of bounded individuality, even if those boundaries are quite porous. The more precise and
illuminating interpretative question, and the one that guides my discussion in this section,

120 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, "Introduction: Autonomy Refigured" (2000), p. 22. The
concept of causal relationality, and its counterpart, constitutive (or intrinsic) relationality, is also discussed
and elaborated upon in Natalie Stoljar's "Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy"
(2011), most explicitly at page 377.
121 Misha Strauss, "The Role of Recognition in the Formation of Self-Understanding" (2002).
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is not whether Foot or Hursthouse hold that human beings are relational, but in just what
way and to what degree they think humans are relational.
3.1.a: Foot's Hobbesian Social Animality
Unlike Hursthouse, Foot does not make the fact that we are social animals part of the
structure of natural normativity. As described in the first chapter, for Hursthouse, the fact
that a species of animal is a social species complicates the theory by adding to it the end
of the good functioning of the social group. Foot's theory, however, undergoes no such
modification and remains concerned only with the ends of survival and the continuance
of the species, even when the evaluation of goodness is trained on the parts and
operations of social animals. Still, she does not deny that this feature of a species has
moral significance. In Natural Goodness Foot makes only a single explicit reference to
human beings as "social animals" and in that instance she employs the term to denote our
need for cooperation in order to satisfy our basic needs. Here, Foot compares our
interdependence to that of wolves who must hunt in packs to acquire nourishment,
although she adds that our particular form of cooperation "depend[s] on special factors
such as conventional arrangements."122
The topic of our social nature comes up again later in the book where Foot defends Peter
Geach's claim that human beings need the virtues as bees need to sting. In agreement
with Geach, she mentions two sets of needs that humans have along with the
corresponding sets of virtues that are required to meet these needs. The first set of social
needs is the "pursui[t of] human ends having to do with love and friendship,"123 which
requires the virtues of industry and tenacity of purpose. The second set is the "ability to
form family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours," which requires the
exercise of "virtues such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances
obedience."124 This seems far loftier than the earlier comment that we cannot meet our

122 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 16.
123 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 44.
124 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), pp. 44-45.
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basic needs without assistance and might suggest that there is more to our social
animality than the sort of thing that wolves do when they hunt in packs. It may, however,
only be an elaboration of the same kind of interdependent cooperation mentioned in the
earlier passage. This is clearest with the second set of needs under discussion, those
involving the formation of social bonds. Our friendships and special relations with
neighbors might, after all, be particular instances of the conventional arrangements that
Foot mentions as a characteristically human form of cooperation. The need to form
various social bonds, in other words, is one that might be derivative insofar as we need
these bonds not for their own sake but only so that we can cooperate to achieve our more
basic needs of survival and the continuance of the species. It is less clear that this is the
case with the first set of needs mentioned, since these are not concerned with the
formation of bonds per se but with the ends of love and friendship. We have here
admittedly thin textual grounds on which to base our judgment of Foot's conception of
our social nature, yet, given the basic structure of her theory, the most natural reading is
that the ends of love and friendship are also derivative. They are, that is, simply part of
the ways our species meets the basic needs that are fundamental to Foot's moral theory.
For the purposes of evaluations of natural goodness, then, this mention of the need for
social bonds, love, and friendship is not much different from the earlier comparison to the
cooperative activities of wolf packs.
If my reading of Foot is correct, her account of natural goodness has very little room for
relationality, or makes room only for relationality understood in a rather thin sense. This
contention can, in fact, be further strengthened by noting how her account of the social
nature of human beings is similar to that of one of philosophy's most notorious social
atomists: Hobbes.
For Hobbes, the pre-societal state of nature is characterized primarily by insecurity. It is,
famously, a state not of violence but of "war of every man against every man,"125 that is,
a state in which all are known to be ready to engage in battle to secure the objects of their

125 Leviathan I.xiii.13.
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desires.126 The result of this insecurity is that the "fruits [of industry] is uncertain," which
leads not only to the neglect of any long-term projects such as agriculture, the
development of various arts, and exploration, but results also in a solitary life, one with
"no society."127 Interactions between people in the state of nature, moreover, provide "no
pleasure, but... a great deal of grief" since each person "naturally endeavours... to extort a
greater value from his contemners, by damage, and from others, by the example."128 In
the absence of the security provided by the presence of a "common power to fear,"129
humans live "dissociate[d]"130 from one another. In order to meet their basic needs, then,
those in the state of nature band together, forming civil society by appointing over them a
sovereign authority. The Hobbesian account of the social bonds of human beings is, in
this respect, much like Foot's. Both the Hobbesian citizen and the Footian social animal
are beings who need to form social bonds primarily to ensure cooperation in meeting
their basic needs and to be assured that "if... a stranger should come on [them] when
[they] are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill [them] or appropriate the tools that
[they] need for the next day's work."131
It may appear that I am uncharitable to Foot in comparing her notion of human social
animality to that described by Hobbes, given that she mentions family ties and love as
part of her defense of the need for virtues. However, this worry, should it arise, is itself
likely to be the product of an uncharitable reading, although of Hobbes rather than Foot.
Writing only about the heads of households in the state of nature is, after all, not an
innovation of Rawls'132 but can be traced back to Leviathan and further still. Although

126 Leviathan I.xiii.8.
127 Leviathan I.xiii.9.
128 Leviathan I.xiii.5.
129 Leviathan I.xiii.11.
130 Leviathan I.xiii.10.
131 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (2001), p. 114.
132 I refer here to Rawls' suggestion that "heads of families" should be the only parties in the original
position (A Theory of Justice [1999], p. 111). It is, I suspect, a stipulation that is primarily associated with
Rawls and which is given salience thanks to Susan Moller Okin's work. However, she has not overlooked
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Hobbes writes about the state of nature in a way that suggests that his comments are
meant to apply to all of those who dwell in it, they primarily apply to the adult males who
exist outside of civil society. This is evident in two passages from his discussion of the
state of nature. First, Hobbes claims that men in the state of nature "use violence to make
themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle."133 The second
passage is Hobbes' aside that populations who do not live under a common power have
no government save "the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth
on natural lust."134 Life in the state of nature is, indeed, described as being solitary but
what we find in the Hobbesian state of nature is nevertheless collections of families rather
than collections of unattached individuals. In the fuller picture of Hobbes' account of
human social bonds, then, human beings cooperate to meet their basic needs by forming
social relationships, and family ties are presupposed and accounted for by natural
affection.
There are, of course, some discontinuities in the two accounts. Hobbes is inviting us to
imagine a pre-political existence, one in which people are organized in family units, and
perhaps even tribes or clans,135 whereas Foot is, instead, imagining an anti-social
existence, one in which people are selfish agents. The remedy to these conditions are,
correspondingly, different. For Hobbes, those in the state of nature exit their insecure way
of life by the establishment of a sovereign power "to defend them from the invasion of

its precursors in the likes of Hobbes, since she mentions that it is an assumption that runs "throughout
almost the entire liberal tradition" ("Justice and Gender" [1987], p. 44).
133 Leviathan I.xiii.7. My emphasis.
134 Leviathan I.xiii.11.
135 Hobbes' mention of "the savage people in many places of America" (Leviathan I.xiii.11) as an example
of contemporary people living in the state of nature might suggest that he has something like tribes in mind
when discussing the state of nature, rather than the first establishment of households described by Aristotle
in Politics I.2. It is not clear, however, from the Leviathan what Hobbes believed about the people of
America and it remains possible that he thought them to have no social arrangements beyond those of the
household.
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foreigners and the injuries of one another."136 As for Foot, she holds that "the virtues...
are corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be
resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good."137 The virtues, in other words, are
the character traits we develop in order to act against our more selfish tendencies. We
avoid living in a state characterized by intense insecurity, then, by developing virtues
which temper our callous self-interest, and by promoting their development in others.
Still, despite these differences, the important affinities between the two accounts of our
social natures remain, at least when we take into account all of Hobbes' claims about the
state of nature rather than rely on the more popular summaries of it.138 It is the case, for
both Hobbes and Foot, that we are social beings both insofar as we have natural
affections for our family members and insofar as we need some form of cooperation to
meet our basic needs. Both philosophers posit a different corrective to our self-interested
natures—government in the case of Hobbes, and virtue in the case of Foot—but when it
comes to Foot's understanding of social animality, there is nothing inaccurate or
uncharitable with labeling her view "Hobbesian."139
3.1.b: Hursthouse's Aristotelian Social Animality

136 Leviathan II.xvii.13.
137 Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices" (1978), p. 8. Her comment that the virtues are corrective was, of
course, published well before the post-Humean turn in her career (referring to the point at which she claims
to have abandoned a Humean conception of practical reason), but I see no reason to think that she
abandoned this view by the time she published Natural Goodness. In fact, her continued focus on the joint
problems of showing that human beings need the virtues and that the immoralist moral outlook poses a real
danger to us—presumably because their views appeal to some natural tendencies in human nature—seems
to suggest that she still thought of the virtues as corrective.
138 As Edwin Curley notes in the opening of his introduction to the Leviathan, "Hobbes has suffered a fate
shared by many classic authors. His greatest work is more often quoted than carefully and thoroughly read"
("Introduction to Hobbes' Leviathan [1994], p. viii). As we can see from the popular mischaracterizations
of Hobbes' state of nature, it is a fate that befalls not only the whole of the Leviathan but also its parts.
139

There is a reading of Foot according to which her theory implies a deeper relationality than the account
of social animality I have summarized here. In “Rationality and Goodness” (2004), Foot argues that moral
considerations, including those concerning our particular relationships with others, are intrinsically reason
giving. From this material, it is possible to develop an account of social animality that is less Hobbesian in
nature. John Hacker-Wright’s work on ethical naturalism provides an especially good account of how
Foot’s natural goodness might require non-instrumental investment in relationships (see, especially,
“Human Nature, Personhood, and Ethical Naturalism” [2009]).
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In her discussion of the four ends relevant to the evaluation of the natural goodness of
social animals, Hursthouse's statements about the social nature of certain species takes on
the same character as Foot's Hobbesian comments. Hursthouse first provides a set of
examples of animals who are defective with respect to the end of the good functioning of
the social group. A number of these concern the need to cooperate in order to meet
certain needs, such as the "free-rider" wolf that does not participate in the group hunt or
the ape who does not participate in mutual grooming.140 Hursthouse then notes that a
social group functions well simply insofar as it enables its members to achieve the other
three ends relevant to the natural goodness of social animals, so that "[t]he individual
survival of social animals is in general served by their sticking with the group" and "[t]he
continuance of the species depends on the group's functioning well."141
Hursthouse's emphasis on interdependence in matters of our individual and collective
survival is in part the result of her hesitance to define human social animality in a way
that is discontinuous with that of other social species. When she considers the question of
what is characteristic about our species's way of functioning as a social group, she brings
up the fact that we communicate by means of language and notes that, while "there is
something very significant about that fact about us as a species," nevertheless "it is not
easy to see what the significance is"142 and concludes that there is nothing characteristic
about our way of being social. When not dealing with that question directly, however,
Hursthouse reveals that, while it is the case that "'[t]he way' human beings live varies
enormously from place to place, from time to time,"143 she is willing to commit to some
views about our uniquely human form of social animality. In her criticism of ethical
egoism, for instance, she notes that, as social animals, we survive both individually and
as a species not only through social co-operation but also by the upbringing that provides

140 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 201.
141 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 202.
142 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 219.
143 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 219.
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children with a sense that "morality [is] more than mere convention."144 To get a better
grasp on Hursthouse's understanding of what it means for humans to be social animals,
then, we must look to more unguarded moments like this one.
We can locate one of these unguarded moments by considering her denial of the
significance of language in explaining what makes our social animality a
characteristically human one. This denial might seem to cut our social animality off at the
Hobbesian interdependence described by Foot. Her comment, however, is also evocative
of Aristotle's answer to the same question, that is, the question of what difference
language makes to our particular social species. In Politics I.2, Aristotle states that many
animals have a voice, but only humans have speech. Animals able to make vocal sounds
employ these to communicate to each other their perception of what is pleasant or
painful, but the ability to employ language in addition to simply vocalizing allows
humans to communicate to each other what is "good and bad and just and unjust and
other things [of this sort]."145 Although Hursthouse seems to disclaim the significance of
language in explaining what makes our social animality a particularly human one, this
ability not only to perceive but to communicate a variety of normative distinctions does,
in fact, play an important role in her conception of our social lives. This is most evident
in her comments about the training of the emotions, particularly in her paradigm case of
such training put to bad ends, namely, the inculcation of racism. There, her comments
show that her understanding of what it means for us to be social animals goes beyond the
fact of our interdependence in meeting our basic needs and also includes the view that we
are causally relational beings.
Hursthouse shows that the training of the emotions is a process in which the rational and
the non-rational are intertwined. It is rational for two reasons. First, it is rational insofar
as it involves teaching children specific applications of normative terms by employing
evaluative statements in their presence, such as, to use some of Hursthouse's own

144 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 253.
145 1253a17-18. The bracketed words are a clarificatory amendment added to the text by Lord.
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examples, "such people are dangerous, ignorant, perverted," and "she wouldn't have
anything to do with him/she pushed him over?, quite right too, how brave, how
sensible."146 Second, in addition to encountering such baldly stated evaluative comments,
children will occasionally hear these comments paired with some rationale meant to
bolster them; it is not simply that members of certain races are said to be dangerous, for
instance, but that they are said to be so "because they can't control their passions, because
they hate us, because they are cunning and devious."147
Of course, these two rational aspects to the education of the emotions would have little
force on their own, especially in cases where the evaluative claims and their attendant
rationales could not be sustained in the face of much scrutiny. The influence of these
types of statements is strong because the young are disposed to be receptive to them, in
part due to "unconscious imitation."148 Imitation, however, may seem to be an odd sort of
culprit for the inculcation of racism. After all, there is nothing unusual about someone
who, taking on the role of a villain in a play, imitates immoral actions and utters base
sentences without thereby becoming wicked themselves. To get a better grasp on the kind
of imitation Hursthouse seems to have in mind—a kind that can play the educational role
she ascribes to it—it is helpful to borrow from Aristotle's account of imitation, or
mimesis. In Poetics 4, Aristotle claims that human beings are not only "the most imitative
creature[s] in the world"149 but that the first forms of learning that each individual
engages in are imitative in nature. Imitation is educational not only because we acquire a
variety of skills by imitating the actions of those who exercise those skills, but also
because humans delight in imitative behavior.150 The pleasure we get from imitation is

146 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 115.
147 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 115.
148 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999), p. 115.
149 1148b7-8.
150 Aristotle only specifies that "it is... natural for all to delight in works of imitation" (1148b8-9, emphasis
mine), and therefore delight in representations of things even when we would not care to witness the things
that are being represented or imitated. The point of his discussion, however, is to show that we gradually
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not an insignificant matter, since learning to take pleasure in the right things is partly
what virtue consists of, and associating pleasures with their proper objects is, for that
reason, "the right education."151 Imitation, then, is not simply the playful aping of others,
but a process that shapes the character of individuals.
Imitation, moreover, is later accompanied by what Aristotle, in Rhetoric II.11, calls
emulation. While taking pleasure in the parroting of the evaluative language of those
around us is a significant part of our moral development, emulation gives our imitations
normative force. Emulation arises from the admiration of a character trait "in others like
[us] by nature,"152 combined with the awareness that we lack that particular character
trait. The awareness of this lack gives rise to "a kind of distress"153 that motivates us to
acquire the relevant character traits by attempting to act as we would if we possessed
them. This differs from simple imitation in two important respects. The first is that
imitation is concerned with actions, while emulation is concerned with the character traits
that give rise to actions. Imitating someone, then, entails copying their behaviour, while
striving to emulate an admired friend's wittiness, for instance, might entail developing
our own idiosyncratic sense of humour rather than telling the same sorts of jokes they do
or adopting some feature of their persona. Emulation also has an evaluative component
that is absent from imitation. While we can imitate actions without endorsing them or
even while thinking them base or shameful, we only strive to emulate the character traits
we deem admirable, noble, and good. The evaluative nature of emulation further entails
that we are "contemptuous of others... who have the... attributes that are opposites of the

"created poetry out of [our] improvisations" (1148b23-24), which seems to imply that we take delight in the
act of imitation itself, a fact that is a bit obscured by his decision to focus his demonstration on the pleasure
we get from the witnessing imitations rather than the pleasure we get from engaging in them
151 Nicomachean Ethics II.3, 1104b8.
152 1388a30-31.
153 1388a30.
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emulated... ones,"154 whereas the actions that are the opposites of those we imitate are
not, thereby, objects of scorn.
It is this kind of Aristotelian imitation, rather than a simple copying of speech and
behaviour, Hursthouse appeals to in her account of the training of the emotions. We
begin, then, by adopting the evaluative language of those around us and learning, by
making repeated use of it ourselves, to find it pleasant and comfortable. Gradually, we
come to admire the characters of those who employ or embody the evaluative language
with which we have been familiarized. Our disposition to imitate, combined with this
admiration, gives rise to emulation and its cementing of the evaluative language that we
have grown familiar with, since it is no longer simply the language we find pleasant or
comfortable (and evaluative language that conflicts with it is, conversely, a source of
discomforting disorientation) but is now also taken to represent what is noble, good, and
right (and, conversely, the conflicting language is taken to represent what is shameful,
bad, and wrong).
I may seem to be equivocating by using "pleasure" and "comfort" more or less
interchangeably in the previous paragraph. This is not carelessness on my part, but,
rather, a feature of Aristotelian philosophy of mind. In Nicomachean Ethics VII.12,
Aristotle defines pleasure as unimpeded activity.155 When it comes to the pleasures
related to our ideas and their expression, much of the pleasure involved will be of a
tranquil kind, a kind of comfort that accompanies our use of familiar and well-worn
thought patterns. This tranquil pleasure is disturbed by the discomfort that arises from
challenges to these thought-patterns, as occurs when we confront applications of
evaluative terms that conflict with our own normative ascriptions. My interpretation of
the pleasures of unimpeded cognitive activity as involving this kind of comfort in
familiar thought patterns is further reinforced by a comment Aristotle makes in Politics

154 1388b21-26.
155 1153a14-15. I will set aside the question of how the accounts of pleasure in Book VII and Book X are
related as dealing with it in this context would be an unproductive digression.
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VIII.5, where he states that children should not be educated for the sake of play since
"[t]hey do not play when they are learning, as learning is accompanied by pain."156
It is clear from this discussion of imitation and emulation that the results of this training
of the emotions cuts rather deeply. As Hursthouse notes, there is another way in which
the inculcation of racism is non-rational: "it is... non-rational, or irrational, in the sense
that the whole system of the application of [normative] terms, their putative explanations
and justifications, is a tissue of falsehoods and inconsistencies."157 However, recognizing
this irrationality will not itself undo the emotional training. Not only will we not shed the
affective dispositions that we have developed simply because we come to learn that they
are irrational or shameful—at least, not in a short span of time—but Hursthouse also
maintains that "we still do not know" whether it is possible to "re-train [racist] emotional
reactions... into 'complete harmony' with reason."158
The affective dispositions that make up an important aspect of our character are shaped
by others in a way that is deep, long-lasting, and difficult to overcome. Hursthouse does,
then, hold that, in addition to being social animals in the way that bees, ants, wolves, and
elephants are, we are causally relational beings. Her claims about the training of the
emotions, however, might not by itself warrant modifications to the structure of natural
normativity. That we are causally relational beings might simply have implications for
what it means to raise children well, in ways that avoid the kind of bad training of the
emotions that Hursthouse describes, and this could be accounted for by appeal to the four
ends that Hursthouse ascribes to social species. Having the dispositions that make one a
perverse influence on the emotional development of children could count as failing to
contribute to the end of the good functioning of the social group. After all, it is clear from
Hursthouse's response to the ethical egoists that she believes a proper moral upbringing is
an important part of meeting our basic needs.

156 1339a27-29.
157 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 115.
158 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 115.
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3.1.c Relationality
Foot and Hursthouse’s discussions each highlight a different aspect of social animality.
Foot’s comments draw our attention to our interdependence, while Hurthouse focuses
more closely on causal relationality and cogently shows that we are beings who not only
need others to meet our ends but whose character is also shaped in response to and in
conjunction with the influences of others. These two accounts of social animality,
however, do not constitute an exhaustive characterization of the forms of relationality. If
we take into account what Natalie Stoljar calls “constitutive relationality,” we can think
of the descriptions of social animals we get from Foot and Hursthouse as supplying us
only with two components of the trichotomy of relationality.159 We must ask, then,
whether we should rest content with these two components or whether we are also
warranted in positing a deeper form of relationality than the ones discussed so far.
Unlike causal relationality, constitutive relationality describes features of ourselves that
are not only the result of our interactions with others, but features that have these
interactions as ongoing necessary conditions for their instantiation. The salient difference
between these two types of features, in other words, is whether the influence of others is
required to establish them or to sustain them. For example, if the explicit biases harbored
by my family members impart upon me early in life some implicit biases that will colour
my actions and reactions even once I have moved into social circles where I am no longer
exposed to their explicit manifestations, then we can think of these implicit biases as
being causally relational insofar as they arose from interaction with others but persist
without constant re-exposure to those forms of interaction. This is not the case with
features of ourselves that are constitutively relational. Consider, for instance, Stoljar’s
example of self-trust. Self-trust relies heavily on our own self-interpretation—if only
because we can only trust in our abilities, our understanding, and our decision-making if
we believe ourselves to be the kind of person who is capable of exercising these
capacities reasonably well—and our self-interpretation relies, in turn, “on the
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interpretation of the self by others.”160 Self-trust, then, is causally relational insofar as it
requires ongoing feedback from others and the absence of the relevant kind of feedback
can be sufficient for undermining this disposition.
Being deeply or constitutively relational animals (in addition to being social animals in
the sense of being interdependent and causally relational) means that in the absence of
confirmation from others, our subjective apprehension of the world will retain a sense of
subjectivity. It will lack the concrete and stable phenomenal character of things that have
objective reality. Our interactions with others, then, are indispensable to us not only
because we must cooperate to meet our needs or because it is in such spaces that our
character is forged, but also because our sense of the world as stable and concrete can
only be sustained with at least semi-regular interactions with others.
We are, in some sense, in the same position of Berkeley’s knower. As Berkeley noticed,
we cannot, by ourselves, preserve the stable and concrete character of the phenomena we
experience. However, unlike Berkeley, those operating from a secular worldview cannot
rely on the ubiquitous and constant vigilance of God to ensure the objective character of
our ideas (in the Berkelean sense). We must, instead, rely on the occasional—albeit
usually regular—confirmation from others, whether implicit or explicit, that we are
experiencing the world in common, that is, in roughly the same way they experience it.
Unlike Berkeley’s knower, then, we rely not on the infallible eye of God but on our
assessment of other humans’ experiences—and perhaps also those of other perceivers in
the animal kingdom—against which to check and calibrate our own. The absence of a
divine grounding for our experiences and our need to rely on other finite beings for this
grounding is the source of our phenomenological vulnerability, that is, the possibility
that, in seeking confirmation of our experience of the world, we can confront the flawed
apprehension of it by others or the absence of others altogether.
I will discuss some of the implications of this vulnerability for the natural goodness
model in the next chapter. For now, I will endeavour to bolster my claim that the natural
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goodness model of evaluation should account not only for our social animality but for a
deeper form of constitutive relationality by examining the effects of one of the aspects of
our vulnerability, namely, the possibility of being deprived of social contact.
Accordingly, in the next section I will survey and discuss some of the literature on the
effects of the long-term solitary confinement of inmates. Showing that the effects of
prolonged solitary confinement are not those that we would predict to befall a social
animal but are precisely those that we would expect to afflict relational beings will
provide us grounds for holding that humans are deeply relational and that we are
constantly playing a role in sustaining the stability of one another’s character, sense of
self, and grasp of external reality.

3.2 Solitary Confinement
In this section, I will first describe the conditions in which inmates in solitary
confinement are kept and then discuss some of the typical psychological effects of being
housed under such conditions for extended periods of time. I will discuss solitary
confinement in rather clinical terms, not because I believe we should be unperturbed by
the practice but because I marshal the psychological findings with a very precise and
narrow aim in mind. My current purpose is not to convey either the extent of the damage
suffered by inmates housed in solitary confinement or the horror of living in such
conditions. I am, instead, concerned with showing that there is something fundamental to
human nature that is not fully captured by Foot and Hursthouse’s comments about social
animality and with the revisions to natural normativity that should follow from
recognizing this. As such, I will need only to describe how solitary confinement radically
restricts interpersonal contact and to discuss only a small, specific subset of the
psychological effects of this restriction.
Before I proceed with my discussion of the psychological effects of solitary confinement,
there are two terminological matters that should be settled. First, there is the question of
what name to apply to the practice itself. Solitary confinement goes by many names. Ivan
Zinger, Cherami Wichmann, and D.A. Andrews, for instance, list "administrative
segregation, dissociation, isolation, seclusion, protective custody, and solitary
confinement" as terms that are often employed interchangeably and treated as
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synonymous.161 Of these, the terms "administrative segregation" and "solitary
confinement" are most commonly used to identify the practice in question.162 However, I
have reservations about labeling the practice "administrative segregation," since it does
not identify its defining features. As Julian V. Roberts and Robert J. Gebotys remark,
"[s]egregation implies collective separation, as in racial segregation."163 Inmates kept in
so-called administrative segregation, however, are not housed communally as a small
contingent of inmates that are kept separate from the prison's general population. Rather,
they are each separated from every other inmate and their opportunities for interpersonal
contact are deliberately curtailed. It is, then, isolation and solitude, rather than
segregation per se, that are the defining features of this form of confinement. As such, I
take "administrative segregation" to be a euphemistic term that obfuscates the nature of
the practice. For this reason, at pains of some slightly repetitive prose in the rest of this
chapter, I will refer to the practice as "solitary confinement" and avoid the use of
synonyms that do not connote the deprivation of human contact.
The other terminological matter concerns the name applied to the institutions in which
solitary confinement is practiced. As with the practice, the institutions are referred to by a
number of terms taken to be synonymous, such as "penitentiary," "prison," and
"correctional facility." The terms, while taken to be synonymous, have an etymology that
reflects different understandings of the purpose of incarceration. We can see this in the
way the various terms reflect the shifting rationales behind solitary confinement. Solitary
confinement in the United States has waxed and waned since the 19th century and can
generally be seen as having come in three separate waves.164 The first wave of solitary
confinement arose in the 19th century and was aimed at reforming the prisoners' thoughts

161 Ivan Zinger et al., "60 Days in Administrative Segregation" (2001), p. 50.
162 I should note, however, that these are sometimes distinguished from one another, as in the claim by the
government of Canada that "'administrative segregation' in Canada is different than solitary confinement,
because inmates can sometimes still have TV and staff visits" (Josh Wingrove, "Canadian government
rejects solitary confinement limits" [2014], n.p.). This distinction, however, is rarely made in the literature I
have reviewed, almost all of which uses the terms interchangeably.
163 Julian V. Roberts and Robert J. Gebotys, "Prisoners of Isolation" (2001), p. 86.
164 These three waves are discussed at length in Lisa Guenther's Solitary Confinement (2013).
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by isolating them in order to encourage introspection and repentance. It is this wave, in
which the prisoner was thought of as a penitent working toward spiritual repair, that gives
us the term "penitentiary." The second wave took place from the 1950s to the 1970s and
focused only on modifying the behaviour of criminals, rather than their souls. This aim of
correcting deviant behavior is reflected in the term "correctional facility." The third and
ongoing wave of solitary confinement differs from the first two insofar as it does not
purport to reform inmates, either spiritually or behaviourally. Rather, it is a method
employed simply to manage inmates deemed to be potentially dangerous to others or
themselves, a potential target of abuse from other inmates,165 or troublesome to the
correctional officers. As the phenomenologist Lisa Guenther puts it, the current American
system is one in which "the immobilization of prisoners has become an end in itself."166
The term that most reflects this wave of solitary confinement is "prison," with its root
meaning, derived from the French term "pris" (which may translate to "held"), implying
mere captivity. This term, then, is the most apt for the kind of facility I will be discussing.
Nevertheless, I am concerned with the effects of isolation on inmates rather than the
rationale behind the practice and, as such, I will employ the terminology quite freely,
reflecting the common usage that takes all or most of the terms for facilities in the penal
system to be equivalent rather than restrict myself to the more technical or even pedantic
taxonomy.
3.2.a: "a well-built machine": Solitary Confinement in American Supermax Prisons167
Inmates in solitary confinement spend their days in three small areas. The holding cells
that house them for most of their confinement are small cells whose dimensions range in

165 In many cases, this is done preemptively, as in the common practice of housing transgender women in
male prison facilities and placing them in solitary confinement in order to "separate [her] from general
population for her own protection" (American Civil Liberties Union, Worse than Second Class [2014], p.
9).
166 Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement (2013), p. xvi.
167 The quotation in this subchapter heading and the next are from Hans Christian Andersen. After
witnessing the condition of prisoners in solitary confinement after a tour of a prison, Andersen commented
that "It is all a well-built machine, a nightmare for the spirit" (qtd. in Smith, "The Effects of Solitary
Confinement" [2006], p. 460).

68

size from 48 square feet to 80 square feet.168 More evocatively, the size of the cells have
been compared to, among other things, "the size of a parking space"169 and "almost
exactly the size of a standard king mattress."170 Visual perception of activities that take
place outside the cell is typically obstructed by the presence of a door made of solid steel
rather than steel bars or a plexiglass pane. Inmates also have controlled access to an
exercise yard, which is surrounded either by a fence or a cement wall and often the only
sight available to the prisoner beyond the walls of the enclosed space is the sky above
them. While the term "exercise yard" may have spacious connotations, these are typically
quite small, so much so that Craig Haney reports that they "are so constraining they are
often referred to as 'dog runs'"171 and Laura Gottesdiener refers to them as "kennels" that
are "too small to do anything except pace back and forth."172 Finally, some of the inmates
have controlled access to showering facilities if there is no shower in their cell.
A stay in solitary confinement tends to be quite lengthy. The average length of a
prisoner's stay in solitary confinement varies across states and figures compiled by
Solitary Watch range from an average of 5.3 months in New York to 6.8 years in
California.173 While some of the prisoners are held for a few weeks, others are housed in
solitary confinement indefinitely and may be held for decades, as is the case for Albert
Woodfox, who has been housed in solitary for 43 years—longer than any other US
prisoner.174 While there is quite a variety in the length of stay across prisons and

168 The dimensions of the cells will vary across pentitentiaries. Craig Haney describes them as being "60to 80-square -foot cell[s]" ("Mental Health Issues" [2003], p. 127), while Bruce A. Arrigo and Jennifer
Leslie Bullock claim that the cells are "often 6 X 8 feet" ("The Psychological Effects of Solitary
Confinement" [2008], p. 624), or 48 square feet. In my survey of the literature on the psychological effects
of solitary confinement, I have encountered no reference to cells that are smaller than those mentioned by
Arrigo and Bullock, or larger than those described by Haney.
169 Laura Gottesdiener, "The Unbelievable Inhumanity of Solitary Confinement" (2012), n.p.
170 Thomas Silverstein, quoted in Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, "America's Most Isolated Federal
Prisoner" (2011), n.p.
171 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary" (2003), p. 126.
172 Laura Gottesdiener, "The Unbelievable Inhumanity of Solitary Confinement" (2012), n.p.
173 Sal Rodriguez, "Solitary Watch FAQ" (2012), n.p.
174 Alan Yuhas, "Angola Three: court expands Albert Woodfox's 43-year-long imprisonment" (2015), n.p.
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sentences, the daily and weekly routines of prisoners held in solitary is far more uniform.
Inmates spend almost all of their time in their cell, usually 23 hours a day, although
Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner report that some days do not include the one hour
reprieve spent in the exercise yard.175 Prisoners are allowed to leave the cell to go to the
exercise yard, usually for one hour each day. Access to the exercise yard, however, may
be far more infrequent than this. Thomas Silverstein, for example, reports that while he
was housed at United States Penitentiary Atlanta his time in the yard was limited to one
hour a week.176 Those who do not have showers in their cells are also allowed
occasional access to showering facilities. For those whose cell is equipped with a shower,
its use may still be regimented. The shower might, for instance, only be activated for
fifteen minutes three times per week.177
Those housed in solitary, then, experience only a slow rhythm to their days, with their
time in the cell broken up only by the daily access to the exercise yard and three meals
that are inserted into their cells by a slot in the door or wall. How inmates spend the rest
of their time within their cells will depend on what they are allowed to have in it. Many
of the cells have nothing but "Furniture... made of poured concrete... consist[ing] of a
fixed bunk, desk and a stool, as well as a shower and a toilet."178 This, it is obvious,
severely restricts the kinds of activities the prisoner can engage in during their
confinement. In certain facilities, some inmates will have the opportunity to spend their
time in one or two additional ways. Some, for instance, may be allowed to have books—
in some cases, only a bible, as was the case with the earlier Pennsylvania model—or be
provided with a radio or television. While the time in the exercise yard does provide a
slight change of scenery—although it may be little more than a change from being
enclosed by blank cement to being enclosed by blank cement walls—the yard is devoid

175 Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner, "Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons"
(2010), p. 104.
176 Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, "America's Most Isolated Federal Prisoner" (2011), n.p.
177 Laura Gottesdiener, "The Unbelievable Inhumanity of Solitary Confinement" (2012), n.p.
178 Amnesty International, "USA: Prisoners held in extreme solitary confinement in breach of international
law" (2014), n.p.
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of exercise equipment and, therefore, affords an even narrower range of activities than
are available within the cell.
Throughout this whole time, steps are taken to ensure that the inmates are kept isolated
from other human beings. As part of solitary confinement, inmates are alone in their
cells, and only access shower facilities and the exercise yard when no other inmates are
present. The design and management of solitary confinement units ensures that the
prisoners are not only housed in single-person cells but also deprived of contact from one
another and the guards. The isolation imposed upon them is primarily a deprivation of the
sight and touch of others. The doors and walls of their cells prevent them from seeing
anyone who may be passing by. Their meals are delivered to them through a slot in the
door or wall, which renders it difficult to glimpse much of the body of the person
providing the food—if it permits prisoners to see any of it at all—and does away with the
potential for physical contact that other methods of meal delivery would afford. The
prisoners are monitored by camera, eliminating the need for guards to check on them in
person, which might involve a face-to-face encounter. In some facilities, moreover, their
movement can be regulated remotely, by means of "computerized locking and tracking
systems."179 Cell extractions can involve physical contact, but even in cases where tactile
interaction is required the contact is either minimal—typically "limited to being touched
through a security door by a correctional officer while being placed in restraints or having
restraints removed"180—or violent in nature, as usually occurs when the extraction is the
result of an infraction committed by the inmate, in which case they "are subdued with
batons, shields, Tasers, and rubber bullets."181 As the nature of these interactions show,
Peter Schraff Smith is right to point out that "[t]he reduction of stimuli is not only

179 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement" (2003), p.
126.
180 Chase Riveland, quoted in Peter Schraff Smith, "The Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 443.
181 Bruce A. Arrigo and Jennifer Leslie Bullock, "The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement"
(2008), p. 626
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quantitative but qualitative," that is, "the occasional social contacts are seldom freely
chosen, are generally monotonous, and are not typically empathetic."182
Unlike the Pennsylvania system of the 19th century, there has been no great effort to
ensure that the prisoners live in a silent environment. While they are not able to converse
with anyone, they may nevertheless be exposed to a number of cacophonous sounds. The
guards of modern prisons do not wear woolen socks over their shoes as did their
predecessors, and the prisoners may be exposed "day and night" to the sound of "shouts
[and] muffled cries" as well as non-vocal sounds that nevertheless signal the presence of
another person, such as "the sounds of closing gates and rattling meal carts."183 Silence
was a key feature of the early penitentiary, since it was meant to be conducive to the
introspection that would—or so it was hoped—reform wayward souls. The presence of
auditory stimulus is no longer a concern in the modern supermax prison, where the object
of solitary confinement is simply to confine and manage inmates. As was the case with
the visual and tactile stimuli available to the prisoners, none of the auditory stimulus that
is experienced in the cells approximates ordinary human interaction. The prisoners may
be able to hear each others' screams but they cannot speak to each other in any
meaningfully communicative way.
We have, then, in these supermax housing units a total or almost total isolation from
meaningful human contact. Moreover, this isolation is not simply, as Lisa Guenther puts
it, "the empirical absence of other people"184 but also the elimination of the very
possibility of a meaningful significant encounter with another person, whether for weeks
or, for some of those who are held indefinitely, decades. This situation provides us with a
population of human beings who have been deprived of relational interactions and
examining the effects of this deprivation should provide us with insights into what kind
of social animals we are.

182 Peter Schraff Smith, "The Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 449.
183 Lorna A. Rhodes, "Questioning Supermax" (2010), p. 48.
184 Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement (2013), p. 147.
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3.2.b: The Isolation of (Merely) Social Animals
Before proceeding to an examination of the reported psychological effects of prolonged
solitary confinement, it will be helpful to consider what sorts of effects we can predict
would befall social animals under these conditions. Comparing this prediction with the
actual effects of confinement will give us a sense of whether Foot and Hursthouse’s
comments about social animality fully captures human relationality or whether we can go
further and posit a deeper, constitutive form of relationality as an aspect of the life form
of the species.
Solitary Confinement and Foot’s Hobbesian Social Animality
The Hobbesian conception of social animality articulated by Foot is, as we have seen
above, three-fold. It consists, first, of an interdependence requiring us to cooperate with
others in order to meet our basic needs; second, of a natural affection toward family
members; and, third, a desire for love and friendship. Even on this somewhat minimal
conception of social animality, it is clear that we cannot be isolated from others without
some harmful outcomes.
As concerns the first aspect of Hobbesian social animality—our dependence on others for
the satisfaction of our basic needs—total prolonged solitude would ordinarily leave us
unprotected and unable to provide for ourselves in any adequate manner. If we imagine
someone in a state of even greater solitude than is found in Hobbes' state of nature—say,
an individual fending for themselves in some remote wilderness, entirely disconnected
from other human beings—the importance of this interdependence is clear. Without any
cooperation from others, the outcomes of this individual's industrious endeavours would
likely be far less bountiful than they would be as part of a group effort or an economic
network. Moreover, without the aid of others, such an isolated individual would face
periods of great vulnerability during which illness or injury leaves them incapable of
repairing their shelters, harvesting or scavenging for nourishment, and evading or
confronting predators. Prolonged solitary confinement differs from this state of lonesome
industry insofar as the needs of the inmates are met without much contribution from
them. Indeed, while our imagined wilderness dweller would likely be compelled by
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necessity to spend most of their days exerting themselves, it is difficult to find an
existence less productive than one confined to a solitary housing unit and its adjoining
exercise yard. Yet, despite this, the basic needs of these prisoners are met with the help of
others, albeit from one-sided dispensations rather than co-operative activity. Perhaps
contrary to expectation, then, the first aspect of Hobbesian social animality—the
dependence on others for the provision of our basic needs—is satisfied adequately in the
radical isolation of solitary confinement.
We should not conclude from this, however, that our Hobbesian social animals can
flourish in these kinds of arrangements. Although the means for survival are provided,
the second and third aspects of Hobbesian social animality will be frustrated in any
situation of extended isolation. Our natural disposition to affection for loved ones is one
that we could imagine will emerge intact after a stay in solitary. This affective disposition
might function like the muscle memory of skills that we can execute expertly even after
prolonged periods of disuse. That is to say, even without the presence of loved ones to
call forth our affection for them, this affection may still be felt strongly once we are
reunited with them. It is also not clear that there are absolutely no opportunities for this
affection to manifest itself. We can, after all, rouse such feelings by thinking of our loved
ones, rehearsing our memories of them, or imagining our future with them. Moreover,
our disposition to affection might well increase as a result of isolation, since the
resumption of contact with family members after such a prolonged absence of human
interaction might be a source of overwhelming emotion. While it is possible to imagine
that absence really does make the heart grow fonder, or at the very least leaves its
tendency to fondness intact, we can also easily imagine that having no direct contact with
the objects of our affections could dim our emotional responses to them. Craig Haney's
work suggests, albeit indirectly, that this latter outcome is often the case. Haney has
identified five "social pathologies"—patterns of behaviour observed in released prisoners
who have formerly endured lengthy stays in solitary confinement—three of which might
indicate lasting damage to our natural affection. In some cases, the imposed inactivity of
the prisoner's housing unit can translate into a lack of "personal initiative" upon release,
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which can manifest itself as "[c]hronic apathy, lethargy, depression, and despair."185 A
second social pathology is "social withdrawal," which is an alienation from others that
results in "being disoriented and even frightened by [social contact]."186 Finally, a third
social pathology is the experience of "intolerable levels of frustration that, for some, turns
to anger and then even to uncontrollable and sudden outbursts of rage."187 While none of
these symptoms directly indicates a loss of affection for loved ones, it is quite possible
that chronic apathy and depression, social withdrawal, and uncontrollable anger and rage
either result, in part, from such a loss or bring about such a loss.
The frustration of the third aspect of Hobbesian social animality, that is, of our desire for
love and companionship, is even more obvious. It is true that ties and bonds may survive
an extended stay in solitary, and that friendships and romantic engagements can resume
and new ones can be forged once a prisoner is either returned to the prison's general
population or released from incarceration altogether. However, the desire for love and
companionship is not a desire for a latent connection but for a certain level of intimacy or
closeness with particular others. The satisfaction of this desire, then, requires not only an
affective disposition toward another person but actual physical proximity to them, or at
the very least some sort of direct, mutual interaction with them even if it is mediated via a
telephone line or computer monitor. While there may be some interaction between
inmates in solitary confinement and the staff who provide them with material necessities,
this will typically involve either minimal contact—as is the case when trays of food or
soap are dispensed through the cell door's cuffport—or violent contact—as is the case
when correctional officers will subdue an inmate or extract them from their cell and apply
severe restraints to them. Although some inmates engage in rule violations such as

185 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement" (2003), p.
139.
186 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement" (2003), p.
140.
187 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement" (2003), p.
140. The other social pathologies suffered by former prisoners of solitary confinement are a total
"dependen[ce] on institutions to organize their existence"and "a feeling of unreality that pervades one's
existence in [social contexts]" (pp. 138-139).
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throwing their bodily waste through their cell's cuffport188 in order to provoke the guards
to come into violent contact with them, this is—even if deemed preferable by the inmate
to a total absence of physical contact—an act of desperation and not one that will result in
the meeting of a social animal's need for companionship.
Solitary Confinement and Hursthouse's Aristotelian Social Animality
Hursthouse's Aristotelian account of social animality is more complex than Foot's.
However, despite this, it is not likely that someone who ascribes to Hursthouse's
conception should expect individuals in solitary confinement to flourish even less than
would be predicted by an adherent of Foot's Hobbesian version. Hursthouse's account of
the training of the emotions in children and youth shows that an important component of
the social aspect of our species is that we have strong tendencies to imitate the behaviour
of others and, beginning a bit later in our lives, to emulate their character traits. These
components, however, are causally relational, that is, they play a role in establishing
character traits and dispositions. As such, they show only that some aspects of the
development of our behavioural, affective, and epistemic dispositions are strongly
influenced by our interactions with members of our social circles. The causally relational
processes described by Hursthouse will remain totally inoperative in conditions of radical
social isolation, unless they operate weakly in response to our memories of the behaviour
and character of others we have previously encountered. This does not mean that changes
in emotional dispositions, or in character more generally, will not occur while someone is
cut off from all social contact. All such development, however, will occur according to
non-relational processes such as the formation of new habits (something that is inevitable
given how alien the lifestyle of intensive confinement is in comparison to the ways of life
found outside the prison system or even in the prison's general population), introspection,
and the gradual attenuation of existing dispositions brought about by their inactivity.
As interdependent social animals, then, prolonged isolation impedes our flourishing, and
as causally relational social animals this kind of isolation cuts us off from some of the

188 Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement (2013), p. 188
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influences that help establish and shape our character. The literature on the psychological
effects of solitary confinement, which I will summarize in the next section, shows,
however, that there is more to our relationality than this.
3.2.c: "a nightmare for the spirit": The Effects of Solitary Confinement
The pioneering 20th century work on the psychological effects of solitary confinement is
a study by the psychiatrist Stuart Grassian. In 1982, Grassian conducted a series of
interviews with prisoners held in solitary confinement at the Walpole State Penitentiary
(since renamed the Massachusetts Correctional Institution - Cedar Junction) as part of a
class action law suit alleging that the conditions in the prison's confinement units were
unconstitutional.189 The inmates reported a series of symptoms that Grassian calls
"strikingly consistent"190 and which he has labeled "SHU syndrome," named for the
Special Housing Units in which the prisoners were isolated. Seven symptoms collectively
make up the SHU syndrome:
a) a gradual inability to tolerate ordinary external stimuli
b) perceptual distortions, illusions, and hallucinations
c) severe panic attacks
d) difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory
e) unwelcome and intrusive aggressive and violent thoughts
f) paranoia and fear of persecution
g) outbursts of violence and loss of impulse control.191
Grassian remarks that these symptoms are not only significantly consistent among the
inmates he interviewed, but also "strikingly unique; [since] some of the symptoms... are
found in virtually no other psychiatric illness."192 This is especially the case with the
perceptual disturbances reported by the prisoners, which are "almost pathognomonic of
the syndrome, meaning they are symptoms virtually found nowhere else."193 For the

189 Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 432 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1982).
190 Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 335.
191 Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), pp. 335-336.
192 Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 337.
193 Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 337.
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purposes of this chapter, I will discuss the perceptual disturbances associated with
solitary confinement rather than the other symptoms of the SHU syndrome, not only
because of its uniqueness but also because it illustrates well the loss of the inmates' grip
on reality as a result of intense isolation.
The loss of perceptual constancy is a characteristic feature of the hallucinations
experienced in isolation. In the case of auditory constancy, this loss means that sounds
become louder or softer without a corresponding change in the intensity of the auditory
stimulus. In the case of visual constancy, the loss results in "objects becoming larger or
smaller, seeming to 'melt' or change form."194 One of Grassian's interviewees, for
example, reports an experience in which he receives pancakes in his meal tray and
witnesses them seeming to shift in size, "get[ting] real small, like silver dollars."195 Other
prisoners have reported seeing their cell doors vibrating and "the surface of the wall
seem[ing] to budge."196 Given the loss of perceptual constancy, it is no surprise that
Silverstein claims that, while housed in solitary, he "lost some ability to distinguish what
was real" and ceased to be able to differentiate between his dreams and his waking
reality.197
The illusions experienced by the inmates do not only affect their ability to accurately
perceive their surroundings, but also result in uncertainties about their own persons. As
Arrigo and Bullock put it, not only does "complete lack of social contact make it difficult
to distinguish what is real from what is not" but also "what is external from what is
internal."198 Grassian's interviewee who seemed to witness his pancakes shrinking also
reports instances of being unsure whether someone has hit him or not (despite,

194 Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006), p. 337.
195 Anonymous inmate, quoted in Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006),
p. 335.
196 Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement (2013), p. 35.
197 Thomas Silverstein, quoted in Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, "America's Most Isolated Federal
Prisoner" (2011), n.p.
198 Bruce A. Arrigo and Jennifer Leslie Bullock, "The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement"
(2008), p. 627.
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presumably, being entirely alone at the time).199 Guenther states that the prisoners' "basic
sense of identity" is so threatened by prolonged confinement that inmates can lose
features so fundamental to their own self-perception, such as the ability to know whether
or not they are experiencing pain and the capacity to "distinguish their own pain from that
of others."200 She further notes that, isolated from social contact, inmates in solitary lack
the capacity "even to tell where [their] own bodily existence begins and ends."201
3.2.d: Solitary Confinement and Relational Beings
Foot and Hursthouse's theories allow us to predict some of the quite serious effects that
inmates in prolonged solitary confinement might undergo as a result of their social
isolation. Yet they do not allow us to predict one of the most striking consequences of
solitary confinement. These accounts of social animality give us neither the grounds to
predict that isolation will lead to a hallucinatory disconnection from external reality and
the loss of concrete boundaries in one's sense of self, nor does it provide us with the
resources to explain why such effects arise. To account for these effects, we need to posit
a deeper relationality than the social animality described by the natural goodness
theorists. We are, then, not only social animals who must engage in cooperative
endeavors, feel affection for others and seek companionship, and develop our character in
response to the example of others; we are also relational beings who can only experience
the world and our selves as objective, solid, and stable when we experience them jointly
with others. We are beings for whom the deprivation of others is not only dreary and
distressing, but also alters our experience of the world, so that, as Guenther puts it, it
"become[s] equivocal for [us], as if phenomena have dissolved into mere
appearances."202

199 Anonymous inmate, quoted in Stuart Grassian, "Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement" (2006),
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Moreover, while the psychological studies of the effects of solitary confinement rarely
venture hypotheses about what causes us to lose our grip on reality in the absence of
others, there is one notable exception: Craig Haney. After discussing the results of his
interviews with 100 randomly selected prisoners confined in solitary at California's
Pelican Bay State Prison, Haney offers an explanation for the prevalence of perceptual
distortions in the interviewees. Commenting on his findings, he states that the "feeling of
unreality that pervades one's existence in these places" is due to the isolated prisoners
having no "routine and recurring opportunities to ground [their] thoughts and feelings in a
recognizable human context."203 Since "so much of our individual identity is socially
constructed and maintained," the prolonged frustration of these interpersonal acts of
grounding "leads to an undermining of the sense of self."204 It is this need for these
routine and recurring opportunities that makes us constitutively relational beings. Our
sense of the concrete and stable character of our selves and the external world is not
simply established by our interactions with others, but must be regularly sustained by
renewed contact. As Lisa Guenther puts it, the fact that our sense of a stable external
reality and our concrete sense of self can be undermined simply by the absence of others
indicates that we are "hinged subjects," that is, beings whose subjectivity is not an
atomistic "point"205 and who can, therefore, "become unhinged when the concrete
experience of other embodied subjects is denied for too long."206
What we have here, then, is not merely a terminological dispute over how to define
"social animals;" there is a significant difference between social animality and this
deeper, constitutive relationality. Yet it might be tempting to preserve the simplicity of
Hursthouse's theory by simply redefining social animality so that it includes this deeper
relationality—as Hursthouse herself seems to have added complexity to Foot's definition

203 Craig Haney, "Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and 'Supermax' Confinement" (2003), p.
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by adding to it a causally relational dimension, rather than positing a separate imitative
aspect of human function. This is a temptation, however, that I believe we should resist.
For one thing, there does seem to be something qualitatively different between, on the
one hand, our drive to live with others communally and, on the other, our being incapable
of keeping a cognitive grasp on the world without the at least occasional presence of
others, and this difference seems to indicate that they should be thought of as discrete
aspects of the human life form and, consequently, referred to using different terminology.
There is also the fact that including this kind of relationality in the structure of natural
normativity—whether we include it as a component of social animality or count it as a
separate aspect—will give rise to a new end or set of ends against which we must
evaluate the goodness of an individual's dispositions. While there is no rule dictating that
a variant of the natural goodness theory should not posit more than one end per aspect of
a species’ life form, prudence also dictates that we should not risk conflating the end
corresponding to social animality with those corresponding to relationality. In other
words, whatever the ends corresponding to relationality turn out to be, they will not be
equivalent or reducible to the end of the good functioning of the social group, and our
theoretical classification of them should reflect this. Finally, we must also remember that
the theory of natural goodness is one that is employed not only to evaluate the goodness
of human traits, but also those of all living beings. We should be careful, then, not to
import too much into our concept of social animality that we might doubt applies to nonhuman social animals. We find cooperation, imitation, and affection across various social
species, and while emulation might seem to be a specifically human trait, we can
reasonably consider it to be a type of imitation that arises when the imitative disposition
of rational beings is exercised in conjunction with the kinds of normative evaluations
enabled by rationality. When it comes to experiencing the objectivity and stability of the
world in relation to others, however, it is far less clear whether this extends to elephants,
gorillas, dogs, and other non-human social animals. We should, therefore, leave open the
possibility that there are at least some social animals who are not also relational animals
and our theory should reflect this by making social animality and relationality discrete
components of the structure of natural normativity.
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3.3 Solitary Confinement and Minimal Sensory Stimulation
My defense of the claim that we are relational beings has relied in great part on the
effects of the social deprivation that is imposed on inmates in solitary confinement. A
difficulty arises, however, from other features of solitary confinement that could be the
source of at least some of the effects I have discussed in the previous section. One feature
of solitary confinement is the minimal sensory stimulation that is a characteristic feature
of life within secure housing units. The conditions, it is true, do not amount to sensory
deprivation—the inmates are afforded, after all, an illuminated environment, within
earshot of the activity outside the cell and the shouts and screams of other inmates, and
unlike those who float in sensory deprivation tanks they have constant opportunity for
tactile interaction with solid objects—but the objects of their sensory experiences are
rather bland and intensely routine. To put it more crudely, they are not deprived of seeing
but they are not given much to look at. While not amounting to deprivation, this minimal
sensory stimulation may nevertheless give rise to perceptual distortions that approximate
those that result from sensory deprivation. If it is the case that the unstable character of
our experience of the external world and of features of ourselves that result from
prolonged solitary confinement can be attributed to the lack of sensory stimulation and
not to the deprivation of human contact, then I have missed the mark in identifying it as
evidence of a constitutive relationality, even if it would still indicate a need for revising
Hursthouse’s model of natural normativity.
This problem is compounded by the difficulty in prising apart isolation and minimalistic
sensations in ordinary conditions. It is rare to find situations in which there is social
interaction and also sensory minimalism207 given that the mere visual perception of
another human being provides us with rich sensory stimulation, and this richness is
magnified if we also hear them speak, sing, or hum, or if we touch or are touched by
them. More common are situations in which there is ample sensory stimulation but no
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The term “sensory minimalism” may seem an inappropriate gloss of “minimal sensory stimulation” if
the term “minimalism” is taken to suggest a kind of intentionality, as is the case, for instance, with works of
art described by this adjective. I have no qualms in using the term, however, because there is nothing
adventitious about the limited stimulus available in the deliberately designed solitary housing units.
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contact with other human beings. However, even relevant cases of this sort should be
difficult to find, since most would not likely choose to prolong their isolation to the point
of incurring any distressing or damaging effects from it. Even Thoreau, who famously
sought some measure of remove from society by living for more than two years in a cabin
by Walden Pond, did not attempt to live in any kind of radical isolation. In fact, he
follows his praise of solitude in Walden with a chapter describing the visitors to his cabin,
noting that “I had more visitors while I lived in the woods than at any other period of my
life.”208 Moreover, even when cases of isolation with rich sensory experience can be
identified, we face a problem regarding the sample size. In analyzing the effects of
solitary confinement, we benefit from an artificial and carefully constructed institutional
situation which ensures that there are a large number of people undergoing similar
conditions for extended periods of time. Solitary Watch reports estimated that there were
80,000 to 100,000 inmates housed in solitary confinement in American prisons in
2015.209 The American penal system, then, provides researchers with a large population
on which to study the effects of extended isolation, allowing them to eliminate the
occasional outlier or individual whose experimental conditions have somehow been
compromised. No such experimental luxury is afforded to those who wish to study
extended isolation outside these kinds of strict institutional confines.
Nevertheless, while there is no perfect population on which to study the effects of
isolation in the absence of minimalistic sensory stimulation, there are studies of a few
situations, helpfully compiled by Grassian, that approximate some of the features of
solitary confinement and can provide us with some preliminary evidence. Grassian notes
that those who spend time confined in small groups, in situations that offer limited
environmental stimulus, such as cases of “men isolated on a Pacific island, in submarines,
and on Arctic expeditions,” show “dramatically increased levels of hostility, interpersonal
conflict, and paranoia.” 210 Not surprisingly, the smallest possible groups, those

208

Henry David Thoreau, Walden (1962), p. 222.

209

Sal Rodrigez, “Solitary Watch FAQ” (2015), n.p.

210

Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement” (2006), p. 357.

83

composed solely of two individuals, proved to be the situation that is “the most
pathogenic of all” and is “associated with especially high rates of mutual paranoia and
violent hostility.” 211 Grassian focuses a bit more closely on explorers and researchers
living in Arctic and Antarctic habitats. This situation in some ways provides a closer
parallel to solitary confinement than do the other small groups mentioned above. While
those living in polar habitations are not entirely cut off from human contact—Grassian
mentions that they usually house groups of “fewer than fifty members”—they are
confined for long periods of time, given that “winters can last for up to nine months with
weather conditions so cold... that leaving the confines of the indoors is dangerous.” 212
Individuals living in these conditions have been reported to be afflicted by “winter-over
syndrome,” the symptoms of which are “progressively worsening depression, hostility,
sleep disturbance, impaired cognitive functioning, and paranoia.” 213 Individuals in small
group confinement, then, display some of the symptoms that are characteristic of the
SHU syndrome that results from prolonged solitary confinement. However, it is notable
that the symptoms highlighted by Grassian as characteristic of group confinement do not
include the kind of perceptual disturbances experienced by isolated inmates. Things are
different, however, in cases of restricted stimulation that are coupled with isolation.
Military pilots who undergo lengthy solo flights report not only the kind of anxiety
experienced in polar habitations but some also describe “[f]eelings of derealization,
feelings or detachment from reality, and perceptual distortions.” 214 Grassian also
discusses the reported experience of individuals undertaking long solo voyages by sea
and sailors who find themselves alone as the result of shipwreck. Of these, he notes that
they “have generally described ‘disturbances in attention and in organization of thought,
labile and extreme affect, hallucinations and delusions.’” 215
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As mentioned above, these studies do not provide a perfect counterpart to serve as a kind
of makeshift control group for extended solitary confinement. Nevertheless, the
differences in the characteristic symptoms experienced by small groups in conditions of
restricted sensory stimulation and those experienced by isolated individuals in such
conditions suggest that the experience of the self and the external world as unstable or
unreal is primarily caused by the isolation imposed by solitary confinement rather than its
accompanying sensory minimalism.

3.4 Solitary Confinement and Forced Incarceration
Minimal sensory experience is not the only feature of solitary confinement that might
cause trouble for my analysis. Violence and imposed confinement are also entangled
along with sensory minimalism and social isolation. Prisoners in solitary confinement, in
the first place, find themselves in their situation as the result of the wills of others. The
involuntariness of their condition means that they are not in the same kind of situation
that those who have confined themselves voluntarily, to work in submarines or polar
habitats, for example. They are, additionally, in a different situation than those of others
who are isolated involuntarily. Shipwreck survivors or those adrift at sea, for instance,
are, like prisoners, in situations they have not chosen to enter, but unlike inmates in
solitary confinement they find themselves in those situations as the result of impersonal
forces rather than the deliberate decision of other human beings. Additionally, the
prisoners know that the only substantial contact they can provoke from the correctional
staff is violent in nature, as was described in Section 2.a. There is, then, a violence that
suffuses solitary confinement and it may be this violence that accounts for at least some
of the effects I contend are the result of isolation.
There is one consideration that might mitigate our worries about the violent nature of the
confinement imposed on inmates. It is, namely, the difficulty in knowing whether we
should, in the context of this inquiry, treat violence as a feature of the confinement that is
separate from the isolation or, rather, as a component of that isolation. There is something
social or relational about the violence (both its threat and its execution) and imposition
experienced by inmates in the penal system, but its involuntary nature means that it
cannot have the character of cooperation and cannot be experienced as a joint endeavour.
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The violence experienced in solitary confinement, in other words, ensures that there is
always a rift between the inmates and the correctional officers with whom they might
have some kind of contact. While it is, then, a feature of solitary confinement that is
distinct from the physical isolation of inmates, we can nevertheless understand it as
propping up the sense or experience of isolation.
I do not, however, have to hang my hat on this response alone; it can be supplemented by
considering the case studies described in the previous section. Something at least
analogous to the hallucinatory effects experienced as part of SHU syndrome have been
reported by those who undertook lengthy solo flights, solo sea voyages, and by
shipwrecked sailors. The shipwrecked sailors, it is true, found themselves in their
situation involuntarily, although not as a result of another’s will, but this was not the case
for the military pilots or the solitary seafarers. The fact that those who undergo isolation
voluntarily for some period of time experience at least some small or preliminary loss of
their grip on reality suggests that it is the inability to engage in social reality checking, to
borrow a phrase from Haney, and not the violence or forced confinement that is the
source of the perceptual disturbances experienced in prolonged solitary confinement.

3.5 Conclusion
After spending time in jail for refusing to pay the poll-tax, Thoreau mocked his jailers'
attempts to punish his transgression by locking him up:
as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the
door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the
light, I could not help but being struck with the foolishness of that institution
which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked
up.... As they could not reach my mind, they had resolved to punish my body,
just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a
spite, will abuse his dog.216
It is clear from the effects of solitary confinement described above that Thoreau had
significantly underestimated the psychological harm that could be inflicted upon a person

216 Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience" (1962), pp. 102-103.
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with little more than thick and solid doors and walls.217 It is precisely because we are
more than mere flesh and blood and bones that prolonged confinement in isolation from
others can cause us to lose our grip not only on the external environment but also on our
sense of self. As I have shown in this chapter, we are harmed in this way by radical
isolation because we are constitutively relational beings, rather than the kinds of
atomistic beings Thoreau supposes us to be.
I concluded Chapter One with Hursthouse's model of natural normativity. For
Hursthouse, the evaluation of the goodness of plants, either as individuals or of their
specific parts and operations, is conducted in light of the species ends of survival and the
continuance of the species. For animals capable of emotion and desire, the evaluations of
their parts, operations, and actions must also take into account the species end of the
avoidance of pain and the enjoyment of pleasure in ways that are characteristic of that
species. For our evaluations of the goodness of parts, operations, and actions of social
animals, we must also consider how conducive these are to the good functioning of the
social group. While Hursthouse posits no fifth end that arises in the evaluation of rational
beings, I concluded Chapter Two by defending the addition of contemplation as an end
relevant to the evaluation of the goodness of rational animals. At the close of this chapter,
I have added a new aspect of species function to the structure of natural normativity by
defending the claim that human beings are deeply relational, that is, relational in a way
that goes beyond the relationality of (mere) social animality. This metaphysical view,
however, does not have normative pay-off for the natural goodness theory until we draw
out some of its implications for the assessment of the goodness of character traits. This
chapter ends, then, with an unanswered question: should the structure of natural
normativity include some new species end corresponding to the relational aspect of the
human life form? I devote the next chapter to providing an at least partial answer to this
question by positing recognition as an end relevant to the evaluation of the dispositions
and traits of relational beings.

217 Thoreau's pronouncement on the harm of imprisonment was based on a far easier stay than the one a
typical supermax prisoner faces. Not only was Thoreau imprisoned only for a single day, but he had a cell
mate with whom he spent that day in conversation.
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Chapter 3

4

Recognition I: From Relationality to Recognition

As we saw in the first chapter, Hursthouse’s model for evaluating the goodness of human
beings rests on an understanding of humans as possessing a few relevant traits: the ability
to perform actions, the psychological complexity required to feel pleasure and pain, the
collective organizing and needs that arise from being social animals, and the rationality
that enables us to endorse things as good or bad. In the previous chapter, I appealed to
reports on the psychological phenomenological effects of prolonged solitary confinement.
One thing that is clear as the result of that discussion is that Hursthouse’s model should
be supplemented with another important but easily overlooked feature of human function,
namely, our relationality.218 In this and the following chapters, I will draw out some of
the implications of this relationality for an account of the virtues.
My exploration of whether Hursthouse’s model can be expanded continues in this second
and final part of my project. Chapters One to Three were concerned with laying the
metaethical and metaphysical underpinnings of the virtues, first by outlining the natural
goodness model for the evaluation of character traits and, second, by adding nuance to
the account of human nature posited by Hursthouse. Chapters Four to Six are devoted to
drawing out the normative consequences of the constitutive relationality discussed in the
previous chapter. I begin that work in this chapter by explaining and defending my
contention that, as relational beings, the goodness of our character traits must be
evaluated partly in terms of how conducive they are to meeting our need for recognition.
I will then add precision to the concept of recognition and isolate a few of its components
by drawing some conceptual and terminological distinctions. The final two chapters will
be devoted to providing an outline of the virtues of recognition, starting with what I will
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call the virtues of cognizing (Chapter 5) followed by those I will call the virtues of
recognizing (Chapter 6).

4.1 Recognition
Now that we have established that human beings are relational animals we must ask what
implications this has for our model of natural goodness. The addition of relationality to
our account of the morally salient aspects of human function opens up two theoretical
paths, but it is not immediately clear down which of them the conclusions of the previous
chapter should lead us. Human relationality may, on the one hand, give rise to additional
ends relevant to the evaluation of natural goodness, in the same way that all of the aspects
of the human form of life discussed so far have. That is, just as evaluations of the natural
goodness of emotionally complex animals must factor in the individual organism’s
tendency (or, more precisely, its parts’, operations’, and actions’ tendencies) to promote
the enjoyment of pleasure and avoidance of pain in ways that are characteristic to the
species of which it is a member, so relationality could give rise to some new end against
which we are to measure the natural goodness of human individuals (or, to be more
precise once again, their cognitive, affective, and behavioural dispositions). On the other
hand, it is possible that the addition of relationality leaves the evaluative structure
unchanged. Like rationality as it is understood in Hursthouse’s account—although not in
the account I defended in Chapter Two—it would modify our understanding of human
morality and flourishing without positing any additional ends against which to evaluate
character traits. In the case of Hursthouse’s account of rationality, this means that, unlike
non-rational animals, humans are capable not only of desiring and pursuing certain things
but also of endorsing them as good. This ability to engage in normative endorsement
entails some modifications in our understanding of human goodness, such as giving rise
to a concept of moral responsibility that is absent from our evaluation of the goodness of
the members of other species. What it does not entail for Hursthouse, however, is any
change in the ends against which we measure the goodness or badness of some character
trait. If this is the sort of change that is brought about by taking relationality into
consideration, then there will be implications for our understanding of human goodness,
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but whatever those implications will be, they will leave our “table of the virtues,” and
possibly even their ordering, intact.
We are proceeding into uncharted territory (uncharted within the fields of Virtue Ethics
and Natural Goodness, at any rate) and it will be easier to begin mapping out the
implications of relationality—of the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 3, we are beings for
whom the very objective character of the world requires uptake of our experiences from
others—by focusing on the question that is central to Foot’s approach to ethics, and to
Anscombe’s for that matter, namely, the question of what needs we have in virtue of the
kinds of beings we are. As social animals, for instance, we are beings who need
friendship, love and affection, and co-operation in securing our means of survival.
Whatever may be our conception of the virtues of social animals, it must be understood
as being conducive to fulfilling those needs. Framing the question of what relationality
means for natural goodness in these terms will reveal that the proper approach to
implementing human relationality into our system of natural normativity will be to
modify the structure of that normativity and, correspondingly, our understanding of some
of the virtues. In the previous chapter, we have seen that our experience of the world and
ourselves as concrete, stable, and objective depends on receiving some confirmation from
others of the features of our experience. One of our central needs as relational beings,
then, is recognition from others, specifically, acknowledgment that others perceive the
world as we perceive it, at least to some extent. As will be clearer after the discussion of
relational harms, including gaslighting, in the next section, our ability to flourish requires
some confirmation or uptake of our experience.
Recognition is no simple idea but, rather, a family of concepts that operate at various
social levels and perform a number of functions. Much of the philosophical discussion of
recognition concerns recognition at the macro-social level. At the level of politics,
recognition has been promoted in part as an antidote for the indifference that is built into
the notion of toleration. As Judith Butler remarks, toleration can be considered “a weak
instrument, often presupposing a disdain for those toward whom it is directed.” Those
who acknowledge and approve of political and legal safeguards against discriminatory
and prejudicial treatment afforded by toleration yet find its built-in disdain troubling or

91

harmful in itself “favor recognition as a more robust and affirmative alternative.”219 The
political recognition that is advocated as an alternative ranges from simple economic
redistribution motivated by concerns for equity, as Rasmus Sommer Hansen has
proposed,220 to a legal protectionism of marginalized or threatened culture, as promoted
by Charles Taylor,221 and, of course, models of recognition that lie between these or, as
in Nancy Fraser’s account of recognition, encompasses them both.222 Outside the realm
of economics and state politics there is also a macro-social form of recognition operating
at the less formal level of culture. Cultural recognition can take the form of
representation, that is, of contributions to the social imaginary that gives certain religions,
cultures, ethnicities, and various forms of social identities more social visibility. We
have, for instance, thanks to the Hollywood Code, entire decades of American cinema
during which cinematic depictions of homosexual characters were either entirely absent
or conveyed only in minor and heavily coded ways.223 More recently, cultural
representation has received widespread news coverage when a selection of only white
actors and actresses were nominated for the 2016 Academy Awards, prompting critiques
of both the awards themselves and the representation of race and ethnicity in mainstream
cinema more generally.224
My concern, however, is with recognition as it operates on a much smaller scale, namely,
in the personal interactions of individuals. I want to briefly acknowledge, albeit only to
set it aside, that there is no clean separation between micro- and macro-social
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recognition. After all, institutional structures, laws, and cultural representation are the
products of the efforts, promotion, or indifference of a number of individual actors. On
the micro-social side, the influence of the larger scale is evident as well. We are mimetic
and emulative beings and our individual acts of recognition or non-recognition can be
informed by the conduct promoted by the laws, the institutional normalization of certain
features of society, and by the content and tenor of political discourse. We also easily
succumb to enculturation, so that our perspective is always conditioned by the cultural
products we imbibe. Despite this interplay, I will focus quite squarely on interpersonal
recognition in isolation, with only rare allusions to recognition as it operates at the
macro-social level. I do this not in an effort to over-simplify the matter but to pin-point
the virtues that arise from our need for interpersonal recognition. As such, I will, in what
follows, obviate two obvious questions that arise from my inquiry, namely, how we are to
conceptualize and understand the interaction between the micro- and macro-social forms
of recognition and whether collectives such as institutions can also be the bearers of
virtues and vices. In what follows, then, “recognition” of an individual will denote only
the acknowledgment or corroboration of their experience of the world, and the virtues
that arise from consideration of such recognition will apply only to individual agents and
not the various collectives in which they may find themselves operating.

4.2 Recognition and Relational Harms
The previous chapter dealt with conditions in which experiential uptake is almost entirely
withheld. Although I appealed to the psychological outcomes of solitary confinement in
order to make a general point about human experience—that some of its features that are
easily taken for granted as simply given are, in fact, products of a constantly renewing
but discreet process of corroboration—it may not be evident that the harms suffered by
those who are housed in such extreme conditions have much relevance to the flourishing,
let alone the virtues, of those who are fortunate enough to have avoided such intense
incarceration. We are not, however, beings whose relationality can be used against them
only as a form of prolonged torture; we can suffer relational harms in far more mundane
contexts. A brief consideration of what is known in the psychological literature as
“gaslighting” will suffice, I hope, to show that relational harms associated with failures of
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recognition occur in ordinary situations and that taking them seriously should have
implications for our understanding of virtuous conduct.
Gaslighting
Gaslighting owes its oddly non-clinical-sounding name, lacking the medical grativas of
terms derived directly from Latin or Classical Greek, to a 1938 stage play titled Gas Light
and a more widely known 1944 film adaptation by George Cukor of the same name
(albeit rendered as Gaslight). Both depict a murderer who attempts to cover up his search
for his victim’s valuable jewelry by convincing his wife that she is merely hallucinating
when she perceives evidence of his activities, including the dimming of the titular gas
lights in her home. The psychological phenomenon that bears the name refers to similar
attempts to discredit a person’s apprehension of some features of the world.
Kate Abramson defines gaslighting as a form of “emotional manipulation” with the aim
of “induc[ing] in someone the sense that her reactions, perceptions, memories and/or
beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds—paradigmatically, so
unfounded as to qualify as crazy.”225 Gaslighting differs from the mere dismissal of
someone, “for dismissal simply fails to take another seriously as an interlocutor, whereas
gaslighting is aimed at getting another not to take herself seriously as an interlocutor.”226
Two clarifications are important at this point. The first concerns Abramson’s choice of
language in describing the effects that gaslighting and gaslighters “aim” at producing.
This intentional language can be misleading since those who engage in gaslighting often
do so without any aim in mind. As Abramson herself points out, while some cases of
gaslighting are deliberate, the typical cases are those perpetrated by individuals with no
conscious intention of eliciting its effects in another.227 The second clarification concerns
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the distinction between dismissal and gaslighting. They are, indeed, separate phenomena,
but they are related insofar as dismissal is one of the causes of gaslighting. While a single
or occasional instance of dismissal will be unpleasant, any kind of systematic or
pervasive dismissal risks producing the effects of gaslighting. Abramson illustrates the
way that individual dismissals can pile up and come to have this greater cumulative effect
in one of her examples of gaslighting. The example takes the form of a quotation from an
anonymous and possibly fictional (although the formatting of the quotation, with its use
of an elliptical mark, suggests otherwise, as does the prevalence of such accounts)228
source:
I moved out of one field of philosophy in grad school due to an
overwhelming accumulation of small incidents... When I tried to describe to
fellow grad students why I felt ostracized or ignored because of my gender,
they would ask for examples. I would provide examples, and they would
proceed through each example to ‘demonstrate’ why I had actually
misinterpreted or overreacted to what was actually going on.229
Here we have a case of a person whose experience of sexism is dismissed by her
colleagues. It is not difficult to imagine how the pervasive dismissal of her experience
among her peers could lead her to doubt not only her interpretation of her experience but
also her capacity to assess such situations properly. Abramson also mentions that
gaslighting “frequently involves isolating the target in various ways”230 and this, too,
exacerbates the effects of the dismissals since it decreases the odds that the person facing
frequent dismissal will find others who will give uptake to their experiences, serving as a

example; by promoting deferential behaviour in a spouse; or simply to shore up their own misperception of
things by calling into doubt those who perceive things aright, as might be the case with someone who is
made uncomfortable by the prospect of acknowledging their social privilege and avoids doing so by casting
doubt on the existence of all but the most egregious forms of, say, ableism and classism.
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counter-narrative of sorts to the one promoted by the gaslighters. It would not be a stretch
to read the example cited above as one that involves a certain degree of isolation, albeit
not one deliberately promoted by those dismissing the student’s experience of sexism.
After all, attending graduate school will entail for many, if not most, students some
significant geographical uprooting, so that they will no longer have regular encounters
with family members and old friends. It is not uncommon, then, for one’s graduate school
colleagues to become one’s only real social circle, the only group of people with whom
there is significant and regular interaction. Given this, for the student to get no
corroboration or uptake of her experience from her colleagues may well mean that she
gets none at all.231
Gaslighting, as we have now seen, exploits our relationality in much the same way that
extreme isolation curtails it. While the person who has been successfully gaslighted may
not experience the kinds of hallucinatory effects that an inmate in solitary confinement
can suffer, there is nevertheless some feature of their perception of the world or of
themselves that they are no longer able to experience as unequivocally objective or
certain. This may be, on the one hand, what we could call episodic doubt, where the
perception of some event that we once experienced as certain is called into question as a
result of encountering pervasive challenges to our understanding of it. Regularly
experiencing such episodic doubt brought on by a lack of corroboration of our
experience, however, could give rise to a more constitutive doubt, that is, a doubt that
calls into question not our perception of some particular event but our very capacity to
perceive things adequately. In this case, it is not that I am left with a sense that I have
misjudged some situation; rather, I am left with the sense that there is something flawed
with my judgment in general, that I am incapable of judging things properly.
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Direct Harms from Loss of Reasonable Certainty
The harms that arise out of this loss of reasonable certainty—of the constitutive sort—are
two-fold. The first harms are the direct effects this lack of recognition has on our wellbeing. Some distress will invariably accompany the sense that our epistemic agency has
been undermined. Abramson characterizes this distress in terms of grief: the gaslighted
person is “grieving the loss of her independent perspective, her ability to form and
maintain her own reactions and perceptions.”232 She also puts the matter in starker terms
by appealing to clinical language, noting that the person who experiences this type of
grief can be described as having “severe, major, clinical depression.”233
Even if being on the receiving end of non-recognition (understood as the withholding of
experiential corroboration and uptake) does not lead someone to a state of severe
depression, there are still other ways that it can compromise well-being. One way is by
preventing a person from drawing as much enjoyment as they could from intellectual
pursuits. It is not only that the motivation to engage in such pursuits will flag as a result
of the discomfort that accompanies over-abundant doubt. It is also that such doubts will
crowd out the enjoyment of what Peter Goldie calls the intellectual emotions.234 Take the
emotions that Goldie associates with caring about the obscure topic of Polish notation in
logic:
We are frustrated in our slowness to grasp a new theorem, and jubilant when
we finally do grasp it; we delight in its capacity to simplify sentential logic;
we are surprised and thrilled when we realize how readily it can be adapted in
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computer programming; we are angry when other logicians mock its
supposed utility; and so on.235
Now, this generalizes to other kinds of intellectual pursuits—Goldie chose Polish logical
notation to illustrate that his account applies to local as well as global concerns—and
what is key, at least for my purposes, is the balance of pleasant and unpleasant emotions.
Intellectual endeavours involve their share of displeasure—in the form of frustration and
anger in the passage quoted above—but these are compensated for by the enjoyment we
receive as a pay-off for our dedicated pursuit—the jubilance, delight, and thrilled
surprise. Being plagued by doubts, however, leaves us with an overabundance of
displeasure that is only meekly compensated by the pleasures we do acquire from
intellectual activity, as might be the case for a student who, perpetually frustrated in their
attempt to understand what has been assigned and taught in their philosophy course,
might react to finally grasping the concept of the synthetic a priori not with jubilance and
delight but with relief at no longer having to ponder about it and perhaps the nagging
question of whether coming to understand the question was worth the struggle. There is,
furthermore, greater potential for doubt in activities that do not have clear success
criteria. The scholar attempting to master Polish logical notation can have clear evidence
of their success when they have employed it in their coding and produced functioning
computer software as a result, someone trying to learn Italian will be able to verify their
fluency by attempting to read a text or hold a conversation, and so on. However, when it
comes to, say, grasping the meaning of a poem, assessing the viability of comprehensive
but untested political theories, or figuring out just what one should make of an Abstract
Expressionist painting, there is far more room for self-doubt, even to the point where a
person can fully and accurately succeed in acquiring the understanding they seek but,
unlike the person whose successful coding or ability to decipher texts provides them with
incontrovertible evidence of their achievement, might still remain uncertain about
whether they have actually accomplished what they set out to do. In such cases, it is not
only that the pleasures associated with intellectual pursuit might not adequately
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compensate for the abundant displeasures, but that the compromising of epistemic
confidence prevents delight, excitement, and pride from manifesting when they should.
Indirect Harms from Loss of Reasonable Certainty
The second type of harm that arises from the effects of withholding uptake are the
indirect impediments to our well-being that arise from difficulties in exercising the
virtues. There are a number of ways that a loss of confidence in our own epistemic
agency can compromise virtuous activity. Some virtuous acts involve risk-taking. This is
obvious in the case of the Aristotelian virtue of courage, which is concerned with facing
death and bodily harm in battle, but far less dramatic instances of risk-taking are also
involved in, for instance, the possibility of incurring social or professional penalties for
speaking up about the racist behaviour or comments of an acquaintance, work colleague,
or boss. To the virtuous agent, these risks appear small when the alternative courses of
action allow them to be avoided only at the cost of cowardice or disregard for those most
directly harmed by the conduct. Without the feeling of certainty that comes with
confidence in our epistemic abilities, however, the risks will likely be weighed more
heavily than they should. Consider, for instance, the person who witnesses what they
believe is racist behaviour, or even a pattern of racist conduct, but is constantly worried
that what they perceive to be racist might be nothing more than a series of uncouth but
ultimately inoffensive actions. The risks of acting are bound to be weighed more heavily
when the course of action involves not simply making an accusation of racism, but
making what we worry might be a false accusation of racism. As such, lack of confidence
makes us less likely to act as virtue dictates.
Compromised confidence in our epistemic abilities also poses a problem in situations that
provide us only a small window for acting well. In Nicomachean Ethics IV.6-8, Aristotle
describes some virtues relevant to ordinary social interaction. That these require speedy
action and reaction is perhaps most evident in the virtuous disposition of those who
display a witty but tasteful sense of humour, one that hits the mean between, on the one
hand, the excess of “vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs, and aiming rather
at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and avoiding pain to the object of their
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fun” and, on the other, the defect of the “boorish and unpolished” who are incapable of
producing much levity.236 Far less controversial than this virtue is the more general one
of friendliness—so named because it “most resembles friendship” but falls short of it
insofar as “it implies no passion or affection for one’s associates.”237 The virtue of
friendliness consists simply of causing pleasure and not causing pain in social life, in a
manner constrained by “reference to what is honourable and expedient.”238 There will, in
many cases, only be a brief opportunity to exhibit this kind of virtue and too much
hesitation, or any at all, could mean squandering it or, worse, acting in conformity with
vice. Take, for example, a scenario in an office setting where “The conversation is lively
and a topic comes up that embarrasses your colleague.” In order to spare the colleague
this embarrassment, it is necessary to act swiftly “and turn the conversation away from
the topic,” perhaps “with a humorous remark.”239 Without reasonable confidence in our
own judgment, however, our speedy reaction will likely be supplanted by hesitation,
often lengthy enough for us to miss the opportunity to perform the right action.240
Having too low a sense of confidence in our own epistemic abilities can also interfere
with the formation and maintenance of consistent character traits, at least consistent
character traits of the right kind.241 A person who does not put much stock in their ability
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to perceive or reason well about various aspects of their social environment could
become prone to wavering in their judgments. This is especially so if not putting much
stock in themselves leads them to develop a tendency to defer to the judgment and
perception of others when their own should suffice. We can safely assume that there is no
uniformity of judgment across different people and this means that the overly deferential
agent will be a person whose decisions and assessments of situations will lack
consistency. This inconsistency and wavering in judgment and action will prevent the
formation, or interfere with the maintenance, of virtuous dispositions, which require, as
Aristotle notes, not only acting in conformity to virtue, either in an incidental fashion or
because of momentary moral inspiration, but acting as the virtuous person would, which
includes doing so from a “firm” character.242
I do not intend this list of ways that non-recognition can have a negative impact on wellbeing to be an exhaustive summary of its potential harms. However, I believe that it is
sufficient to demonstrate the importance of taking it seriously as a need that all relational
beings have. Withholding uptake and corroboration where granting it would be warranted
can result in a dampening of our epistemic agency. This can affect our well-being directly
or by preventing us from engaging in virtuous activity, which hampers our flourishing by
leaving us without one of the necessary conditions for achieving it. North American
beavers require a well-functioning colony to flourish, African bush elephants require a
well-functioning herd, and mandrills require a well-functioning troop; but a beaver,
elephant, or mandrill can flourish without confirmation of the character of their
experience from other members of their species. If there are some among us who find
ways to flourish without that kind of confirmation—a question I leave open despite my
doubts—they are surely the exception rather than the rule.

features of a person’s character that make the other aspects of their character less easily predictable. We
can, in other words, say of a person who consistently and predictably wavers or defers to the influence of
others in their judgment that this forms part of their character, even if the outcome of these traits is a more
general fluidity of behaviour.
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I am, as I imagine is evident by now, not advocating an understanding of the virtues that
is Stoic in nature. I will not counsel that we aspire to the detachment and disinterest of the
Stoic sage and strive to become inured to the effects of non-recognition. Even if some
relatively small degree of stoic fortitude would be desirable—something that falls short
of the cold ideal of the classical Stoics but that can nevertheless immunize us against
some of the vagaries of human interaction—it is not clear how we can expect anyone to
develop and maintain it in adverse relational conditions, that is, in the face of a serious
and pervasive lack of recognition. Rather than allowing us to do without it, I suspect that
this kind of fortitude requires far more recognition than is usually acknowledged. In her
discussion of the harms of gaslighting, Abramson states that “[s]uffering on account of
[gaslighting] is not a sign of fragility, weakness, or an exceptionally damaged psyche; it
is a sign of being human.”243 Indeed, to add some specificity to this claim in light of the
previous chapter, these harms are precisely what we should expect to befall a human qua
relational being. Considering vulnerability to non-recognition to be a sign of fragility or
weakness is to assess harm in light of a truncated account of human nature or human
function, perhaps one that puts all of its focus on the fact that humans are rational beings
and only occasionally grants small supporting roles to the other aspects of the human
form of life. Whatever our understanding of the virtues will be, it must include virtues
that promote interpersonal recognition in the form of reasonable experiential
corroboration and uptake, rather than those that would purportedly allow us to flourish
without it.

4.3 Apprehending, Cognizing, and Recognizing
I want to add further precision to the concept of recognition by dividing it into two
components, or movements, that instances of recognition bear in practice. To label these
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movements, I will borrow a pair of terms from Axel Honneth and refer to one of them as
“cognizing” and the other as “recognizing.”244
Cognizing is the first part of the process of recognition, if not always temporally then at
least conceptually.245 It is the epistemic component of recognition, the one that involves
an apprehension of another’s experience in some way, whether by tell-tale signs in their
behaviour or facial expression; the proper receipt of their testimonial utterances; or by
extrapolation from prior knowledge of the individual, their previous experiences, and
their past assessments of those experiences. By the concept of cognizing I mean to imply
a success criterion, that is, not merely a perception of some situation but successfully
reading that situation insofar as we correctly apprehend what is being communicated to
us about another’s experience or perception. It is, then, different from what we might call,
borrowing from Judith Butler, mere apprehension, which “can imply marking,
registering, acknowledging without full cognition” and is, as such, “a mode of knowing
that is not yet recognition.”246 It is not merely the acknowledgment that we are
confronted with some object, person, or feature of our social environment, but a proper
understanding of its relevant meaning to another. To use an impersonal example—that is
to say, one that does not directly involve an interpersonal encounter—someone seeing the
words “arbeit macht frei”247 atop the gates of Auschwitz or Dachau while visiting the
sites or seeing them in photos can be said to apprehend them insofar as they see the
words and even understand their literal meaning. There will be something missing from
their understanding, however, if they read the statement not as accentuating the cruelty
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and horrors of the concentration camps, but in some positive and encouraging way,
perhaps in light of an industrious notion of the virtues inspired by Benjamin Franklin’s
Poor Richard’s Almanack aphorisms. They have, in that sense, not properly grasped the
meaning of the terms and how others have understood them—especially those who were
imprisoned behind the gates. Similarly, cognizing another is more than merely
apprehending their utterances, noticing their facial expressions, and perceiving some of
the contextual features of our encounters with them. Rather, it is apprehending these
things while also grasping what they entail for another’s experience or perception of
things. This is, in other words, the private cognitive aspect to recognition, including,
among other things, an understanding of what others intend to convey by their verbal and
non-verbal communicative acts, and how others might be affected by various social,
cultural, or institutional dynamics that have either a different impact on our lives or one
whose character allows it to easily escape our notice.
In paradigmatic cases of recognition, these private acts of cognizing are followed or
accompanied by public acts of recognizing. Recognizing is, essentially, the
communication to another of our act of cognizing them. It is, in other words, not simply
recognition of another’s experience in the sense of grasping or making mental note of
some aspect of it; rather, it is recognition of that grasping and noting by making it known,
often in a very subtle way, to the person whose experience has been cognized that an act
of cognizing has occurred. These subtle acts are no small matter, something which
Honneth makes evident in his discussion of recognition and social invisibility. Someone
is socially invisible if they are “not accorded social approval” or treated as though they
are not “possess[ors of] social validity” in the way that is appropriate for their specific
social roles—“friend, cleaning lady, fellow traveler.”248 When I encounter someone who
is, or has the potential to become, socially invisible, I may become aware of their
physical presence, notice their movements, and hear their words. In doing so, I have
apprehended them. However, if I also privately and internally acknowledge not only their
presence but also their social validity and evaluate them as being worthy of social
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approval, then I have not merely apprehended them but cognized them. Such an act of
cognizing, on its own, will not fulfill the needs of a person who is or is at risk of
becoming socially invisible. As Honneth remarks,
the criterion according to which [the individual seeking recognition] ensures
his visibility in a figurative sense is an expression of specific ways of reacting
that are a sign—an expression—of taking notice of something or someone in
a positive sense. Consequently, the absence of such forms of expression is an
indication of the fact that he is not visible for his counterpart in this specific
sense249
Although the term “recognition” has a certain epistemic or cognitive ring to it—at least,
to those for whom it is not an almost entirely political concept—recognition that stops at
cognizing without the further communicative act will not fulfill another’s needs as a
relational being.
Honneth’s account of social visibility is, to be sure, a different matter than the one under
discussion in this chapter. I am concerned with the communication of shared experience
and with the acknowledgment of disparate but plausible understandings of particular
situations. Neither of those interpersonal dynamics requires a social invisibility of the
kind Honneth has in mind. That kind of invisibility, however, overlaps with the subject of
this chapter insofar as the complete refusal to engage with another will prevent the
relevant communicative exchanges from taking place. I cannot, evidently, communicate
to you any of the ways that I grasp the situations I perceive, even those we are currently
perceiving at the same time, if you do not allow me to communicate my perception of the
world to you. Nor can I receive the kind of feedback about my experience if you react to
me with complete contempt when we do find ourselves in a communicative exchange.
There is, moreover, some communication that does occur in a refusal to engage me as a
person in social space, one that conveys to me that we do not share an understanding of
myself as a person worthy of some respect, as a bearer of dignity—or, should I have had
my dignity trampled enough for me to have internalized this kind of disrespect, what may
be conveyed is a shared understanding of my lack of social worth.
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Of course, unless it is especially fragile, a single instance of someone refusing to engage
with us will not send our sense of self, or the certainty of our experience of the world,
into a tailspin. Securing recognition from other sources may allow us to develop the kind
of resilience by means of which we can resist the more damaging effects of nonrecognition, although these encounters may still leave us justifiably feeling insulted,
irritated, or enraged. Furthermore, not every decision not to engage with someone will
count as a refusal to engage with them.250 I may, for instance, pay no attention to a
fellow traveller on the city bus and cast my glance away from them but not because I feel
any contempt toward them. I might, for example, be desperately trying to mentally
rehearse a presentation I have to give to work colleagues later that morning, be too
exhausted from lack of sleep to want to engage socially with others, or be stewing in my
own sour mood following an unpleasant morning. Yet, despite not giving attention to
another, cases such as these tend to be associated with their own subtle acts of
communication that mark them off from the active refusals to engage with another that
arise from contempt. If my reasons for not engaging with my fellow commuter are
innocent, I am unlikely to treat them as a contemptuous person would, staring at them
coldly; refusing to give them sufficient space, and entirely ignoring their attempts to
convey their discomfort to me; or scoffing under my breath if they attempt to initiate a
conversation with me. Instead, if I am focused on memorizing my coming presentation, I
might stare at my notepad, silently mouth the key phrases I want to cement in my
memory, or look upward and enumerate with my fingers as I try to recall the bullet points
I jotted down the night before. Likewise, if I am riding home in the morning, exhausted
after a long night of revelry, I might supplement my frequent yawning and eye-rubbing
with a kind of mock sleeping pose consisting of crossed arms, leaned-back head, and
closed eyes. These are usually acts that we would not perform if we were alone, at least
not so ostentatiously. We are often at least intuitively aware of our inability to render to
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others the acts of recognizing that we owe them and perform small gestures, including
simple configurations of our body language, to display that we are withholding
recognition that we would grant under different circumstances—conveying that, to put it
colloquially, “it’s not you; it’s me.” This is, in a sense, neutral insofar as it does not
provide another with a confirmation of their experience of the world, but is simply an act
of excusing oneself from the kinds of interaction in which the granting or withholding of
the relevant forms of corroboration can occur.251
I have spoken thus far about recognition—in the technical sense that I am employing—as
a process of uptake and corroboration of another’s experience of the world, and the
notion of cognizing and recognizing allows us to pry apart those two interrelated features
of it. The process of uptake can be understood as a personal acknowledgment of
another’s way of seeing the world, or at least of their testimony concerning their
experience of it, and, as such, it is a type of cognizing appropriate to this particular type
of recognition. Recognizing corresponds to the corroboration of another’s way of seeing
the world, the communication to another of some confirmation that their experience of
the world is either shared by us or that we take seriously the difference in our
perspectives and do not simply reduce theirs to some mistake, delusion, or cognitive
error.
Each of these movements of recognition will have corresponding virtues. These will be
virtues that will increase our likelihood of success in granting recognition where it is due
and that are not already accounted for, or not given sufficient prominence, by the other
aspects of the Natural Goodness model. They are, in other words, virtues that are
especially salient and important to beings whose flourishing depends on recognition and
not only on the good functioning of their social group. In the next two chapters, I will
consider the virtues that are appropriate to proper cognizing, especially in the form of
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uptake (Chapter 5), and, second, to proper recognizing, especially in the form of
corroboration (Chapter 6).

4.4 Heading Some Objections Off at the Pass
Before proceeding to give an account of the virtues relevant to recognition, I want to deal
with a pair of objections that might have occurred to the reader at this point. First, that
my account of recognition and its role in natural normativity has confused an external
good for what Hursthouse characterizes as species ends. Second, that the virtues of
recognition are too other-directed to be justified by a moral theory that makes flourishing
one of its central concepts.
4.4.a: External Goods and Ends
The first objection is that, while I have given recognition a place in the structure of
natural normativity, it seems to have features different than those of the ends posited by
Hursthouse. As we saw above, recognition forms part of the external conditions for
flourishing. Aristotle held that flourishing requires certain goods that are not themselves
virtues. In some cases, they are instrumental to performing virtuous actions, such as
“friends and riches and political power,” and in other cases they are goods the absence of
which “takes the lustre from happiness—good birth, goodly children, beauty.”252 While I
am not claiming that the lack of good birth or beauty mars flourishing, Aristotle’s dyad of
types of external goods maps on quite well to the harms associated with the absence of
recognition as long as we equate taking the lustre from happiness with the more prosaic
concept of a decrease in well-being. The reader may wonder, then, whether I have
misclassified recognition: perhaps it should be considered an external good rather than an
end in the structure of natural normativity. In other words, it might be that recognition
should form a kind of background condition that must be in place if we are to be able to
exercise the virtues and, hence, flourish rather than something against which those virtues
are measured. This makes no small difference, since the former, the external goods, do
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not modify our understanding of what makes for good or bad conduct. We simply have to
think of Aristotle’s list of external goods: there is no conduct that can affect whether or
not I am of good birth.253 If recognition is simply an external good, then, there will be
little reason to proceed with these final chapters since there will be no virtues that arise
from it.
Thankfully, there is no reason to conclude here. For one thing, the ends that Hursthouse
posits share some of the features of external goods that we have discussed here. It is plain
that we cannot act virtuously or flourish if we do not survive, nor if we are brought up
and live in a social group that does not function well. Moreover, we could make the case
that not being assured of the continuation of our species prevents our flourishing by
visiting existential dread upon us and taking away some of our opportunities to act
virtuously by imbuing our long-term projects and future-directed activities with an acute
sense of futility. My own addition of the end of contemplation, likewise, can serve as a
condition for flourishing, albeit in a less dramatic way than individual survival or species
continuance. A life that is devoid of regular opportunities for intellectual or aesthetic
appreciation is one that is missing an important human good. It is, thereby, a life with
some of its lustre taken out, to borrow Aristotle’s phrase. Recognition’s role as a
condition for virtuous activity and flourishing, then, makes it no different than the other
ends of natural normativity.
Still, one issue remains: it is like those other ends in serving as a condition for virtue and
flourishing, but it—along with the other ends—shares that feature with the external
goods. We have yet, in other words, to properly distinguish the ends that serve as a
condition for virtue and flourishing from the external goods that do the same. The proper
distinction between the two, however, is neither mysterious nor complicated; it lies
simply in the fact, as my comment about good birth above highlighted, that, while both
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serve as conditions for virtue and flourishing, only the ends and not the external goods
are achievable through the exercise of the virtues. We might disagree with Aristotle on
some of the details here. Contemporary developmental psychology, for instance, may
leave us with a far less hopeless picture of the effects of good parenting. Most of us
believe that we can do something to at least make it more likely that we raise good
children. The underlying distinction remains despite our disagreements with Aristotle
about the details: external goods are features of our lives that are subject to fortune and
are beyond the reach of the virtues, while we have greater control over the ends of natural
normativity since they are subject to the influence of the virtues. Of course, this is a
matter of degrees rather than absolutes. We are likely to consider wealth an external
condition while also recognizing that certain character traits might make us more likely to
acquire it. Yet, in this case, luck seems to play a disproportionate role, which sets it apart
from, say, the case of the good functioning of the social group, which corresponds much
more closely to the virtues of the members of that social group. It is my contention—one
that I will defend more comprehensively in subsequent chapters—that recognition is far
more a matter of virtue than luck.
4.4.b: Dependence and Eudaimonism
A second objection is that the virtues involved in recognition are far too other-directed to
be appropriate for or justifiable under a eudaimonist ethical framework. Since recognition
is an interpersonal process, it is like the other ends of social animals insofar as securing it
is a communal endeavour. Survival, the continuance of the species, and, most evidently,
the good functioning of the social group are not goods that are secured through the selfsufficient efforts of lone agents. This might be less obvious in the case of contemplation,
save for the fact that contemplation—except of a kind so fleeting that labelling it so
practically makes it a misnomer—depends on leisure and this leisure, in turn, can only be
secured by co-operation and social organization. There is, however, one thing that marks
out recognition as unique among these ends, namely, the fact that the individual seeking
to meet their need for recognition is far more dependent on others than they are when
seeking to achieve the other ends. While individual effort will not suffice to secure one’s
own survival, the leisure required for contemplation, or the existence of a social group
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that functions well, we can nevertheless contribute to securing these ends for ourselves in
rather straightforward ways. We can, for example, improve our chances of survival by
choosing the healthiest lifestyle available to us; make room for contemplation by
developing habits that ensure that we do not squander our leisure hours with distraction;
and contribute to the good functioning of our social group through political engagement,
community involvement, and helping to raise children well (whether our own or those of
others). When it comes to securing recognition for ourselves, however, there is no
activity that we can individually undertake that will straightforwardly bring it about. At
best, we can hope to secure our own recognition by granting it to others and hope that
they return the favour. Even in this case, however, we are relying entirely on others to
react reciprocally to our acts of recognition. We are, then, more totally at the mercy of
others than is the case with the fulfilment of the other ends of natural normativity.
Given that recognition is so other-directed, the virtues that are relevant to securing it will
also be almost entirely other-directed, rather than the mixture of other- and self-directed
virtues that are derived from consideration of other ends.254 How, then, can a
eudaimonistic account of virtue, one that treats the notion of flourishing as central, be
motivating if our efforts can do so little to guarantee our flourishing? Even someone who
is won over by the metaphysical claims that undergird the Natural Goodness theory might
wonder why anyone should adopt its prescriptions if doing so does not secure the wellbeing it promises.
One way to respond to this objection is by reference to the phenomenology of virtue. The
virtuous agent does not exercise the virtues for merely instrumental reasons but because
they perceive the virtuous actions as good, as the only kind of action they can endorse.
Moreover, the virtues are dispositions of character, meaning that they are habits of the
most entrenched kind. It would be no easy business for a virtuous agent to reverse course
and begin acting in a weak-willed or vicious manner, so even the absence of flourishing
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would be too weak a goad to motivate them to abandon their virtuous way of living. Nor
would it make sense to allow their character to deteriorate in such a way even if it were
easy, since the absence of flourishing is a lack that the weak-willed or vicious person
must live with as well, and while the popular imagination is filled with notions of vicious
people securing goods such as wealth and power because of their vice (which, it is
presumed, they would not have secured had they behaved according to the dictates of the
virtues) it is difficult to imagine how a person could secure more recognition by being
weak-willed or vicious.
These comments, however, are only about those who have acquired the virtues and they
may be of little or no help to the moral neophyte standing at a hypothetical crossroad,
wondering whether setting off down the path to virtue is worth the effort. Setting aside
the old chestnut that those who seek happiness directly will rarely find it, there is still a
consideration that can hearten the neophyte in their endeavour. A flourishing life, as
Aristotle defined it, is the zenith of well-being because it is a life that lacks nothing. It is,
in other words, a self-sufficient life insofar as it would be little improved by the addition
of goods since it already boasts a full complement of them.255 What we can draw from
this is that the ideal state of flourishing lies on the far end of a continuum of well-being.
To speak of a full complement of goods, in other words, implies that we can acquire a
partial set of goods. Although being or striving to be virtuous does not guarantee that we
will live a flourishing life, it will at the very least bring us closer approximation of it.
While this still falls short of the ideal, it is, of course, preferable to falling still further
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away from it. Those at the moral crossroads can also take heart from Hursthouse’s
analogy between physical health and flourishing. As she points out, when a doctor
advises a patient to give up smoking, drink moderately, and exercise regularly, it is on the
“grounds… that that’s the way to flourish physically, to be healthy, to live a long, healthy
life.”256 What the physician offers is not a guaranteed formula for a clean bill of health
and a lengthy life. Yet, it remains the only sensible course of action: “if perfect health is
what I want, the only thing to do is to follow her advice and hope that I shall not be
unlucky.”257 Likewise, virtue provides no airtight guarantee of flourishing, but if the
moral neophyte wishes to live well “they are the only reliable bet.”258 Although whether
this is heartening or not probably depends on the moral neophyte not being the sort of
person who disregards their doctor’s orders.
There remains, finally, a simple conceptual response to the objection. While a
eudaimonist moral theory does take flourishing to be at least one of its central
concepts,259 it does not have to play a motivating role. Eudaimonism, in other words,
appeals to flourishing in order to provide an account of the proper conduct of one’s life. It
provides a moral theory that takes seriously the question of how to live well, but it does
so primarily in order to explain the good life, not to entice others to follow it. Although
many theorists, I am sure, hope that this explanatory function will suffice to motivate
others to strive to live virtuously, a moral theory could promote, or even require, some
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other form of encouragement in response to the question of what should motivate a
person to become virtuous and, nevertheless, still retain its eudaimonistic status. Since
eudaimonism does not have to play the persuasive role in a moral theory, the fact that our
flourishing as relational beings is nearly completely dependent on the virtues of others is
no objection to a theory that purports to be eudaimonistic.
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Chapter 4

5

Recognition II: The Virtues of Cognizing

In the previous chapter, I have argued that, as relational beings, the goodness of our
character traits and dispositions must be evaluated in light of how conducive they are to
recognition, understood broadly as the corroboration of another’s experience (or, at least,
an acknowledgement of its plausibility). I have also made the case that acts of recognition
have two components: an epistemic one that I have labeled cognizing and a
communicative one I have labeled recognizing. This chapter and the next will be a
preliminary exploration of some specific virtues relevant to cognizing and recognizing.
The virtues of recognition are undoubtedly manifold but since my purpose is not to
catalogue the virtues of recognition but to provide some illustration of what difference
adding relationality and recognition to the model of natural goodness does in practice, I
will not attempt to display a panoply of them. Instead, I will discuss only a few virtues
that I take to be in some way paradigmatic of cognizing and recognizing.
A good starting-point for considering the virtues and vices of cognizing is Miranda
Fricker’s celebrated and influential account of epistemic injustice, a form of injustice that
occurs when “someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower.”260 Fricker
divides epistemic injustice into two branches: testimonial injustice and hermeneutic
injustice. Each of these has its corresponding corrective virtues that, by mitigating
epistemic injustice, assist in securing the recognition of others in the form of the uptake
of their experience. Even with these epistemic virtues in place, however, there will
remain a further step to a complete act of recognition, namely, the corroboration of
another’s experience that follows our private, cognitive uptake of it. I will reserve
discussion of that second movement of recognition for the following chapter.
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5.1 Testimony
Fricker’s first type of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, consists of a kind of
improper transaction in the economy of credibility, one in which another’s testimony is
given insufficient value. In her words, testimonial injustice arises when we grant
another’s testimonial utterances a “credibility deficit.”261 Such a deficit occurs when a
speaker “receiv[es] less credibility than she otherwise would have”262 as the result of
some prejudice harboured by the hearer. What Fricker calls the “central case of
testimonial injustice” is, more precisely, “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.”263 It is
prejudice related to social identity that serves as the backbone of testimonial injustice
because it is the main type of prejudice that “track[s] the subject through different
dimensions of social activity—economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal,
political, religious, and so on.”264 It is, accordingly, the kind of prejudice that can account
not only for discrete and transitory testimonial wrongs that may be inflicted upon
individuals, but the ones that, because they are frequent and “connected, via a common
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“prejudicial dysfunction in testimonial practice” (Epistemic Injustice [2007], p. 17), but denies that it is a
form of injustice. This is on account of the fact that credibility is not a finite good and, as such, ill-suited
for a distributive model of justice according to which there is an unfairness to the mere fact that “someone
has got more than his fair share of a good” (Epistemic Injustice [2007], p. 19). This strikes me as correct
only with some qualification. It is always the credibility deficit that is unjust, but a credibility excess can
often bring about a credibility deficit. This is clearest in cases when someone has to weigh the rival
testimony of two people. In the case of judge or jury weighing the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant,
of a teacher who must decide which of two clashing students has instigated the dispute, or of a pair of
friends imploring us to believe their side of a story, inflating the credibility to one party because of their
clean-cut attire, posh accent, or winning smile is to grant the other party’s testimony insufficient weight.
Still, while I think that Fricker treats the dangers of credibility excess too lightly, I do agree that the
epistemic injustices related to it are reducible entirely to credibility deficits that arise in tandem with them.
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prejudice, with other types of injustice,”265 can qualify as systematic epistemic wrongs or
injustices. This notion of identity prejudice allows us to distinguish between various
types of cases that the notion of prejudice simplicter would, at least at the theoretical
level, run together and treat identically. Fricker illustrates identity-prejudicial credibility
deficit with the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, in which
the members of an all-white jury give Robinson’s testimony far less weight than it
deserves because of their prejudiced attitudes and beliefs about black men. This is a far
different matter, and a greater epistemic wrong to an individual—not to mention a greater
wrong simpliciter—than the kind of “highly localized” and “incidental” testimonial shortchanging that might occur from a prejudice that is not tied to social identity, such as that
of “a panel of referees on a science journal who have a dogmatic prejudice against a
certain research method.” 266
Although it might be the case that someone we might label “fully virtuous” would have
the kinds of epistemic, affective, and behavioural dispositions that would lessen their
tendency to commit or be implicated in acts of even incidental testimonial wrongdoing, I
will focus only on the more systematic sort that is grounded in identity prejudice. I do so
because suffering highly localized, incidental forms of testimonial wrongdoing will not,
unless the person falling victim to them is especially hapless, cumulate into severe nonrecognition.
In cases of testimonial injustice, we have, as Fricker puts it, a “hearer [who] perceives the
speaker in an epistemically loaded way—she sees him as more, or less, credible in what
he is telling her.”267 In order to identify the virtues that are most directly involved in
correcting tendencies to engage in testimonial wrongdoing, we must, then, identify those
that will epistemically unload or re-calibrate the hearer’s perception. In cases of
credibility assessment there is usually an element of spontaneity—we evaluate the
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interlocutor rapidly, automatically, and often subconsciously. This spontaneous judgment
is often coloured by prejudices we harbour, including those that we disavow but that
permeate our social and cultural environment thoroughly enough to change our
perception of others regardless of our conscious distaste for them. Fricker’s virtue of
testimonial justice is, accordingly, a corrective disposition that allows virtuous agents to
modify their spontaneous judgments of credibility. It is a virtue that is both reflexive and
reflective in its structure. It is reflexive insofar as it combines the other-directed identitybased judgment with a more self-directed “reflexive critical awareness of the likely
presence of prejudice.”268 The virtue of testimonial justice, then, involves not assessing
the credibility of others entirely on the basis of our perception of them but also on the
basis of our understanding of ourselves and our susceptibility to making identityprejudicial judgments. It is, I should specify, not simply a sensitivity to social differences
that makes salient the ways in which our identities are differentially positioned (such that
we recognize when our own identity is socially or culturally dominant while our
interlocutor’s is socially or culturally marginalized) but also requires an awareness of the
kinds of prejudices common within our own environment that might make us grant a
credibility deficit to someone who bears the same marginalized social identity as we do.
There is, in other words, no necessary reason why being a woman would serve as a
prophylactic against down-grading another woman’s report of their experiences on the
basis of her gender, no necessary reason why being a person of colour would prevent a
tendency to take testimony more seriously when it comes from a white speaker, or no
necessary reason why being poor or working class would ensure that we do not deem the
wealthy to be more trustworthy. We should not, then, mistake the reflexivity involved in
testimonial justice for an awareness of social difference—although that is certainly part
of it—since it is, more generally, an awareness of the kinds of identity prejudices that
may be at play in testimonial situations, including prejudices about people within our
own social categories that we may have internalized from frequent exposure.
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While testimonial justice is reflexive insofar as it disposes us to a certain self-awareness,
it is also reflective insofar as it corrects not only for the presence of an identity-prejudice
but does so in part by correcting for the spontaneity of credibility assessments.
Testimonial justice, then, involves a “shift[ing of] intellectual gear out of spontaneous
unreflective mode and into active critical reflection.”269 It is a virtue that requires a
thoughtful recalibration aimed at amending the perceptive and affective reactions that
often provide us with a judgment about the credibility or trustworthiness of another
before we can engage in a more deliberate and reasoned assessment of the matter. Fricker
is careful to specify that the goal of this recalibration, its “guiding ideal,”270 is not a
perfect and confident judgment of credibility but the “neutraliz[ation of] the impact of
prejudice in [the hearer’s] credibility judgments.”271 This may, of course, result in a
correction that allows us to unequivocally believe the speaker’s testimony despite our
initial hesitance to do so. Yet it could also simply “render our judgement more vague and
tentative.”272 To put it another way, there are times when the only way we can correct for
the influence of an identity-prejudice is to recuse ourselves from making a firm
judgement, knowing that our attempts to make up for the influence of prejudice are rarely
perfect.273
Fricker understands the virtue of testimonial justice primarily as a kind of cognitive
compensation that we will perform in the heat of the moment, that is, within the span of
testimonial encounters. These encounters will often begin with the hearer making a
spontaneous judgment about the credibility of the speaker, and over the course of the
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conversation the hearer will come to doubt the accuracy of that judgment in light of the
kinds of prejudices that may have triggered certain features of their perception and affect.
This realization will be coupled with an adjustment to our judgment so that it is more
likely to approximate one that we would have formed in the absence of prejudice. In fact,
Fricker notes that a person who has successfully acquired the virtue of testimonial justice
may implement these corrections even more rapidly than this, such that their “testimonial
sensibility would spontaneously furnish them ready-corrected credibility judgments”
because “the requisite social reflexivity of her stance as hearer has become second
nature.”274 There is surely more to the virtue than this, however. We will, after all, often
find ourselves in situations that are ill-suited for such rapid-fire corrections. The bustle of
our frequent and brief everyday encounters with diverse strangers and acquaintances
along with the demands on our attention called for by lengthier and more focused
interpersonal interactions can leave us little opportunity for adopting a reflective mood
adequate to correcting our visceral judgements. In such cases, the reflective disposition
that is part of the virtue of testimonial justice will take the form of reflection in a cool
hour, of the sort counselled by Bishop Butler. We will, in other words, adjust our
judgement after the fact, and if we do so frequently enough, and do so in the spirit of
contrition as opposed to a merely intellectual exercise, we will decrease the influence of
the relevant prejudice or prejudices in our future interactions with others, whether by
supplying us with ready-corrected credibility judgements or by allowing us to both detect
and correct for the influence of the prejudice in a less effortful manner.
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5.2 The Social Imaginary
The second kind of epistemic injustice that Fricker analyzes is hermeneutic injustice.275
Unlike testimonial injustice, it is less focused on particular interactions between
interlocutors and is, instead, concerned with the conceptual resources available in what
we might call the social imaginary. Fricker’s central case of hermeneutic injustice is the
absence of the concept of sexual harassment prior to its coining and formulation in the
1970’s. Without this concept, there was a “lacuna” in the “collective hermeneutical
resources” that prevented the naming and communicating of “a distinctive social
experience.”276 As Fricker remarks, however, a merely epistemic account of this lacuna
is not sufficient to highlight the injustice of its absence. After all, it is not only those who
suffered sexual harassment who had access to impoverished conceptual resources by
means of which to explain their experience; rather, “harasser and harassee alike are
cognitively handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna... but the harasser’s cognitive
disablement is not a significant disadvantage to him.”277 Indeed, far from being
disadvantaged by this conceptual fuzziness or blank, “there is an obvious sense in which
it suits his purpose.”278 The injustice lies, as it did with testimonial injustice, not in the
mere epistemic fact but in the influence of identity prejudice on that fact. Identity
prejudices, in this context, exclude marginalized individuals who bear certain social
identities from the process of creating and contributing to collective conceptual resources.
It is, in other words, unjust insofar as it is the product of withholding epistemic authority,
positions of influence, and means of widespread communication from groups of people
on the basis of their social identities. Systematic hermeneutic injustice, then, is “the
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from
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collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutical resource.”279 To stay with Fricker’s central case, it is not simply the fact
that there was a conceptual lacuna that made it more difficult to demarcate, say, flirting,
harmless fun, and employer favouritism from something more troubling but as yet
unnamed; it is the fact that one of the social experiences remained unnamed in part
because of the absence of women’s authoritative participation in defining the norms of
interpersonal conduct, establishing legal definitions, and articulating their experiences in
the popular press (or, to the extent that they did participate in the creation of
hermeneutical resources, that the effect of their input was minute given that the
understanding of their social experience was “unduly influenced by more hermeneutically
powerful groups.”)280 This unequal contribution to the collective hermeneutical resource
creates a hermeneutical inequality that sets the background condition for the epistemic
injustice that occurs when the marginalization results in “a more or less doomed attempt
on the part of the subject to render an experience intelligible, either to herself or to an
interlocutor.”281
The structure of the hermeneutic injustice is a bit complex, but in essence it occurs in
three steps. There is, first, an identity prejudice that leads to the marginalization of
members of certain social groups from authoritative, powerful, and influential social
positions. Second, this marginalization results in a collective hermeneutical resource—a
social imaginary—that is shaped primarily by members of socially dominant or powerful
social groups. Finally, members of the marginalized social group are then unable to fully
understand or to explain to others some features of their social experience. As a result, it
was, and often continues to be, more difficult than it should have been for people of
colour to explain why being praised for being articulate is often more an insult than a
compliment, for transwomen and transmen to explain why certain language is offensive
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or harmful rather than innocent grammatical convention, or for women to explain why
forced sexual intercourse with their husband is rape rather than just an unstated and
reasonable aspect of the marriage contract. This final step, then, highlights the way that
the initial hermeneutical powerlessness, that is, the lack of influence on the collective
conceptual resources, culminates in a compounded powerlessness, an inability to take
what is known intuitively or suffered and voice it as a proposition that is publicly
intelligible, entirely decipherable by means of ordinary, commonplace, and widespread
conceptual resources.
The resources being collective rather than particular or local is especially important when
it comes to the cognizing involved in recognition. Marginalized social groups, or pockets
of people within them, may formulate concepts adequate to articulate their unique social
experiences, and this is of no small value as it allows greater self-knowledge, the building
of solidarity within or across social groups, and a more careful management of social
relations in order to minimize personal harm. However, the struggle to make one’s
experiences intelligible to those outside the social group will require more than a
localized language that has traction only with the disempowered. For certain
hermeneutical resources to be collective in a robust sense—part of the collective rather
than a collective—they must have some currency within the wider society and culture.
The struggle to make one’s social experiences intelligible is, after all, not always a matter
of lacking understanding of one’s condition—the very fact of actively trying to
communicate it indicates some awareness of what one is struggling to convey—but if the
conceptual resources employed are not common currency it will serve to render one
powerless to some extent. If the hearer has no notion of, say, whitesplaining,
intersectional oppression, mis-gendering, or marital rape, then the struggle to explain
one’s experience is unlikely to end in success since it will require either beginning at
square one with a laborious attempt to impart the conceptual resources to the hearer or by
having to use widely-held but clumsy and ill-fitting concepts that are more likely to make
the speaker’s claims seem implausible or confused rather than clear and illuminating.
Like testimonial justice, the virtue of hermeneutic justice acts as a corrective to the
effects of identity prejudice, or more precisely as a corrective to the hermeneutic lacunae
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that result from them. It is not, however, a disposition to fill those lacunae any more than
testimonial justice is a disposition to eliminate a society’s identity prejudice. It will not,
that is, render its possessor an inventive philosophical hero who can remedy a speaker’s
struggle for intelligibility by filling in the conceptual void and coining, defining, and
imparting to them the necessary tools to render every nuance of their social experiences
transparent and public. In fact, attempting to play the philosophical hero in this way is
likely to do more harm than good, not only by encouraging others to slot their
experiences into re-packaged, inadequate commonplace categories but also by silencing
those who are already struggling to find the right way to voice some feature of their
experience by claiming that their struggle for expression is pointless since the
hermeneutical lacunae have already been filled. Rather than filling these gaps, the virtue
of hermeneutic justice is characterized by the awareness and acceptance that such gaps
exist. It is, in effect, a disposition not to dismiss someone’s struggle for a comprehensive
expression of a social experience as “due... to its being a nonsense or her being a fool”
and remaining sensitive to the possibility that “the speaker is struggling with an objective
difficulty and not a subjective failing.”282 Those who are hermeneutically just will
respond to this struggle for expression or faltering attempts at communication not by
attempting to provide suggested formulations to the speaker but by attempting to
“generate a more inclusive hermeneutical micro-climate through the appropriate kind of
dialogue with the speaker.”283 This is not an entirely silent role, but it is not characterized
primarily by the act of speaking since it is not the hearer who is privy to the tacit
knowledge that the speaker is labouring to explicate. It is, rather, characterized by “a
more pro-active and more socially aware kind of listening than is usually required in
more straightforward communicative exchanges.”284 This kind of good listening will
create a space in which the speaker has the opportunity to deliberately and carefully craft
and try out formulations. Good communication will be facilitated by the hearer refraining
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from taking too large a role in the formulation and, instead, offering mostly questions and
tentative interpretations in order to ascertain how well they understand the speaker’s
intent.
It is, of course, not always possible to carve out such a careful and productive microclimate but this does not mean that the virtue of hermeneutical justice is inoperative in
fleeting or distracted encounters. The defining feature of hermeneutic justice is a
presumption that there is a strong possibility that the apparently confused or hazy
accounts of social experience provided by individuals from marginalized groups may be
the result of conceptual obstacles that exist at the level of the social imaginary rather than
only within the speaker’s personal hermeneutical resources. When circumstances do not
permit translating that presumption into the kind of interpersonal space in which the
speaker can either impart to the hearer the conceptual tools that will allow them to
understand the social experience under discussion or in which the hearer comes to some
approximate understanding by a lengthy discussion that makes cautious and judicious use
of the hermeneutical resources already shared by the interlocutors, the presumption of
sensibility on the part of the speaker might simply lead the hearer to withhold
judgement.285 By doing so, the hearer does not make any hasty assessments simply due
to the fact that we are wed to our potentially skewed and flawed epistemic tool-kit, so to
speak, but also does not believe just any old thing that is told to them. In other words,
withholding judgement in hasty situations instead of simply assuming that everything
reported by people from marginalized social groups is the behaviour that best
corresponds to presuming that they are sensible knowers rather than oracles whose
pronouncements, though mysterious to our ears, always proves to be truthful. Moreover,
the withholding of judgement is appropriate given the fact that the interpretations of
social experience provided by members of marginalized social groups will rarely be
monolithic. Since any hearer encountering a sufficient number of speakers within a
particular social group will be given competing interpretations of various social
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phenomena, the hearer must be disposed not to credulity but to honest attempts at
understanding.

5.3 Differentiating the Virtues of Epistemic Justice
There are some similarities between the virtues of testimonial justice and hermeneutic
justice that may make it difficult to distinguish them. Perhaps their most obvious
commonality is the shared “mediate end” of “neutraliz[ing] the impact of structural
identity prejudice on one’s credibility judgement.”286 Furthermore, that shared mediate
end is achieved, in both cases, by developing a sensitivity characterized by “a certain
reflexive awareness on the part of the hearer.”287 They are, however, not identical virtues,
nominally distinguishing the same corrective disposition as applied to different effects of
prejudice. Rather, they are discrete dispositions or sets of dispositions. It is easiest to
draw this out by considering whether these two virtues could, at least in theory, be prised
apart.288
Let us suppose that a hearer is testimonially just and, as a result, never discounts the
credibility of a speaker simply because that speaker bears a perceived marker of some
particular social identity. The hearer, then, may discount the credibility of a speaker’s
testimony but never because that speaker is, say, a woman, disabled, or working class.
Despite such a perfect display of the virtue of testimonial justice, the hearer could
nevertheless fail to display the virtue of hermeneutic justice. In cases where someone
from a hermeneutically marginalized social group attempts to convey something novel to
the hearer, they may fail to believe them simply because they assume that commonplace
conceptual resources are adequate for understanding all social dynamics. Imagine, for
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example, that prior to the existence of the notion of sexual harassment in the collective
hermeneutical resources a male hearer is told by a female work colleague that the boss’s
ostensibly playful and flirtatious behaviour really constitutes the far graver conduct that
we now term sexual harassment. The hearer may dismiss this report as entirely
implausible because it is ill-fitting with the worldview sustained and promoted by the
collective hermeneutical resources. Crucially, however, he does not dismiss the report or
discount its credibility because its source is a woman or because of any prejudices he
harbours about women. We can further suppose that he would give equally flimsy weight
to the report had it been delivered to him by a worried male colleague. In such a case, we
have a hearer displaying perfect testimonial justice while failing to display the kind of
sensitivity characteristic of hermeneutical justice.
We can further prise apart the two virtues by revising the example to show how someone
could display hermeneutical justice while being testimonially unjust. Suppose, again, that
a work colleague is attempting to get our pre-1970’s male hearer to understand that the
behaviour of their boss constitutes sexual harassment rather than innocent flirtation. In
this case, however, the hearer is a good listener who, when confronted with another’s
attempts at making something intelligible, will keep an open mind and allow them the
time and attention required to make an honest attempt at understanding them. Our hearer
does just this with the report of sexual harassment, and tries as best as he can to
understand what is being conveyed to him by his colleague. In other words, he displays
the virtue of hermeneutic justice. Suppose, however, that he is disposed to take little, if
any, corrective action with regard to the identity prejudices that colour his perception of
others. After making an honest attempt at understanding what his colleague wishes to
convey to him, he nevertheless discounts her testimony, not because he has failed to
listen to her or because he failed to realize that there is a possibility that she is working
with inadequate conceptual resources, but because his prejudicial attitudes and
stereotypical beliefs concerning women lead him to discount her testimony. Unlike the
former case, our hearer will lend an honest ear to the speaker but will judge the testimony
they provide more credible if the work colleague raising the concern is a man rather than
a woman. Here, then, we have a case in which the hearer displays the virtue of
hermeneutic justice while also displaying the vice of testimonial injustice.
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Both of the epistemic virtues Fricker discusses are concerned with remedying the effects
of identity prejudice on our perception and assessment of others. As the examples
discussed in the two previous paragraphs highlight, however, the virtue of testimonial
justice concerns itself primarily with the proximate effects of identity prejudice—the way
that those prejudices are likely affecting the way the hearer sizes up the speaker—while
hermeneutic justice concerns itself primarily with its distal effects—those conceptual
lacunae that are caused by a long-term marginalization and that can remain in play even
if none of the parties in the communicative act hold, even implicitly, the relevant
prejudices. This distinction can help us come to a clearer picture of the particular
dispositions that enable individuals to act according to these two forms of epistemic
justice. Both virtues are characterized in part by a reflexivity, that is, a critical awareness
of our social location and its relation to that of our interlocutors, along with some notion
of the kinds of stereotyping and marginalization associated with various social dynamics.
As we saw above, since testimonial justice is a corrective to the proximate acts of identity
prejudice that we might be committing in discursive exchanges, its reflexive character is
paired with a reflective disposition that promotes an introspective consideration of our
own contribution to epistemic wrongs and encourages us to remedy them. Since
hermeneutic justice is concerned with the distal effects of identity prejudice rather than
the ones that the interlocutors bring to the table, its focus will be not on the skewed
perspective of the hearer but on the difficult situation that the struggling speaker finds
themselves in. Introspection will do little to counter the conceptual roadblocks that arise
from hermeneutically unjust situations; they will remain present whether or not I am
prejudiced. As such, the reflexivity of hermeneutic justice will not be paired with the kind
of reflection that is a central feature of testimonial justice but, rather, with a disposition to
be attentive to the speaker. It is by a disposition to this kind of attentiveness that the
hearer helps carve out a discursive space in which either an adequate formulation, or at
least an approximation of one, can be produced.

5.4 Summary of the Virtues of Cognizing
We began with the broad concept of the virtues of cognizing. Through Fricker’s work, we
added precision by sub-dividing it further into the two categories of virtues corrective of
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testimonial injustice and virtues corrective of hermeneutical injustice. Finally, my
analysis of these two sets of virtues has yielded and named a trio of particular
dispositions that form at least part of the virtues of cognizing, namely, reflexivity,
reflectivity, and attentiveness. There are undoubtedly more—and it is not evident to me
whether the reflexivity in both sets of virtues is the same disposition paired with a
different one or whether it admits of further sub-division—but insofar as these three are
correctives to some of the epistemic effects of identity-prejudicial judgements and
hermeneutic marginalization they serve as important corner-stones for the proper
recognition of others.
While my analysis has provided something of a small taxonomy, this is not only meant to
be a lexicographical exercise of simply spelling out our shared definition of a concept.
Cognizing is a concept that is at once more capacious than I have treated it but also more
nebulous, so that it could admit, in the hands of other theorists, virtues and concepts that I
do not wish to attribute to it. This is a feature of virtues in general: we all agree that
justice and courage are virtuous traits but when we set ourselves to the task of explicating
them we often come to figurative blows over exactly what counts as just or courageous
action. Yet there is also a practical purpose to this analytical exercise: specifying more
precisely the individual dispositions involved in properly cognizing others gives us
something of a preliminary guide to the habits we should strive to develop in order to
better ensure the acquisition and exercise of the virtues of recognition.
Identifying and giving some definition to the virtues of reflexivity, reflectivity, and
attentiveness has made the concept of the virtues of recognition more concrete. As I
mentioned earlier, however, recognition can be understood as having two movements:
cognizing and recognizing. We cannot, then, have a proper grasp of the virtues of
recognition without knowing something about the virtues of recognizing. I conclude,
then, in Chapter Six with a discussion of three of these virtues, namely, epistemic
temperance, deference guided by humility, and a moralized account of etiquette.
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Chapter 5

6

Recognition III: The Virtues of Recognizing

Now that I have said something about acts of cognizing and the virtues that best dispose
us to engage in them more frequently and with greater success, I must now deal with the
other movement of recognition, namely, recognizing. While cognizing is a kind of
glimpse into another’s experience of the world—whether through their behaviour, their
testimony, or the laborious process of cooperative description and definition—
recognizing is the communication of that act of cognizing to the recipient of recognition.
It is, in other words, the public expression of its private counterpart and what turns
cognition into recognition.
Cognizing is crucial but by itself it is not sufficient for my purpose of identifying the
virtues conducive to recognition (understood as the corroboration of another’s experience
of the world) since recognition is only achieved when there is an awareness of having
been recognized. We are, after all, beings who have a far more fundamental need to be
recognized by others than to grant recognition to others, as Chapter Three’s discussion of
the effects of solitary confinement have made clear. As such, this chapter will present two
sets of virtues that are concerned with the communication of our private acts of
cognizing. I set aside for now the virtues that are more obviously associated with
broadcasting our uptake of another’s experience or perspective, such as the courage to tell
someone, in clear and direct propositions, that we have acknowledged their way of
experiencing things. I do so partly for considerations of space and partly because these
overt declarations are a comparatively rare medium for communicating our uptake, but
also because a discussion of the subtler forms of recognizing will give the reader a better
sense of just what recognizing is and how it is exercised in ordinary interactions. I will
restrict my discussion of the virtues of recognizing, then, to those associated with Cynthia
Townley’s concept of “epistemophilia” and those inspired by Amy Olberding’s
moralized, neo-Confucian account of etiquette. As with the virtues discussed in the
previous chapter, these will be by no means exhaustive but I take them to be paradigmatic
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insofar as they concern the most common acts of recognizing: the subtle and often
unstated ones that infuse our ordinary conduct.

6.1 Simple Ignorance and Epistemophilia
The discussion of hermeneutic injustice in the previous chapter touched on a kind of
ignorance, specifically, a failure or inability to understand something because the
marginalization of certain groups of people have left gaps in collective epistemic
resources. This section will focus, instead, on a much more innocent kind of ignorance,
one that that is neither willful nor the result of identity prejudice. This is the kind of
ignorance Cynthia Townley calls “simple ignorance,” an ignorance that, unlike its more
insidious or wicked counterparts, consists of simple lack of knowledge, of merely not
knowing. Far from a sign of bad character, it is simply part of our lot as finite beings. On
its surface, this may seem like a topic with little relevance to the virtues of recognition.
There is ordinarily nothing vicious—or even virtuous, for that matter—about the way
simple ignorance accumulates in us; we simply cannot know everything. Yet the concept
is relevant to the discussion of recognition because there are good and bad ways of
managing our ignorance, and it is in its management that we can either communicate or
fail to convey to others our recognition of them.
Townley makes the striking and counter-intuitive claim that responsible epistemic
practices do not always aim at reducing the knower’s ignorance. Rather, she contends
that “global devaluation of ignorance should be resisted,” since some forms of ignorance
“contribute[ ] positively to epistemic responsibility and a lack of knowledge is not
necessarily a regrettable epistemic flaw.”289 One reason for this is that some forms of
ignorance have instrumental epistemic value. For instance, a teacher may withhold the
answer to a question or solution to a problem from a student as a pedagogical exercise
aimed at encouraging the student to discover the answer or work out the solution on their
own. Scientists may also employ instrumental ignorance when they create “double-blind”
experiments or drug trials that involve temporarily shrouding some features of the study
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to the participants and researchers alike in order to decrease bias and improve the
likelihood that the experimental results and the conclusions drawn from them are sound.
Interestingly, Townley also lists Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” as an example of this kind of
instrumental ignorance, since those who make this thought experiment part of their
political or moral methodology do so in an attempt to gain new knowledge by creating
cognitive conditions meant to bring about “insights similar to an outsider’s view of a
family, culture, or institution.”290 These examples render uncontroversial Townley’s
claim that ignorance is not always an epistemic flaw. As she notes, these kinds of
ignorance-generating practices are those that even an epistemophiliac could endorse since
they employ ignorance that is either of a small magnitude or that remains with us only
temporarily in order to build an overall greater store of knowledge.
The epistemophiliac will not be so eager to endorse the other kind of epistemically
responsible practices of withheld knowing, those that involve the generation or
maintenance of non-instrumental ignorance. While ignorance is (epistemically)
instrumental when put in the service of knowledge-gathering, it is non-instrumental when
we deliberately refrain from knowing as “part of inherently valuable epistemic
relationships.”291 The instrumental use of ignorance cannot serve as a proper substitute
for the role its non-instrumental counterpart plays in allowing and sustaining these kinds
of relationships since those seeking only to bolster their store of knowledge will take a
“spectator/collector” stance toward other individuals, treating them merely as epistemic
instruments.292 This is the epistemic stance that is characteristic of the knowledgegathering enterprises of science, bureaucracies, and colonial administrations.293 Noninstrumental forms of ignorance differ from this insofar as they are characterized by
treating others as epistemic agents. Townley’s two primary examples of relationship
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types supported by non-instrumental ignorance are those of trust and those that involve
what she calls “epistemically responsible empath[y].”294
As I will show in my discussion of each of these types of non-instrumental albeit
valuable ignorance (in Sections 1.a and 1.b), epistemophilia is a disposition that tends to
impede rather than encourage recognition (it may also corrode the good function of the
social group, but since my purpose here is to begin mapping out the virtues of
recognition, that is a discussion for another day). As such, it qualifies as a vice on the
natural goodness model. Specifying just what makes it vicious will allow me to identify
the virtues that lie at the mean between the extremes of epistemophilia and a disregard for
truth, namely, epistemic temperance, humility, and deference.
6.1.a. Ignorance and Trust
Relationships of trust, such as friendship,295 require a certain amount of ignorance. As
Townley states, “[i]f I insist on investigating to confirm or corroborate what you tell me,
you might rightly accuse me of not trusting you.”296 Nor is trust upheld if I believe what
the trusted person tells me only if it corresponds to what I already know or conforms to
my intuitions about the relevant subject. The epistemophiliac’s violation of trust can be
understood as a sub-set of what Heather Battaly calls the vice of epistemic selfindulgence. Battaly models this vice on Aristotle’s account of moral self-indulgence—the
vice of deviating from temperance by seeking out excessive or inappropriate bodily
pleasures. Correspondingly, the epistemically self-indulgent person can run afoul of
epistemic temperance in one of three ways: such a person either
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(ES1) desires, consumes, and enjoys appropriate and inappropriate epistemic
objects; or (ES2) desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic objects at
appropriate and inappropriate times; or (ES3) desires, consumes, and enjoys
epistemic objects too frequently, or to an inappropriately high degree, or
consumes too much of them.297
Epistemophilia in the context of would-be trusting relationships can best be understood in
terms of ES2 and ES3. While it seems, on its surface, that ES1 could explain a
breakdown of trust, Battaly’s account of what makes an epistemic object appropriate or
inappropriate shows that it is a distinction irrelevant to trusting relationships.
Battaly considers but rejects two candidates for the inappropriate epistemic objects that
characterize ES1.298 The first are theoretical truths that have no practical use. It is
certainly possible to pursue these in excess—we need only think of Thales tripping into a
well while gazing up at the heavens—however, Battaly maintains that this excess is not
epistemically inappropriate, but only pragmatically so. Her second rejected candidate is
the pursuit of knowledge that is harmful rather than helpful, such as nurturing an interest
in biology by acquiring the knowledge required to construct biological weapons rather
than the knowledge required to practice medicine. Here, as with the head-in-the-clouds
theorist, there is something worrisome about the knowledge that is being consumed, but,
again, not because there is something epistemically inappropriate about it—qua
knowledge, there is nothing untoward about biological facts, no matter what practices
they are associated with. Instead, what is troubling about the pursuit of knowledge
required to construct biological weapons is that it is part of a larger course of action that
is itself vicious (assuming that the knowledge is acquired in order to aid in producing
such weapons and not with the aim of discovering some way to identify, disarm, and
dispose of them).299
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Having eliminated prima facie plausible candidates for inappropriate epistemic objects by
separating off their moral and pragmatic features from their epistemic ones, Battaly
proposes a distinction that focuses squarely on the epistemic appropriateness of
knowledge, namely, one between trivial truths and important truths. She does not provide
us with a way of distinguishing between the two, save to note that the distinction has
intuitive force and that we can presume that some truths, such as those of science, “will
actively contribute to valuable epistemic ends,”300 whatever those may be. It is no vice,
of course, to pursue trivia. As is the case with the bodily pleasures kept in line by moral
temperance, trivial knowledge has its place in the life of an epistemically temperate
person. What makes the consumption of trivial truths epistemically self-indulgent is the
pursuit of them without moderation. The epistemically temperate individual does not
have to abstain from learning detailed hockey statistics, memorizing the release dates of
Frank Sinatra’s studio albums, or satisfying their curiosity about the red carpet attire of
celebrities. To be epistemically temperate, however, is to approach these sorts of things
as “epistemic treats”301 and not let them serve as our primary source of intellectual
nourishment. ES1, then, is a form of epistemic self-indulgence that consists of overvaluing truths about trivial matters. We do not need to delve further into this issue and
formulate an account that allows us to identify just what sorts of knowledge counts as
important or trivial; it suffices to note that the kind of epistemophilia that quests after
trivia is not the kind that will shut someone off from potential trusting relationships. In
fact, a relationship may even be strengthened, without detriment to its level of trust, by
bonding over joint trivial pursuits, such as knowing the dining habits of past Canadian
Prime Ministers.
Considering the irrelevance of ES1 to trust shows that if epistemic self-indulgence plays
a role in dismantling trust it will not be because it encourages epistemically inappropriate
behaviour but because of the pragmatically or morally inappropriate conduct that arises
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from the epistemophile’s consummate distaste for ignorance. It is this kind of conduct
that is captured by ES2 and ES3.
An epistemically self-indulgent person who “desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic
objects at appropriate and inappropriate times,”302 regardless of whether they are trivial
or important, displays epistemic self-indulgence of the ES2 type. This kind of selfindulgence could tarnish relationships of trust, since it can manifest itself as tactless
social conduct or disregard for the interlocutor’s needs and desires, which might cause
others to hesitate when deciding whether to place their trust in the epistemophile. If, for
example, I am in distress after nearly being run over by a car and I seek some comfort or
reassurance by telling someone what has just happened to me but they interrupt my story
to run to their laptop because something I have just said made them curious about when it
is grammatically appropriate to use “lay” instead of “lie,” I may conclude that this person
doesn’t care enough about me not to betray me should the opportunity arise. More
directly, ES2 can be ruinous to trusting relationships by disposing the epistemophile to
refuse to simply believe someone—to take them at their word—at a time when doing so
would be of the utmost importance to them. After all, the trust another places in us is not
likely to remain strong if they come to us for support when others refuse to believe them
and we respond with skepticism or an insistence on verifying their claims.
Epistemic self-indulge of the ES3 type, since it is also a pragmatic violation, is similar to
ES2. It concerns the self-indulgent person who “desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic
objects too frequently, or to an inappropriately high degree, or consumes too much of
them.”303 While there is no reason to suppose that a person possessed of an ardent
intellectual curiosity would not be able to enter into trusting relationships, a person whose
epistemic self-indulgence leads them to constantly seek confirmation of an interlocutor’s
claims is unlikely to come across as trusting them. This example might seem to make
ES3 shade into ES2 a bit—like the case of ES2 discussed in the previous paragraph, the
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violation of trust results from seeking confirmation of the truth of speaker’s claims—but,
unlike conduct displaying ES2, ES3 self-indulgence does not have to involve poorlytimed quests for evidence. A relationship of trust could break down if the epistemophile
seeks confirmations from the speaker that, on their own, are perfectly harmless and
appropriate, but whose accumulation makes them so frequent that they betray the belief
that the speaker is trustworthy.
Maintaining trusting relationships, then, requires a virtue to counteract the tendency to
the vice of (ES2 and ES3) epistemophilia, an epistemically temperate—or, at least,
enkratic (strong-willed) or not overly akratic (weak-willed)—disposition that, unlike its
vicious counterpart, is conducive to recognition. As we saw, the epistemophile prevents
the formation and sustenance of trusting relationships by refusing to abide the kinds of
non-instrumental ignorance relevant to establishing and maintaining trust. In doing so,
they squander opportunities to perform acts of recognizing. It is within the context of
trusting relationships, after all, that our cognizing can be communicated most frequently
and with a greater likelihood of success. In most acts of recognizing, especially those
involving subtle communicative acts and cues, there is the potential for
miscommunication due to attributional ambiguity, that is, uncertainty about the motives
behind another’s words or actions. Rachel McKinnon illustrates this phenomenon with
her experience going through airport security:
I’m told that I’ve been selected for a random search. I select the pat-down
(not wanting a full body scan), and before being taken to the private room,
I’m asked if my gender is female. Now, did the employee do that because she
suspects that I’m a trans woman, or was asking the question standard
operating procedure? (All of my identification lists “female” as my
sex/gender). At the time, it was unclear.304
Another one of her examples—one less propositional and institutional—concerns a site
of heightened stereotype threat for trans women, namely, public washrooms. The trans
woman in a public washroom might notice a “nasty look” directed at her from a
cisgender woman and face an interpretive hurdle: “Was [it] because she’s jealous of what
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the (trans) woman looks like, or is it because she’s ‘clocked’ the (trans) woman as a trans
woman? It’s ambiguous.”305 Attributional ambiguity, moreover, not only makes the
evaluation of another’s motives more tentative but they often heighten our estimation of
the probability that the motives are negative, especially when we are aware of prevalent
negative stereotypes that might influence these motives. As McKinnon notes, in scenarios
such as these “the possibility of a less positive cause pollutes the possibility of the more
positive one.” 306 This polluting of the assessment of motives is an impediment to
recognition, since acts of recognizing—of communicating uptake or corroboration of
another’s experience—may themselves be attributionally ambiguous and, as such, can
easily be misinterpreted and discounted by the hearer. Relationships of trust, however,
can attenuate such ambiguities. Genuine trust moves us to err on the side of a more
generous or positive interpretation of the speaker’s motives—an option that is available,
but not always prudent, wise, or even psychologically possible when dealing with notyet-trusted acquaintances. Even if the forms of expression are the same in both cases, we
are likely to assume that a trusted friend is reacting with sincere uptake and
understanding when we would worry that an acquaintance might only be engaging in
polite but feigned agreement, masking their disbelief in order to smooth social
intercourse or as a way of “picking their battles” to avoid the trouble of a potential
quarrel. Trusting relationships, then, allow not only a greater frequency of
communicative acts associated with recognition but enable them to be far more likely to
succeed than they would in the absence of trust.
We have, in this discussion, cast some light upon another virtue associated with
recognition. The epistemophile, as we have just seen, in disvaluing ignorance so
thoroughly that they engage in epistemic self-indulgence, cuts off their potential to form
bonds of trust with various other people. This inability to create and sustain trusting
relationships is, in turn, a squandering of countless opportunities to grant recognition to
others by gestures of recognizing that are both momentous and miniscule, overt and
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restrained. Epistemic temperance, especially in its more pragmatic guise, then, is one of
the virtues of recognition.307 We can add further precision by spelling out the two types
of temperance—ET2 and ET3—that correspond to ES2 and ES3 epistemic selfindulgence in Battaly’s analysis. The person who is epistemically temperate in ways that
are relevant to the formation and maintenance of trusting relationships, and, by extension,
relevant to recognition “(ET2) desires, consumes, and enjoys [epistemic objects] only at
appropriate times; and (ET3) desires, consumes, and enjoys them only to the appropriate
amount and degree and with the appropriate frequency.” 308 The ET2 and ET3
epistemically temperate person, then, is disposed not to recoil at all forms of ignorance
but is comfortable with abstaining from the type and amount of knowledge that would bar
them from the good of friendship grounded in trust.
6.1.b. Ignorance and Epistemically Responsible Empathy
The epistemophile’s interpersonal troubles do not end with their difficulties forming
relationships of trust. They cut themselves off from another non-instrumentally valuable
form of ignorance, one that Townley characterizes as an “epistemically responsible
empath[y].”309 This is not the affective type of empathy, that characteristic of, say, caregiving or intimate relationships. It is, rather, empathy as a tendency to “see the other as a
knower with her own perspective, one that I have to strive (and might fail) to
appreciate.”310 This kind of empathy is epistemically responsible because it is
constitutive of the participatory stance that is required when engaging in co-operative
epistemic endeavours, especially with other knowers who occupy saliently different
social locations than our own. Epistemically responsible empathy, then, requires
sensitivity to situatedness, both of our own particular social and epistemic location and of
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the distance, if any, between it and that of our epistemic collaborator’s. The
acknowledgement of that distance should—barring the “epistemic vice of arrogance…
[of] taking my own (superior) status for granted”311—entail an acknowledgement that we
will require significant input from the perspectives of others to fully gain the
understanding we are seeking, along with the corresponding behaviour toward them as
co-inquirers as opposed to instrumental objects of study or storehouses of information.
This will be the case for technical or scholarly endeavours—I can, for instance, pore over
Plato’s dialogues ad nauseum on my own but my understanding of the texts will be
enriched considerably by getting my more literarily-minded colleague’s take on them—
but it will be especially important for understanding various features of our social
environment. The distance between the different social locations we inhabit can never be
fully remedied; it is a space that cannot fully be bridged. Even if I gain a rather
sophisticated understanding of gendered, racialized, or class-based social dynamics from
my empathetic engagement with differently-situated people, my inability to wholly
inhabit their social position, and, hence, to have a vantage point from which to perfectly
replicate their particular perspective, means that I will likely still require their input. After
all, what we gain from our epistemic collaboration with differently-situated others is not a
new perspective we can occupy—although we may, in our unguarded moments, speak of
it in such terms. Rather, what we gain is a new set of interpretations that are highly
unlikely to have occurred to us. To be sure, these interpretations can serve us well, and
we can employ them to read many social dynamics with a newfound savviness. That they
are merely interpretations, however, will especially be clear to us when novel situations
or questions arise. My mind may be well-furnished with interpretations related to, say,
race, gender, and ability but I might still find myself unmoored when encountering
Rachel Dolezal’s assertion that she is trans-racial312 or the concept of transdisability, that
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is, “[b]ecoming disabled by choice, not chance,” as a National Post headline put it.313
When we encounter such concepts, testimonies, and reports for the first time, our wellworn and normally useful interpretations might fall short or become intensely tentative
and we will require fresh collaborative efforts in order to gain proper understanding of
and insight into these matters.
Both forms of non-instrumental ignorance discussed by Townley (those related to trust
and those related to epistemically responsible empathy) involve certain epistemic
restraints, but we should not let this mask an important difference between them. As we
saw above, the virtue involved in the maintenance of trusting relationships is an epistemic
temperance concerning the frequency and timing of our attempts to confirm and
corroborate the claims made by an ostensibly trusted individual. It is important to note,
however, that epistemic temperance is concerned solely with the desire for and
consumption of epistemic objects and, as such, is perfectly compatible with a negative
assessment of the character or intellectual traits of the person to whom trust is granted. I
can, in other words, be motivated to maintain a trusting relationship with someone
without believing them to be trustworthy. We might, for instance, exercise epistemic
temperance in order to keep a smooth relationship with our spouse, to ensure that our
friend does not decline our future lunch invitations, or to attempt to remain on good terms
with our children in the hope that they will keep in touch with us once they move out of
our home. We might also engage in therapeutic trust, which H.J.N. Horsburgh defines as
“trust which aims at increasing the trustworthiness of those in whom it is reposed.”314
This is analogous to attempting to encourage someone to become a responsible person,315
which can only succeed by giving responsibilities to someone who has, presumably, not
yet proven themselves to be reliable in discharging them. Likewise, therapeutic trust has
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the peculiar feature that we exhibit some degree of trust in another by deliberately
maintaining a certain degree of ignorance—that is, we do not check up on their assertion
that they, for example, did not throw a party during our absence, are no longer
corresponding with an ex-lover, or cheating on their homework—not because we believe
them to be trustworthy but precisely because we believe them to lack this characteristic
and wish to encourage its development. Therapeutic trust, like the encouragement to
responsibility, fosters its desired outcome in two separate but related ways. It involves,
first, giving the person who is trusted some space to exhibit trustworthiness. The
forbearance of the trusting person gives the one who is trusted an opportunity to make the
decisions that a trustworthy person would make and, in doing so, begins to form the
habits that will eventually bloom into genuine trustworthiness. Secondly, this forbearance
not only provides the opportunity for trustworthy behaviour, but functions as a kind of
moral appeal.316 Put simply, imparting trust on someone will function as a sort of call to
live up to that trust—the very fact, for example, that my father has trusted me to take care
of his house and pets while he is away, despite my spotty record in fulfilling such tasks,
will be, if I am not entirely insensitive to such things, one of the reasons that moves me to
take proper care of them.
The cases of relationship maintenance and therapeutic trust just discussed involve the
acquisition of certain goods through the display of trusting behaviour facilitated by
epistemic temperance, not because of but despite the character traits of those for whose
sakes the temperance was exercised. It is a wholly other matter, however, with
epistemically responsible empathy. Showing this kind of empathy toward someone
involves setting aside some of our epistemophilic tendencies, but refraining from
consuming certain epistemic objects (or doing so at the wrong times or with too great a
frequency), as an (ET2 and ET3) epistemically temperate person would, will not be
sufficient. Unlike the maintenance of trust, which does not require a positive assessment
of the trusted person’s relevant character traits, epistemically responsible empathy
involves an acknowledgement of another’s epistemic agency, especially an awareness of
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their epistemic authority relative to us. Of course, having this kind of empathy does
require us to practice abstinence from certain epistemic objects—persistent checking on
another’s claims is a problem here too, since it betrays a lack of confidence in the other
knower’s epistemic authority—it also requires an awareness of our own epistemic
limitations and of the epistemic advantages that particular others have over us, and it is
this acquiescence to the authority of another that is characteristic of epistemically
responsible empathy and that facilitates co-operative epistemic endeavours.
Townley names two epistemic virtues that are relevant to the proper acknowledgement of
these epistemic limitations and for engaging with differently-situated others as full
epistemic agents: humility and deference.317 These are very plausible candidates;
however, she labels these traits but leaves them undefined. Humility and deference are
concepts that carry a number of connotations and can be used to denote a number of
different character traits. Defining their contours, then, and distinguishing them from
various other traits that share the same name is no simple matter. Still, so that we will
have a better idea of what the virtues of recognizing might look like in practice, I will
make a brief attempt at it, keeping in mind the fact that they should be, as discussed in the
previous paragraph, concerned with the relative epistemic authority of different epistemic
collaborators concerning particular subject-matter.
Epistemic humility strikes me as a more cognitive disposition, while epistemic deference
seems a more behavioural one. To be epistemically humble is to properly understand our
place in a community of knowers, or at least some reasonable approximation of it. It is
not humility as a form of self-abasement, exhibited by holding an unwarrantedly low
opinion of our intellectual authority. Humility so understood, in fact, marks out what is
actually a vice in the context of epistemic collaborations. The appeal of the notion that
humility is a virtue of abasement—setting aside for a moment its Abrahamic heritage—
likely results from the fact that its most evident and bothersome corresponding vice is
arrogance, which is remedied most conspicuously by lowering our assessments of our
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talents, skills, and wisdom in an exaggerated fashion. This kind of conspicuous underestimation of oneself is, however, itself a vice. When it comes to co-operative epistemic
projects, it matters that we make good collaborators and this will involve acknowledging
and making use of our strengths and our acquired knowledge rather than masking them.
Humility, then, is, properly understood, a disposition to accurately assess our intellectual
and epistemic qualities, as well as the roles that we are best suited to play and tasks we
are best suited to perform on account of these qualities.318
If humility is understood simply as non-overestimation of one’s epistemic qualities, then
it would be odd to pair it with deference if it is understood as a heedless capitulation in
the face of any challenge to our intellectual authority. It should, instead, be seen as the
behavioural counterpart to humility as non-overestimation. To be deferential in the
epistemically virtuous sense, then, will be to cede to the authority of others when it is
warranted rather than take on a superior role no matter our place in the community of
knowers and to listen attentively to those with expertise that we lack rather than ignoring
them in order to rely solely on our own inadequate resources.
To characterize virtuous deference simply as the behavioural counterpart of humility,
however, may seem to render it superfluous. After all, if we already have attained
humility, there might be little need of a virtue that simply seems to grow directly out of
that humility. While it is true that virtuous deference grows directly from humility, it
nevertheless earns its place since non-overestimation of one’s talents and abilities can
often prove to be fallow soil. Someone might, after all, perfectly well recognize their own
standing within a group of epistemic collaborators and have a Socratic awareness of the
limits of their own knowledge, yet still try to overplay their authority or overstate their
expertise because they enjoy the heady feeling of taking charge, or want to shore up their
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reputation as a learned and insightful person, or seek to protect their social privilege or
some status quo by overpowering the perspectives and opinions of marginalized others.
We must be careful here not to let the popular connotations associated with humility lead
us astray. It is true that this non-deference sounds like a far cry from the conduct of a
humble person, but the kind of thrill-, reputation-, or privilege-seeking non-deference is
entirely compatible with humility defined simply as the cognitive non-overestimation of
one’s talents and abilities.
Virtuous deference, then, far from being superfluous, is an essential component of
epistemically responsible empathy and, as such, essential to acts of recognizing. As we
saw in previous chapters, recognition, as I am using the term, is a matter of corroborating
the experience of another or, what is perhaps more important in this context,
acknowledging the plausibility of their interpretation of the world. It is through virtuous
deference that we signal to others our acknowledgment of their epistemic authority and
communicate to them that their perception of the world is respected and not dismissed out
of hand. Deference guided by humility, then, is a trait conducive to the recognition of
others and is, therefore, one of the virtues of recognition.

6.2 Etiquette as Virtue
I will end my list of some of the virtues of recognition with a very brief discussion of a
virtue that lies outside the Aristotelian tradition—that lays, in fact, outside the Western
tradition entirely—but that is not without precedent in it. The virtue is that of etiquette, as
defended by the neo-Confucian scholar Amy Olberding. Although I am transplanting it
form the Confucian tradition into the Aristotelian one, it will prove a comfortable fit,
especially once neo-Aristotelianism has been updated in light of concerns for
interpersonal recognition.
Olberding advocates for moral philosophy that is not focused only on momentous moral
dilemmas—what Joel Kupperman calls “big moment ethics”319—but on a concern with
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etiquette, with the moral quality of the details of our everyday comportment. She takes
her cue from the early Confucian philosophers, especially their concept of li. Although
she notes that li is standardly translated “ritual,” that term does not quite capture its otherdirectedness—at least not for contemporary Western moral philosophers who are not
versed in Confucianism. “Etiquette” itself is inadequate, since the concept that she
articulates runs together etiquette and manners, which are treated as distinct by “[b]oth
popular etiquette writers… and ethicists advocating the inclusion of manners in moral
discourse.”320 Manners is the set of “constant and universal”321 principles of respectful
conduct which serves as the foundation for etiquette, that is, for the particular social
conventions through which manners are expressed. It is, for example, a principle of
manners that we show respect to those to whom we are introduced, but whether or not
this respect is signalled by removing one’s hat and offering a handshake is a conventional
matter that falls under the province of etiquette. Olberding, however, runs the two
concepts together under the single heading of “etiquette” in order to capture the fact that
li involves the performance of conventionally mandated social conduct but not in a
merely formulaic manner. Rather, the social rituals observed fall under the category of li
only if their observance is an embodiment of the principles of manners. While we can, in
other words, fulfill the demands of etiquette by simply going through the motions, it will
not constitute li, or the analogous moralized sense of etiquette, unless “both emotion and
form are fully realized.”322
The performance of etiquette as a virtue, then, consists of an attentiveness to the small
gestures we perform daily, with a sensitivity concerning to whom and in what contexts
we perform them. It is a habituation of our movements, modes of address, and even,
when relevant, modes of dress that signal the respect we owe to others. Part of
Olberding’s rationale for this moralized notion of etiquette appeals directly to the need
for recognizing others, that is, for communicating recognition to them. As she points out,
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People generally do care about how the prosaic interactions of ordinary
shared life transpire. Whether we feel ourselves respected, our dignity
recognized, and so forth will often have far more to do with such interactions
than with whether our social partners abstain from sharply injurious
conduct… the felt contours of moral experience—our sense of whether we
are valued and valuable as human beings, our capacity to develop and
maintain secure moral community—will derive more from the mundane
acknowledgments and subtle social signaling that infuses human
interaction.323
These acts of recognition in the form of signaling of respect to others is also relevant to
recognizing as I have understood it in this chapter, as the communication to others of our
uptake and corroboration of their experience of the world. This is so in at least two ways.
First, the hearer’s acts of etiquette signal a respect toward the speaker that aids in opening
and maintaining a line of communication with them. If the speaker does not perceive us
as someone who respects them, they have little incentive to share with us their reports or
testimony of their experiences, nor are they likely to seek uptake and corroboration from
us. As is the case with an inability to build relationships of trust, lack of etiquette
decreases our opportunities for recognizing by impeding the formation of the kinds of
relationships in which recognizing can occur. Second, etiquette reduces the odds of
unclear communication that result from the attributive ambiguity discussed in the
previous section. As we saw above, acts of recognizing can misfire when the motives
behind our conduct are unclear. Etiquette is relevant here, too, since failing to signal our
respect for someone is likely to increase their assessment of the probability that our
ambiguous conduct is the product of bad motives or indifference toward them. Our
motives are rarely as transparent as we would like them to be and deviating from
etiquette can lead to the miscommunication of our good intentions. I may, for instance,
mean nothing untoward by violating the injunction to don solemn attire at funerals by
attending one wearing neon green bicycle shorts, but unless I have some compelling
reason to do so—perhaps it is known that the deceased had a fondness for tacky dress and
everyone has been asked to wear eye-popping colours—the potential for
miscommunicating my good intentions, even if I loudly and emphatically insist that I
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meant no disrespect, is high. The threat of attributional ambiguity, then, is lessened by
ensuring that our small gestures signal a respect for our interlocutor in a highly legible
way. For these two reasons, the virtues of recognition involve a disposition to be attentive
to the details of our conduct, to the way they register or tend to register with others,324
and to deliberately attempt to change it so that our small gestures communicate what we
wish them to—attempts that will be effortful and stiff at first, but will gradually become
second nature.
The notion of a moralized etiquette inspired by Confucian philosophy may seem an illfitting transplant to an Aristotelian account of virtue. I am, however, not beholden to the
letter, and not even always to the spirit, of all of Aristotle’s claims. So long as this virtue
of etiquette can be understood as one of the products of a conception of natural goodness
that is sensitive to the need for interpersonal recognition, then it can comfortably remain
part of my account of human virtue.
Moreover, such a thing is not so alien to Aristotle’s ethics as might be supposed.
Although Aristotle begins his discourse on particular virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics
with dramatic and grandiose displays of bravery by those who face death on the
battlefield, he soon moves on to far more minute subject matter. Nicomachean Ethics
III.10-12 cautions the student of virtue to neither be gluttonous nor insensitive to the
pleasures of food, while IV.8 advises them to become witty conversationalists while
always refraining from telling offensive jokes. The importance of comportment, however,
is most evident in his discussion of the magnanimous individual, the agent whose virtues
are crowned by that of pride. The magnanimous person is one who “thinks himself
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worthy of great things and is worthy of them,”325 and is especially, or only, concerned
with the “greatest of [external goods]… that which we render to the gods,” namely,
honour.326 Aristotle goes into great detail about what sort of person the honour-worthy
magnanimous individual is, describing the attitudes and character traits they display. 327
He concludes by stating that the magnanimous individual is not only characterized by
their worthiness, their attitude, and their character, but also by their “slow step… deep
voice, and… level utterance” so that we can spot a person who lacks this crowning virtue
by noticing their “excit[ability]… shrill voice and rapid gait.”328 While neo-Aristotelians
would do well to eschew the cartoonish masculinity that underpins the specific features
of Aristotle’s virtuous man—along with, quite frankly, all of Aristotle’s views on the
sexes—it does nevertheless show that the Aristotelian virtuous agent’s morally relevant
traits go beyond those that are employed in making momentous decisions and extend all
the way down to those that govern the minutiae of mundane, everyday conduct.

6.3 Summary of the Virtues of Recognizing
In the previous chapter, I provided the broad outline of an account of the virtues of
cognizing. There, I defended the claim that dispositions to reflexivity, reflectivity, and
attentiveness are important preconditions for ensuring that we engage in reasonably
frequent and reasonably successful acts of cognizing, that is, understanding another’s
experience of the world usually by their verbal reports or by interpreting their reactions to
certain situations. While cognizing is essential to the uptake and corroboration of
another’s experiences, it is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for recognition.
Recognition requires the additional communication of this cognizing—what I have,
adopting Honneth’s terminology, called recognizing—to those who are the objects of our
recognition.
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Recognizing, as I have stressed in this chapter, is partly a matter of explicit, verbal
communication, but is above all enacted in our everyday conduct; our small gestures; and
our prosaic, off-hand remarks. For this reason, the virtues I have chosen to serve as the
contours of a more complete and comprehensive account of the virtues of recognizing are
those that are most salient for these small moments rather than those that motivate us to
make grand declarations or issue repeated, explicit, verbal assurances of our
understanding. Nor is it a purely idiosyncratic preference that leads me to privilege these
virtues above those more magnified ones. They are, I contend, more fundamental insofar
as the grand declarations we make and assurances we give are likely to be taken as
insincere expressions of our motives or perceptions and beliefs about others unless they
are also accompanied by the small gestures that communicate to them the goodness of
our character and the positive inclination of our assessment of them. For this reason, the
virtues of cognizing must be paired with virtues of recognizing. These will, at the very
least, include those that I have defined in this chapter: the epistemic temperance (with
respect to timing and frequency of the consumption of epistemic objects) required to
build and sustain trusting relationships; the humility and deference required to convey to
others some respect for the authority of their epistemic vantage-point, and the (moralized)
etiquette required to signal to others the respect that smooths our acts of recognizing—of
communicating our recognition to others—and increases their odds of succeeding.

6.4 Conclusion: The Virtues of Recognition and a New
Model for the Old Structure
The Natural Goodness theory is one whose boundaries can be pushed in two directions.
There are those who seek to trim off as many of its theoretical appendages and to
discover how slim a theory the Natural Goodness model will tolerate. They may be
drawn to the elegant simplicity of Foot’s model or they may be awed at what a rich
vocabulary of virtues and vices can bloom from so few seeds. Or they may be of a more
particularist bent and believe that if we have justified the value of practical wisdom, we
have firmly anchored our justification for the rest of morality. In other words, they hold,
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like Thoreau, that even the golden rule is “but the best of current silver” and that “[i]t is
golden not to have any rule at all.”329
As should be evident from the culmination, in these last three chapters, of my brief
exploration of the Natural Goodness theory, I am far more inclined to push the theory in
the other direction—to see how far the theoretical apparatus can be expanded. When it
comes to the deep metaphysics of the theory, I have left everything untouched. The
underlying logic of the structure that Foot built remains the solid base from which I
theorize. Following Hursthouse, however, I have tried to explore just how much of virtue
we can formalize. I am not so naïve as to believe that a few explicit principles can neatly
disentangle every conundrum that we face but there are some formalizable features of
good character and good conduct that seem to me not only theoretically defensible, but
utterly undeniable. So, keeping the old structure, I have drafted for it a blueprint for a
new model that pushes the boundaries of the theory a bit further than Hursthouse’s
already capacious account.
I began laying down this foundation and made the case for pursuing the expansion of the
natural goodness model in the first chapter by building onto the conception of human
nature that Hursthouse posits. In the first half of Chapter Two, I responded to Sandler’s
attempts to expand the model of natural normativity by positing various ends
corresponding to rationality. I devoted the second half of that chapter to taking on that
very challenge, arguing against Hursthouse’s dismissal of contemplation as a species end
for rational beings. In Chapter Three, I argued that understanding human social animality
as being a matter of interdependence, affective bond, and causally relational building of
character is to overlook an important but easily missed feature that is, to my knowledge,
unique to our species. As psychological studies and testimony of inmates in long-term
solitary confinement show, we are, unlike other social animals, constitutively relational
insofar as our experience of the external world and even ourselves as having objective,
concrete features is dependent on corroboration from others.
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With the last three chapters, I moved on to the normative side of my project: if we take
seriously the fact that we are constitutively relational beings, what does this entail for the
virtues? I began to answer this in Chapter Four by making the case that constitutively
relational beings need a reasonable amount of recognition, understood as the
corroboration or uptake of our experience, and that, without it, we would be unable to
flourish. Since that is the case, we have to evaluate character traits and dispositions in
light of how conducive they are to fulfilling others’ need for recognition.
I devoted the final two chapters to provide a quick sketch of what sort of virtues become
important if we make relationality and recognition part of our model of natural goodness.
Chapter Five identified reflexivity, reflectivity, and attentiveness as three virtues that are
conducive to cognizing, the first step in recognition. Chapter Six identified three
additional virtues, relevant to the second step in recognition, the communication of our
recognition to others (what I have called recognizing): epistemic temperance, a deference
guided by humility, and a moralized notion of etiquette. Together, these six virtues
provide a preliminary, but by no means complete, picture of the virtues of recognition.
Although adding relationality and recognition to the model of natural goodness, along
with its corresponding virtues, makes the theory somewhat hefty, it does not, I believe,
make it unwieldy. At any rate, no virtue theorist has ever, to my knowledge, been put off
by the vast and seemingly endless vocabulary we have available for virtue and all I have
done is solidified some of the terms in an attempt to make Aristotelian virtue ethics a bit
more concrete.
It is, moreover, my suspicion that the virtues of recognition can be further multiplied and
that the ones I have supplied can admit of further elaboration and specification. It is my
hope that this work will serve as a catalyst for further exploration of the role of
recognition in the virtues, or even renewed attempts at pushing the limits of the Natural
Goodness model. To do so would not be to constrain practical wisdom but to pay tribute
to it by capturing a small sample of its countless manifestations.
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